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PREFACE 
The wider acceptance of the p o l i c y of non-
alignment by majority of countr ies has been the most 
remarkable ev«at In the annals of Internat ional r e l a t i o n s 
s ince the end of the Second World War. The advent of Cold 
War that ensued immediately in the post war period, w i t -
nessed the emergence of m u l t i l a t e r a l and b i l a t e r a l m i l i t a r y 
pac t s or a l l i a n c e s sponsored by the United Sta tes and 
Soviet Union. Both Su^er Powers e s tab l i shed m i l i t a r y a l i i * 
ances in order to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r spheres of in f luence in 
Europe. The North At lant ic Treaty Organization (HATO) was 
e s tab l i shed in 1949 by the Ui i t ed States as i t s leading 
partner. A few years l a t e r the Soviet Union along with 
other a l l i e s of East Europe formed Warsaw Treaty Organisa-
t ion (WTO). 
Both Super Powers adopted various t a c t i c s l i k e 
economic a s s i s tance and m i l i t a r y aid to %fin over newly i n -
dependant coxmtries to the i r r e s p e c t i v e f o l d . 
The conclusion of the Second World War had been 
instrumental in inaugurating the process of deco lon i sa t ion 
leading to the emergence of newly ind^endent c o u n t r i e s in 
Asia and Africa. These newly independent countr i e s who 
have suffered a l o t at the hand of c o l o n i a l powers refused 
to a l l i g n with e i ther of the power b locs and decided to 
k«cp away from the co ld war p o l i t i c s and pxirsued an inde-
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p«Ddflnt foreign pol icy . India gav« a laad to thasa nawly 
lnd«pandant countrlaa In th i s ragard. Jawaharlal Nahru had 
daclarad In Sapt«nbar 1946 that India on achieving Indapan* 
danca %<ould pxiraua an Indapandant foreign policy, and would 
keep away from the power p o l i t i c s of military blocs . 
In March 1947, India hosted an Asian Relations 
Conference ^ I c h was attended by about two dozen countries 
mainly from Asia. This Conference echoed the desire of 
Asian coiintrlas to pursue an Independent foreign policy.The 
attalnmant of Independence by India In August 1947 was 
marked by India's commitment to the policy of keeping away 
from the military blocs . By 1950« Sri Lsnka« Burma, Indo-
nesia and other countries l i k e Afghanistan and Napal also 
asqpressed the desire of not aligning with military bloos 
and reiterated their determination to continue IndepaadaBt 
foreign pol icy . This policy of keeping away from military 
al l iances was kno%in t i l l mid«1950 as ^ e policy of neutra* 
l l t y . 
In l a t e 1950s# the term 'Non->Alignment' gained 
currency and the policy of neutrality In foreign affairs 
and keeping away from military al l iances as pursued by the 
newly Independent countries came to be known as the pol icy 
of non-alignment. The countries practising th i s policy 
came to be known as non-aligned ooxintries. By the begin-
ning of 1960s, the t idal waves of Independence had swapt 
. . . i l l 
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across the African continant «hara about half of tha African 
coxintriea had attained ind<qpandanca. The ntmerical strength 
of the non-aligned countries increased ri4>idly. India« 
Egypt* Indonesia and Yugoslavia being the pioneer non-aligned 
countries held negotiations to convene a s m n i t conference of 
the countries professing and practising ^ e pol icy of non* 
alignment with a view to strengthen the principles of non* 
alignment as an international movement. Prolonged negotia* 
t ions in th i s regard resulted in conveying ^ e First Sunmit 
Conferance of non-aligned countries at Belgrade in Yugoslavia 
in Saptamber 1961. This was the f i r s t time that the ncm-
aligned countries had held a Summit conference. With ^ e 
passage of time« more and more countries joined the non-
aligned movament. There have been eight non-aligned summits 
and the later being held in Harare (Zimbabwe) in Septendber 
1986. The strength of the NAM haa risen to more than 100 
countries. 
There i s voluminous l i t erature available on the 
various aspects of the non-aligned movement however the pre-
sent researcher after scanning through the available materiel 
real i sed that there i s s t i l l a paucity of aerioua academie 
study which could c r i t i c a l l y present ma analytical atudy of 
India's role in the non-aligned movament. The present study 
i s the resul t of th i s thinking. My diseertation i s an analy-
t i ca l study of India's role in the f i r s t two summits of the 
non-aligned movement. 
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The f i r s t chapter of the pr^ssnt study dsals with 
th« theoretical aqpsets of non-aligran«nt such as i t s »««iln9s« 
dist inct ion from nKUtrality Powar P o l i t i e s and Military 
Alliancas. Tha sacond ohi^tar daals i«ith tha growth of tha 
non-aligimant and India's rola in tha atolution of tha MAM. 
Tha third ehaptar daals with tha f i r s t Sunmit of tha noB* 
alignad countrias hald at Balgrada in Saptambar 1961. Zt 
furthar makas an indapth assasamant of India's rola in tha 
f i r s t Sunmit. Tha fourth ehaptar daals with tha saeond 
Summit Confaranea hald at Cairo in 1964. I t also h i ^ ^ i ^ t s 
and e r i t i e a l l y axaainas India's rola in strangthaning tha 
non^alignad movamant. 
I am grataful to my Svqparvisor, Dr Miss Iq^al XhaB«i# 
Laoturer* Dapartmant of Po l i t i ca l Scianca* Aligarh Muslim 
Univarsity* for har kaan intarast^ inspiring guidanea and 
axpart svqparvision of my work. 
I am inddDtad to Profassor A.F. Uamani* Chairman, 
Dapartmant of Po l i t i ca l Scianca, and Profaasor s.A.H.Bilgrami« 
Dapartmant of Po l i t i ca l Scianca, Aligarh Muslim Univ«rsity# 
Aligarh* for thair valuabla suggestions and constant anoouraga 
mant. I also owe my inte l l ec tua l indebtedness to Professor 
S.A.H. Haqqi, former Head of the D^artment of Po l i t i ea l 
Science* AMU.* for h i s valuable suggestions. 
I on also baholdon to the Librariana and staff 
members of the Sapru House Library* (Indian Council of ll»rld 
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Affairs)« ICSSR Library, (Indian Council of Social 
Science Research)« Teen Murtl (N^ru Memorial Library)» 
New Delhi, Maul ana Azad Library and the Seminar Library 
of the Department of P o l i t i c a l Scloice, Allgarh Muslim 
Universi ty, Allgarh, for the cooperation and help they 
extended a t every stage during the progress of t h i s 
work. 
I am p a r t i c u l a r l y thankftil to my pa ren t s , Hajl 
Mahmood All and Hajla Ralsa Begum, for t h e i r continuous 
encouragement throughout the c ruc ia l s tages of my re> 
search work, and bro thers and s l s t « : s for t h e i r whole-
hear ted cooperation and more spec ia l ly to Alhaj Mohd 
Ahmad All, for h i s f inancia l help id thout v>^lch I t would 
have been Impossible for me to complete t h i s work. Last 
but not l e a s t I am I n d i t e d to Mr M.S. Afrldl , %4io typed 
t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n within a lAiort pttclod. 
In the preparat ion of t h i s study I have t r i e d my 
bes t to u t i l i z e a l l ava i lab le mater ia l on the subject but 
I have la rge ly r e l i e d on o f f i c i a l docxonents, books, a r t l » 
c l e s . Journals and newiqpa^ers, e t c . 
htv^O.4,^^^^ 
Department of P o l i t i c a l Science Mohammad jjfajld All 
Aligarh Muslim University 
Aligarh 
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Ch«qpter I 
N O N - A L I G N M E N T 
The most spectacular devslopmont wielding trorocn-
dous Influence on international affairs in the post-second 
World War was the amergence of the Non-aligned Movement 
(NAM). I t i s the most potent force which i s instrumental 
in shaping the nature and content of international re le* 
t ions . NAM forms the basis of foreign p o l i c i e s practised 
by over hundred countries which are cal led non-aligned 
countries. Majorities of the countries of Asia* Africa 
and Latin Anerica are m«nbers of the NAM. There has been 
a r«qpid proliferation of the NAM in recent years. I t s 
membership has enhanced from 25 in 1961 when f i r s t summit 
was held in Belgrade to over 101 at the Seventh Nam summit 
held in New Delhi in March 1983. More and more countries 
not only of the Third Wbrld but from the Europe are also 
showing willingness to join the movement. Some countries 
l i k e Romania* Philippines* and Portugal ^t^ich are members 
of the military blocs and neutrals l ike Swedoi and Switaer-
land have also attended various NAM sunvnits as observer 
guests . This proves the growing strmgth of the NAM. 
Non-alignment functions 'simultaneously as a foreign 
pol icy strategy and as an ideology for po l i t i ca l change of 
• • • 2 
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th« cont«Q>orary international gyBtmn*• iha analysis of 
non-allgnmvtt In tha foralgn policy parapactlva raqulras a 
caaa-study approach which balng tha main th«na o£ tha 
prasant study td l l ba analysad In succaadlng c h ^ t a r . 
Masplnq of Won-allgniaapt 
The tana "Non-allgmant* has baan In vagua slnca 
aarly 1950s and tha NAM haa navar carad to daflna author!-
tatlvaly* conqprahanslvaly and praolsaly tha conoapt of non« 
allgnsiant avan aft«r aavan sussnlts and nunarous othar 
2 Intar-govamnantal oonfarancas for ovar two dacadas.Cvan 
tha First Summit Gonfaranoa hald at Balgrada In 1961 did 
not cara to dallbarata on th i s aqpact. Tha Fourth Suanlt 
Confaranca hald In Alglars In 1973 did provlda an occasion 
whan a Libyan propoaal ralsad tha Issua for a naw daflnl* 
tlon as str lctar Intarpratatlon of tha ooneapt of non-> 
allgnmant. Tha lack of oonsansus fao l l l ta tad tha axclusion 
of th i s Issua from tha aganda of tha confaranca. 
1. Robin Alison Ramlngton, "Tha Non*alignad Contaxtt 
Problams and Pro^pacts"* Punjab Journal of Polltlcif 
(Amrltaar), >tol. VZ, Mo. 1, January*Juna, 1982«p.20S, 
2. M.S. Rajan, '*Tha Concapt of Mon-Allgnmant and tha 
Baals of Marobarshlp of tha Hovamant*', in X.p. Mlara 
and K.R. Narayan« (ads.) Won-Allonmant in QontasBaorarv 
intarnational Ralations (Naw DalhT iJ^lV, p.^23i: 
• • • 3 
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The sixth Non*align«d mamlt Gonf^ranc* held in 
Havana in Saptanbar 1979 witnaaaad tha Burmasa delegation 
ma)cing a proposal for the dissolution o£ the movement «&d 
establish a committee to define the novanent's pr inciples . 
Burma's proposal was not accepted by the Havana Summit. 
Various efforts have been made to define the t«rm"non-> 
alignment" %<ithin and without the non-aligned summit aon« 
ferances. But no 'authoritative statement of the policy 
or for a definition of the concept by the e o l l e o t i v e 
wisdom of the movement i t se l f* has energed so far. 
The pioneers of the mov«ment»Tito« Nehru mad Mass«r» 
made various statements on non-alignment* most of which 
dealt with only as particular or transient elements or as* 
pacts of the policy ref lect ing their respective geo-
p o l i t i c a l s tand^ints . Sven an analysis of the declara-
tion and Joint communiques issued by the Summit Conferenees 
and Ministerial Conferences of the NMt from Belgrade (1961) 
to New Delhi (1983) provides no authentic* comprehensive 
and self-contained definition of non-alignment. 
Burmese delegate Myint Maung at Havana Summit* 
resses Delivered at the Sixth Qonfereaceft* Hm^f 
of s tate or qpvmmenY 
(Havana* 1980;* pp. 147-48. 
Rajmn* n.2* p. 231. 
•wz^Tso^^rTT-w^^r^ 
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The Belgrade declarat ion (1961) provided no d e f i n i -
t ion of the term '^non-allgnmenf« however. I t « iv lsaged 
that the Summit Conference 'do not wish to form a new bloc 
5 
and cannot be a b l o c ' . The declarat ion Issued af ter the 
second 3ummlt Conference held at Cairo In 1964 was also 
s i l e n t on I t and Introduced two new elements ' the p o l i c y of 
a c t i v e peaceful c o - e x l s t « i c e ' and ' the ex i s tence of 
m i l i t a r y b locs . Great Power a l l i a n c e and pacts ar i s ing 
7 
therefrom has accentuated the co ld war*. The subsequent 
sivnmlt dec larat ions even went on adding new ^pendAges with-
out defining the concept of non-alignment. The Algerian 
Q 
Sununlt envisaged a scheme of ''International secur i ty" . The 
l a s t Communique of the preparatory meeting for the Lusaka 
Conference of non-aligned s t a t e s Issued at Dar-es-Salam In 
April 1970# reafflzTRed the w i l l of the non-al igned countr ies 
to adhere to the 'pr inc ip l e s and c r i t e r i a of non-alignment 
as e^qpressed at the non-aligned conferences of Belgrade and 
Cairo' .^ 
5. Dpcuments of the Gatherings of Non-allcmed Countries 
1961-76 (Belgrade, 1973). p . 139. 
6* I b i d . , p . 19. 
7 . I b i d . , p . 25. 
8 . I b i d . , p . 91 . 
9 . I b i d . , p . 37. 
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Even the Lusaka Sisnmit Conference held in September 
1970 observed that 'what i s needed i s not a r e d e f i n i t i o n 
of non-alignment but a rededicat icn by a l l non-al igned 
nat ions to i t s central aims and o b j e c t i v e s ' . The Alg iers 
Summit held in 1973 referred to only unspec i f i ed aims* 
p r i n c i p l e s and p r a c t i c e s of the non-alignment. The empha-
s i s of the Colombo Suimdt held in 1976, was on exerc i s ing 
increas ing v i g i l a n c e by i t s members to 'preserve Intac t the 
e s s e n t i a l character of non-alignment, maintain unswerving 
f i d e l i t y to i t s p r i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s ' . The Havana 
Sunmit (1979) and New Delhi Summit (1963) also echoed the 
previous thinking leaving the d e f i n i t i o n part untouched. 
One can e a s i l y surmise from these f a c t s that the 
NAM i t s e l f has f a i l e d to provide an authentic comprehensive 
d e f i n i t i o n , the absence of which has envisaged 'e source of 
conceptual ae well as i n s t i t u t i o n a l weakness and a major 
cause of the wide g ^ between the theory of the non-a l ign-
ment and the p r a c t i c e of non-al igned s t a t e s , i n d i v i d u a l l y 
12 
and c o l l e c t i v e l y ' . Leo Kates defends the v i r tue of NAM 
for not going in for a s ing le authorised d e f i n i t i o n of non-
alignjTient. He opines: 
10. I b i d . , p . 45. 
11 . I b i d . , p . 179. 
12. I^ajan, n.2« p . 238. 
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I t I s not unreasonable to say that there 
are as many d e f i n i t i o n s of non-alignment 
as there are non-al igned countr ies and 
even pos s ib ly more . . . In a cer ta in sa:ise 
i t can be said that the p o l i c y of non-
alignment has permanently heen undergoing 
change def in i t ion* re -ex amination and 
c r i t i c i s m while r e s i s t i n g arbitrary a s s e s s -
ment All t h i s i s understandable s ince 
the movement of the non-al igned countr ie s 
i s something new in in ternat iona l r e l a t i o n s , 
not only because of a coiwnon platform but 
also because of the form of cooperation 
anong a large number of genera l ly d i s s i m i -
lar countr i e s . 13 
There could be endless argumeit over the meaning 
14 of non-alignment or what def ines a non-aligned country. 
The meaning of non-alignment cannot be sought from out -
s ide , i t s meaning i s manifest vdthin the t e ^ t s j o i n t l y 
negot iated and agreed to at the various Non-aligned 
Summit Conferences. Though Peter W i i i e t t s has observed 
that a Non-aligned Country i s 'one that has joined an 
in ternat iona l organizat ion with other countr ie s that 
c a l l themselves non-aligned*, but h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s 
not adequate enough to comprehend the concept of non-
alignment. 
13. Leo Mates, Non-Aliqnment i Theory and Current 
Pol icy , (Belgrade, 1972), pp. 80-81 . 
14. Peter W i i i e t t s , The Non-Aliqned in Havana : 
Dpcuroqits of the Sixth Summit Conf«rence and an 
Analysis of Their S ign i f i cance for the Global 
P o l i t i c a l System, (London, 1981), p . 3. 
15. Ib id . 
.7 
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Hon-alignment i s a dynamic, pos i t ive and act ive 
concept and so i s i t s ever grovdng movem«it whose strength 
and acceptance i s growing from summit to summit, John 
Burton while tackl ing the problem of def in i t ion of non-
alignment, wrote immediately after the Belgrade Summit 
Conference: 
So far non-alignment has been studied 
pr imari ly in nat ional context; non-
alignment i s Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, 
India . . . Alone these nat ional s tudies 
are not sa t i s fac to ry , for they do not 
d is t inguish those nat ional influences 
v^iich are unique to non-alignment, from 
o thers v*iich are common to aligned and 
to non-aligned a l ike , 16 
Bxirtpn's above statement i s s t i l l val id today v*ien 
more than one hundred countr ies are the members of the 
NAM, These coun t r i e s ' p o l i c i e s are governed by the i r 
respec t ive nat ional i n t e r e s t s , Indonesia adopted non-
alignment as soon as she became indepeident because: 
(1) She needed a diverse market for her varied 
products \*ilch otherwise would t i e her to the 
economies of a few coun t r i e s . 
(2) because the Indonesian people were t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
friend of a l l r a ce s . 
(3) because Intionesla was not on an invasion route , and 
(4) because alignment with a pa r t i cu l a r bloc would 
make the task of In te rna l reconstruct ion more 
d i f f i c u l t . 
16. J.w. Burton, In te rna t iona l Relat ions ; A General 
Theory» (London, 1967), pp. 165-6, 
• • . 8 
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Burma too fre« ly choose non-allgnmoit £or geogra-
phic reasons that are the oppos i t e of Indonesia vd.th t\io 
great neighbours* non->communlst India and Communist Qilna 
a middle way was the l e a s t controvers ia l p o s i t i o n to 
adopt. Heavily d^cndent on f inding markets for i t s 
major crop« rlce# Burma found her main buyers in the com-
munist bloc but i t was also necessary to re ta in i t s econo-
mic l ink with the west for fos ter ing the process of econo-
mic development. 
I t s geographical p o s i t i o n wedged between China 
and India l ed Nepal also in to the non-aligned grouqp. 
Sri Lanka's non-alignment i s a by product of 
i t s trade l i n k s vihile she esqports t ea e x c l u s i v e l y to wes-
tern coxintries i t i s the l a r g e s t s e l l e r of rubber to 
commxmlst countr i e s . 
The non-alignment of the Arab Sta tes i s the r e s u l t 
of anger over the creat ion of I s rae l trtiich was approved 
by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the 
United Nations in 1948. 
For some new s t a t e s of Africa-non-alignment had 
become so much a part of Afro-Asian p o l i t i c s by the t i n e 
they achieved ind^endence that they r e a l l y had l i t t l e 
cho ice but to s%d.m with the t i d e . Non-alignment was an 
easy po l i cy for African Countries to Implemoit because 
they are geographical ly far from the Zone of the 'cold 
. , . 9 
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war' because t h i s p o l i c y opans the way to economic aid 
from both s ides and because i t might concievable help in 
keeping that c o n t i n o i t a nuclear free zone. 
YugoslAvl a found herse l f non-aligned because as 
a deserter from the communist bloc* she was an anathema 
i n the communist world and at the same time she was un> 
acceptable to the West. 
Jawaharlal Nehru* while speaking on I n d i a ' s \junder. 
standing of the non-alignment sa id on 9 December* 1948s 
vftian we say o\ir p o l i c y i s one of non-a l ign-
ment* obviously %#• mean non-al ignnent with 
m i l i t a r y b locs • • • This in i t s e l f i s not a 
pol icy* i t i s only part of a p o l i c y • . . H 
He further observed that the p o l i c y could only be a 
p o l i c y of acting according to one ' s bes t judgement and 
furthering the o b j e c t i v e s and i d e a l s cherished by o n e ' s 
country. Nehru further opinedt 
Every country's foreign policy* f i r s t of a l l 
i s concerned %d.th i t s own secur i ty and %dLth 
protec t ing i t s OMI progress . . . A de l ibera te 
p o l i c y of f r i e n d ^ i p with other countr ies 
goes further in gaining secur i ty than almost 
any thing else* ^ a r t from this* from the 
larger po int of view of the world also* we 
have laboured to the bes t of our ab i l i ty* for 
%orld peace • . • Our foreign p o l i c y has thus 
p o s i t i v e aspect of peace. The other p o s i t i v e 
17. Jawaharlal Nehru* I n d i a ' s Foreign Po l i cv Se lected 
SpW^f* Sfp^ffnfry, l^i^-^ni l?fcL (New Delhi* 
1961)* p . 79 . 
. . . 1 0 
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aspects are an enlargement of freedom in 
the vorld, r^laceroent of co lonia l i sm by 
free and independent coi intr ies and a .g 
l arge degree of cooperation anong n a t i o n s . 
Nehru's assert ion of "acting ^cord inq to our 
b e s t Judgement** and "an independent approach to each 
controvers ia l or disputed issue*** did not mean o b j e c t i -
v i t y or impart ia l i ty as frequently interpreted by some 
19 
scholars both in India and abroad. 
Prior to the holding of the F i r s t Non-aligned 
Summit at Belgrade in 1961# the term "non-alignment was 
used to be denoted by words and phrases l i k e "neutral ity", 
"non-involvement", "pos i t ive neutra l i ty" , and "Neutralism". 
The term "non-alignment" was f i r s t l y used by 
V.K. Krishrla Menon at the United Nations in 1953-54.^° 
Leo Kates also at tr ib i i tes to Krishna Menon for coining the 
term "non-alignment" but there i s a d i f f erence of ner iod. 
He says: "Thexe may have been an e a r l i e r use of the word 
18. I b i d . , pp. 79-80. 
19. J.w. Burton n. 16, p . 220. Many Western Scholars 
have c r i t i c i z e d non-al igned nat ions for lack of ob-
j e c t i v i t y in matters of v i t a l s i g n i f i c a n c e to them. 
See Bertrand Russe l l . Unarmed Victory (Middlesex, 
1963), p . 64. See also William C, Johnstone, Burma's 
Foreign Pol icy : A Study in Neutralism, (Massachu-
s e t t s , 1963), p . 277. See also J .B, Kripalani, "For 
Principled Neutral i ty", Foreign Affairs^ (New York), 
Vol. 38, No. l , October 1959, p .58 . 
20. For d e t a i l s see , Michael Brecher, India and Wbrld 
P o l i t i c s t Krishna Menon's View of the World (London, 
1968), p . 3, Oxford Univers i ty Press , Toronto Bombay. 
. . . 1 1 
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rftlating to the concept as i t was ttorkad out by the non» 
al igned coxmtries* but I found the e a r l i e s t source in the 
Times of India of September 30, 1968« there Krishna Menon 
i n an interview remembered having used the term non-
21 
alignment for the f i r s t time in 1950." 
On the b a s i s of the above ana lys i s , i t can s a f e l y 
be surmised that NAM being a dynamic and ever growing 
movement does not need a d e f i n i t i o n . Once a term i s de-
f ined i t i s l imi t ed within c e r t a i n contours v^ich cannot 
be e a s i l y v i o l a t e d . 
EvDlution of the Concept of Kon-Alignaent 
The concept of non-alignment has not been evolved 
a l l of a sudden. I t s evolution has been f a c i l i t a t e d as a 
consequence of the experience of newly independent s t a t e s 
with the passage of time during the post-World War II 
per iod, Follo%d.ng the end of the Second World War, there 
were a few neutral or n e u t r a l i s t but no non-al igned 
22 
s t a t e s . The e d i f i c e of the non-alignment has been b u i l t 
21. Leo Mates, "The Concept of Non-Alignment", in Una 
Vasudev. ( e d . , ) Isgues Before Mon-Aliqnment t Pas 
and Future (New Delhi , 1983), p . 60 (ICWA). 
2 2. Bimal Prasad, The General Bxperience of Non-Alionweot 
and I t s Prospects for the Future (New Delhi. 1966). 
p . 1. 
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during the l a s t three decades, 'a process in which the 
profess ions and p r a c t i c e s of the non-aligned s t a t e s and 
the summit conferences from Belgrade to New Delhi, 
through c o l l e c t i v e a r t i c u l a t i o n of the Ideas and Idea l s 
23 
of the movement, have played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e . ' 
The evolution of the non-alignment as a movement 
In the h i s t o r i c a l context l a analysed Indepth in the 
next ch i^ter . I t seems s u f f i c e here to descr ibe the 
evolut ion of t)ie concept as such. The evolution of non-
alignment was not the r e s u l t of any pre-concelved idea oc 
pr ior consul tat ion among these countr ies but i t was f a c i -
l i t a t e d owing to cer ta in common experiences . I d e a l s , and 
aspirat ions which these coxintrles shared In varying 
degrees . Ihe l a t e President Soekamo of Indones ia 's add-
r e s s to the Belgrade Conference in 1961 aptly summed up 
t h i s aspect: 
There was no prior consu l ta t ion and agree-
ment between us before we adopted our r e s -
p e c t i v e p o l i c i e s of non-alignment. We each 
arrived at t h i s p o l i c y insp ired by conmon 
Idea l s prompted by s imi lar circximstances. 
2 3. K.P, Misra, "The Conceptual P r o f i l e of ^k^n-Allgn-
menft in K.P. Misra and K.R. Narayan, (eds . ) 
Non»Alianraent in Contsraporerv Internat ional 
Relat ions (New Delhi, 1981), p . 197. 
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spurred on by l i k e experiences . There was 
no attempt at compromlae among \xa, no 
attempt to roxmd o f f disengagements to 
make our p o l i c i e s i d e n t i c a l * But not one 
of U80 I think w i l l dony that we did ins-> 
p i r e each other* . The esqperiencea of one 
country in discovering that a p o l i c y of 
non->alignment i s the b e s t guarantee for 
safeguarding our nat ional and internat ional 
pos i t i on have undoxibtedly helped others to 
come to a s imi lar conclus ion.24 
The non-aligned countr ies had the common experl-
ence of having been subjected to aliesn ru le for centu-
r i e s . The resources of these colonized coxintrles were 
used by the Imperial powers for the furtherance of c o l o -
n i a l power. After at ta in ing indepcndtfice^ these count-
r i e s had r e a l i z e d the p e r i l s of being party to power 
p o l i t i c s . I t was that r e a l i z a t i o n **»lch prompted the 
newly independent countr ies to keep away from the p o l l -
t i c s of power b l o c s . These countr ie s pursued the po l i cy 
of non-alignment in order to g ive f u l l e r meaning and con-
t e n t to the ir newly acquired but hard won p o l i t i c a l In-
dependence. 
The former Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael 
Manely/ v^ i l e emphasising t h i s aspect has written that 
•the non-aligned movement did begin simply because there 
24. The Conference of Heads of s t a t e or Government of 
Non-Alianed Countries (Belgrade. 1 9 6 1 ) / p p . 25-36. 
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25 
were b l o c s . 
Thus as the number of newly Indep^ident countr ies 
after shaking o f f co lon ia l yoke increased e s p e c i a l l y 
after the Belgrade Non-aligned Sunmit of 1961, the member-
ship of the NAM also increased. The Belgrade Summit was 
attended by 25 countr ies and s i n c e then the MAM has come 
a long way. The Seventh NAM Summit at New Delhi held in 
March 1983 was attended by over one hundred countr ies as 
ful f lodged members. I t i s an over-grovring and dynamic 
movement. 
Non-Alignment and Neutral i ty 
Prior to the concept of non-alignment gaining 
currency and recogni t ion as Non-aligned Mov(97\ent. The 
p o l i c y of non-alignment was genera l ly i d e n t i f i e d with the 
terms l i k e "neutrality*** and in the early years of the 
co ld war, the term ''neutrality" was frequently used to de-
note the p o l i c y of the non-aligned c o u n t r i e s . Although 
n e u t r a l i t y and non-alignment are not synonymous. But the 
term non-alignment was i d e n t i f i e d with n e u t r a l i t y and West-
25. Michael Manely, "Third World Under Challenge t The 
P o l i t i c s of Confrontation", Third Wbrld Quyrtrtr^y 
(London), January 1980, p . 29. 
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26 ern Scholars and Stateamen were obsessed vd.th t h i s term, 
ind they preferred to use "Neutrality" or •'neutralism" in 
the p lace of non-allgnm«it for some time and one can even 
now come across these terms in the c u r r e i t l i t e r a t u r e on 
non-alignment. 
According to Peter Lyon n e u t r a l i t y means non-
involvement in war and neutralism means non-involvement 
i n the co ld war however Jawaharlal Nehru the founder of 
non-alignment did not l i k e to c a l l I n d i a ' s po l i cy of non-
alignment even of p o s i t i v e n e u t r a l i t y . 
A scenario of b i p o l a r i t y i s sought to be e s t a b l i s h -
ed between non-alignment and n e u t r a l i t y , one sect ion i s of 
27 the view that the two concepts have nothing in common 
and other i n s i s t that the two are i d e n t i c a l or at any ra te 
28 
s imi lar in the ir e s s e n t i a l s , but the truth l i e s some 
where in the middle. 
26. K.P. Misra, ''The Concept of Non-Alignment i I t s 
Inqplications and Recent Trends", in K.p. Misra ( c d . , ) 
s t u d i e s in Indian Ftoreian Pol icv (New Delhi, 1969), 
p . 90. 
27, Jawaharlal N^ru, I n d i a ' s Foreion Po l i cv , pp. 24,58 
and 86; see also Peter Lyon, NsMtralism (Leices ter , 
1963), p . 183. 
2Q. For d e t a i l s see L.w, Martin, Neutralism and Non-
.\liQnment (New York, 196 2 ) . 
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With a view to have an analyt ica l assessment of 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between n e u t r a l i t y and non-alignnient, i t 
i s e s s e n t i a l to xinderstand the concept of n e u t r a l i t y . 
Neutral i ty i s an in tegra l part of the Internat ional 
law of warfare and a neutral s ta t e / i s , by v i r t u e of an 
internat ional treaty or a binding un i la tera l dec larat ion , 
under a l ega l o b l i g a t i o n , not to p a r t i c i p a t e in any future 
war. I t i s incumbent on a neutral s t a t e to observe the 
norms of the law of n e u t r a l i t y whenever a war as defined 
by internat ional law breaks out . These o b l i g a t i o n s which 
are primarily based on the Hague Convention of 1907 and 
29 part ly based on customary law are to be of four types: 
( i ) The ObllQation of Abswitation 
A neutral s t a t e must not d i r e c t l y or I n d i r e c t l y 
provide be l l lgercs i t s with mi l i t ary support. 
Cli) Qb|iQation of prevention 
Neutrals are not to permit s t a t e s involved in a 
war to engage in mi l i t ary a c t i v i t i e s on the ir 
t e r r i t o r i e s . 
29. See for d e t a i l Hanspeter Neuhold, "Permanent 
Neutredity and tJon-Allgnm^it t S i m i l a r i t i e s and 
Idfferences", India QuartT |v (New De lh i ) , \tol, 
35, No. 3, (1979), pp. 285-87 - July-September 
A Journal of Internat ional Af fa irs . 
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(111) Pr^ncj^pta 9^ IffipyU^^^^Y 
I t onjolns \qpon th« n«utral s tates the obligation 
of treating bel l igerent s tates on equal footing. 
In al l those non-military sector v4iere no obliga-
tions of absentations ex i s t . 
(iv) Obligation of Tblerance 
The neutral state imist put \9 with certain acts 
by bel l igerents % i^ch in peace t ine would be 
clearly i l l e g a l . 
Like neutrality non-alignm«it i s not a corrolary 
of any written international agreement. A non-alignc»d 
s tate i s not under the legal obligation not participate 
in any future war. I t i s free to participate or not to 
participate in any war. Non-Alignment i s v irtual ly the 
main foreign policy l ine detexrmlning a country's Foreign 
Pol i t i ca l a c t i v i t i e s in war as wall as in peace time. 
Neutrality and non-alignment* however entail simi-
l a r i t i e s as well as differences. The most common siadla-
r i t y between permanent neutrality and non-alignment per-
tains to non-participation in military al l iances , even 
among perman&itly neutral or non-aligned countries them-
se lves . The permanontly neutral countries are legal ly 
prohibited in th i s regard but the refusal of non-aligned 
countries to enter into military al l iance i s based sole ly 
on po l i t i ca l maxim. 
This non-participation has been restr icted from 
the very beginning* to multilateral military al l iance and 
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Other agr««Rtant 'concludad in the context of great power 
c o n f l i c t e d which almost remained unspec i f i ed . As i s 
well known« the very raison d ' e t r e of the advent of non-
alignment was i t s d e s i r e not to get involved in the Cold 
War. Consecfuently the msmbership of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s 
such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, CEKTO, SEATO or ANZUS pact 
was regarded as out of question for a non-aligned s t a t e . 
Yet« Organisation of Anerican S ta te s (0A5) did not f a l l 
in to the category of xjunacceptable a l l i a n c e s ; for C\iba was 
one of the founding members of the movsment which in r e -
cent years was joined by several other Latin American 
s t a t e s , t oo . The ssroe seems also to apply, for Instance, 
both to France's m u l t i l a t e r a l mi l i t ary arrangement with 
the Defence Council of Equatorial Africa and b i l a t e r a l 
m i l i t a r y t r e a t i e s concluded by the United Kingdom with 
ten s t a t e s , a l l of whom were admitted to non-al igned con-
31 
ferences* Obviously, a l l these arrangements were exclu-
ded from "the context of Great Powers c o n f l i c t s . " 
30. 0 , Jankoartsch and K.P. Sauvant, The Third Wbrld 
Without Super Po^frs » The G o l l e c f d Documents of 
the Kon-alioned Countries (London, 1975), D . ^ I 
31 . Peter W i l l e t t s , n. 14, p . 37. Nine of the 25 
"radical core gro^^" s t a t e s which attended the 
1961 Belgrade "Summit" had strong m i l i t a r y t i e s 
vdth the United Sta tes or the United Kingdom, 
I b i d . , p . 23. 
. . . 1 9 
(19) 
Thus n o u t r a l i t y i s a l e g a l s ta tus c o n s i s t i n g of 
v a i l daflnad r i g h t s and ob l igat ions* to «^ich tha s t a t e 
i s bound and i s not fraa to a l t e r u n i l a t e r a l l y or termi-
nate at %dll« but the p r i n c i p l e s of non-alignment are not 
l e g a l l y binding on the s t a t e s subscribing t< them; they 
s o l e l y amount to a p o l i t i c a l doctr ine from which devia-
t i o n i s p srmis s ib l e . 
An attenqpt has also been made by some scholars 
to e s t a b l i s h re la t ionsh ip betwe«i non-alignment and Power 
P o l i t i c s * Non-alignm«nt has baen l a b e l l e d as a p o l i c y 
based on morality and ideal ism on the one hand and on the 
other i t has been described as an exerc i s e in power 
p o l i t i c s . ^ ^ 
Power p o l i t i c s i s beyond the scope of our present 
study. However* to make d i s t i n c t i o n c l e a r between non-
alignment and power p o l i t i c s * i t seams s u f f i c i e n t to 
qtiote George Schwarsenberger, who def ines power p o l i t i c s 
as "signifying a type of r e l a t i o n s betweoi s t a t e s in 
which cer ta in pat terns of bi^aviour are predominantt 
32. For an i n t e r e s t i n g d ^ a t e on t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
see A.P. Rana* "The Nature of I n d i a ' s Foreign 
Pol icy", India Quarterly. Vbl. 22 (1966). pp. 
•P. Rana's s«« also a rejoinder to A.p '  view by G . L . 
Jain* "Indian Non-alignment and Balance of Power"* 
India Quarterly. Vol. 22 (1966), pp. 145-54, 
. . . 2 0 
(20) 
armamoits, isoXationlam* power diplomacy* power economics, 
balance of powar and war" subsaquantly he saya that '^ower 
p o l i t i c s may be defined as a system of international re la-
t ions in which groups consider themselves to be ultimate 
ends.** According to Prof. K.p. Misra* non-alignment 
'rejects th i s variety of p o l i t i c s and attempts to high-
l i g h t an organic link between the constituents of the i n -
ternational community . . . I t re jects not only power po l i -
t i c s but also the view held by Hans Morgenthau and others, 
that a l l p o l i t i c s i s a struggle for power*. Thus non-
alignment i s de^nsid of a l l such ambiguities and i s rather 
a 'substitute for power p o l i t i c s in international re la-
t ions' .^^ 
Military Pacts# Alliances and Non-Alignment 
Last but not l ea s t important point to be noted 
here i s about the wrong understanding of non-alignment i s 
that the non-aligned mov«m«it has recently been termed as 
a third Vbrld Alliance. The use of the term al l iance for 
non-aligned movement i s certainly objectionable because 
l i k e "power p o l i t i c s " al l iance too has come to acquire a 
3 3. George Schwaraenberger, Power P o l i t i c s (New York, 
1951), p. 13. 
34. Misra, n. 23, p. 204. 
35. Ibid. 
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d i s t i n c t meaning in in ternat ional r e l a t i o n s . The emer-
gence of the concept of non-alignment as an unprecedented 
phenomena of the post-Second Mbrld War was mainly due to 
the formation of mi l i t ary pac t s or a l l i a n c e s by the Great 
Powers in the wake of co ld war. When the Cold War was at 
i t s peak and h o t l y chased* N^ru had declared on 7 S«pt«n-
ber 1947 i 'we propose* as far as p o s s i b l e to keep away 
from the po%rer p o l i t i c s of groups, al igned against one 
another* irfiich have l e d in the past to world wars and which 
may again lead to d i s a s t e r s on an even vaster s c a l e ' . 
Though Nehru had made the above statement in the context 
o f India ^ i o h had been in the process of a t ta in ing inde -
pendence from the Br i t i sh c o l o n i a l yoke* i t became the 
cornerstone not only of I n d i a ' s foreign p o l i c y but other 
newly ind«^>«id(9nt coxintries as well in the rears to come* 
within few years* i t proved to become the sheet anchor of 
"Asian Neutralism*** which* according to K.M. Panikkar* was 
7^ 
a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the twentieth century p o l i t i c s . 
36. Government of India* Jawaharlal N ^ r u ' a Soeechey. 
September - 1946. Mav ^949. Second edn. (New Delhi* 
Publ icat ion Division* 1958)* p . 2. 
37. K.M. Panikkar* **The Twentieth Century in Asia and 
World Polit ies'** India Quarterly (New Delhi)* Vol. 
12* July-September 1956* pp. 245-56. 
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Conclusion of the Second World War envisaged 
•xibatantial changes in the conten^porary p o l i t i c a l scenar io . 
The war time a l l i e s — - Sov ie t Union and the United 
Sta tes —— emerged as r i v a l s to each other in the post-war 
per iod . The t rad i t iona l c o l o n i a l powers l i k e Britain* 
France* Germany and I t a l y were re legated to secondary 
p l a c e . The dec l ine in co lonia l i sm marked the inauguration 
of the process of deco lonisat ion ^Aiich r e s u l t e d in the 
emergence of newly ind^endent c o u n t r i e s . 
The United Sta tes and the Soveit Union es tab l i shed 
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s in £urope# Asia and the Middle East in 
order to increase the ir r e s p e c t i v e spheres of in f luence in 
the world and to win over the newly independent countr ies 
to the i r resp'ective spheres of in f luence . 
The establishment of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e by the 
Super Powers* was desmed as a potent danger to the i r inde» 
pendence and sovereignty by the newly indspendant countr ies 
who had determined to preserve t h e i r hard->%nn freedom. 
The newly independent countr ies who wanted to 
remain free in internat ional a f f a i r s decided to keep them 
away from these mi l i t ary a l l i a n c e s of Super Powers and 
pursued an independent foreign p o l i c y . I t was t h i s common 
d e s i r e of the newly independent countr ies which manifested 
i t s e l f in the form of non-al igned movaraent (NAM). India* 
as already mentioned* had decided to pursue the p o l i c y of 
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non-alignment •v«n prior to attaining indipandanca. iha 
othar oountriaa of Aaia Ilka Burma* Sri Lanka, Afghaniatvi 
and Indonaaia alao purauad tha *aimilar pol icy . India waa 
1 attar Joinad by Egypt and Yugoalavia, With tha paaaaga 
of tima tha policy of non-alignmant bacania tha comaratona 
of tha foreign policy of thaaa countriaa. Currantly tha 
policy of non-alignmant i a baing practised by over one 
hundred countries. Theaa non-aligned countries are not 
only mi l i tar i ly non-aligned to the military pacta or a l l i -
ances or pacts patronized by the Sopmt Powars but even 
among themselves. The non-aligned countries are bound t o -
gether not through a charter or constitution or defence 
pact but by their desire to respect the principles of non-
alignment to achieve some common objectivea of the policy 
of non-alignmant. 
The dist inct ion between the military alliancea 
and non-alignment delans essential to analyse the various 
e l e c t a of these concepts. 
The term "alliance** i s generally used as conveying 
military awnse. Arnold Vblfars has observed that in the 
technical language of statesmen and scholars "alliances" 
s ign i f i e s a promise of mutual military al l iances between 
38 two or more sovereign s ta tes . He further sayst 'Althogh 
38. Arnold Wolfers, "Alliance", International Bicvclo-
paedia of Social Sciences (New York, 1968), Vol.I, 
p. 268. 
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Bcmm pxopag«nditt •avtiit«0«« mtf b* gained toy applylBg th« 
tfm to loe«« agTMMBts for doopir«tiott •*• this us« •!»•• 
e«r«» th« p«ottXi«rly f«r«rMrihiag oowmifaat eoiit«in«d la 
ai l i t t fy pMttn tof liMt^ a n«Uoii fomMlly proadsM to join 
another in fi«|htiBg « Maaoii mkmKr** thus an allimoo 
•••antlally Qonnotoo i t s MiXitory opnt«ita proaiavitly* 
On tho ]»«oii of tiao atoovo «i«Iyoio« i t dMMs 
•ttffieo to iafor that «|iilo « allianeo ia •aaantialiy 
Military in oharaetar hut Mopi-tAlignodi Harmmt ia baoioaily 
eppeaid to tha aiUtaril illiMoaa. fha policy of aon-
alignmant gainad pcofiihaBoa during ^ a Cold war paried. Zn 
foot tha policy of aon-aligniaBt «aa a revolt agalaat tha 
i 
Cold war «id Military allianeaa eoiWaivad ia tha contasct of 
I tha Cold War. ihiif policy itfaa purauad by tha oountriaa 
Mteieh wara not goia i^ to ba iaiNolirad in tha Gold Mar. tha 
founding itanbar oountriaa of tha MMi Zadia« l^igbaiavia and 
igypt hail ona of ^ o mttig tiiinga in ooaiien iiaa tiiair oppe-
i 
aition to draai Powar altiinea* Ivyp^ waa oppoaad to tha 
Baghdad Paet, India to tha Baghdad Pact and to tha SKMED,^ ^ 
itfhila YUgoalavia waa oppoaad to tha waraaw Pact. 
39* Ifiidk 
40. For India'a Attituda lOwarda SBAiZO and sorao 
Iqbal Khanapf *Zadia* a Attituda Vawarda Ragiooal 
AlliiMCaa"» Intarnatiat^tl _ff|udift V»l. 1S» Mo.i# Jasuary-Marah X979# pp* B9«»l04* 
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The NAM sxjnvnlts have l a i d emphasis on the dismant-
l i n g of mi l i t ary a l l i a n c e s and even foreign m i l i t a r y bases 
i n other c o u n t r i e s . I t i s a well known f a c t that the 
sxiper powers are not bound by the advice of the non-
al igned countr ies and hence the chances of dismantling of 
the NATO and Warsaw Pact are not even remote. Keeping 
t h i s fac t in view* the non-al igned countr ies have to c o -
e x i s t and as such NAM has l a i d emphasis on not allowing 
the non-aligned countr ies for the establishment and main-
tenance of foreign mi l i t ary bases . This view gained pro-
minance at the preparatory meeting at Cairo in Jiine 1961. 
The Belgrade declarat ion declaredt 
. . . they consider the establishmwit and main-
tenance of foreign m i l i t a r y bases on the 
t e r r i t o r i e s of other countr ie s , par tecu lar ly 
against the ir ejqpreased vdshes to be a gross 
v i o l a t i o n of the sovereignty of such s t a t e s . . . 
They c a l l t^ >on countr ies %Aiich maintain 
foreign bases s e r i o u s l y to consider the i r 
abo l i t ion as a contribut ion to world peace. ^1 
The Cairo Declaration (1964) was almost the eame. The 
Lusaka Conference (1970) ttivisaged two new elements. I t 
urged for the d i s s o l u t i o n of great powers mi l i t ary a l l i -
4 2 
ances. I t further agreed to safeguard in ternat iona l 
4 1 . Belgrade Conference of Heads of State or Qovem-
ramt of Non-Aliqned Countries (Belgrade, 1961), 
p . 273. 
4 2 . Review of I n t T n a t i o n a l Affa irs (Belgrade) ,no.491, 
September 1970, p . 25. 
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pttace and seciirity through the d«v«lopmant of social ttco-
nomic# po l i t i ca l and military strength of each country. 
Tha subsaquant MAM sxOTRiit confarance h%a also 
raitaratad tha sama stanca. Thus Hon-Alignment i s an a l -
tarnativa to military al l ianca. Tha growth or parpatua-
tion of military alignmants i s bound to give r i sa to align-
mants and ra«.alignmants resulting in tha exacerbating of 
tension which may lead to war. Cn the other hand« the 
policy of Hob-Alignment i s the Harbinger of peace. 
* 3 . Ib id . 
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Chaqpter II 
INDIA AND IHE EVDLPTIOli OF NON^ ALIGMED 
Internat ional r a l a t i o n s In th« Post war period 
have been grea t ly inf luenced by three main forcest western 
bloc l ed by the United S ta tes , eastctm bloc led by the 
Soviet Union and the non-aligned c o u n t r i e s . There i s no 
denying the £act t h a t the two supor powers have been the 
major actors in the world drama, the non-aligned countr ies 
too have played s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in shaping the events . 
The Post War period has witnessed the increas ing importance 
of non-alignment as a movement and as a force to be reckon-
ed within internat ional p o l i t i c s . 
India i s the founder of non-alignment. The p o l i c y 
o f non-alignm«it was formulated by Jawaharlal M^ru, the 
f i r s t Prime Minister of India, in the context of the cold 
war. Mtfiru wanted to keep India away from the p o l i t i c s of 
the Cold War because he considered the "cold war" worse 
than the shooting war. I n d i a ' s p o l i c y of non-alignment was 
based on I n d i a ' s g e o - p o l i t i c a l standing i t s des i re to play 
an independent r o l e in in ternat iona l a f f a i r s , to get eco-
nomic a s s i s tance from both the power b locs and to protec t 
i t s secur i ty and to promote i t s v i t a l i n t e r e s t . 
. . . 2 6 
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India's policy of non*alignm«nt, was a revolt 
against existing International P o l i t i c s of the Cold War 
and military alliances* The main principles of non-
alignmoit as escplained by N^ru %#ere peace, opposition 
to Colonialism* Racial discrimination* Support to Afro* 
Asian Community of Nations and International Organisao 
tion for the maintenance of pejce and security. India's 
policy of non*alignment* was conveyed to other nations 
through the diplomacy of panchsheel. The policy of Qon<» 
alignment was %#elcomed by a l l the newly independent 
states* and most of the s tates of Asia* Africa* and the 
Middle East, adopted the Policy of Non-alignment. 
ihough non-alignment as a movement dates back to 
the f i r s t Summit Conference held in Belgrade in 1961. I t s 
pol icy and principles had been spelt out much earlier by 
Prime Minister Jawidiatlal Ni^ru* even before India achiev-
ed ind^endence* in h i s h is tor ic announcement on the 
future directions of India's Foreign Policy, made on Sep* 
tember 7* 1946* during the days of the Interim government* 
Nehru saidt 
We propose* as far as possible* to keep away 
from the powar p o l i t i c s of Qro\:gps* aligned 
against one another, which have led in the 
past to world wars and which may again lead 
to disasters on an even vaster scale . We be-
l i e v e that peace mn^ freedom are ind iv i s ib le 
and the denial of freedom anywhere must en-
danger freedom else%Aiere and lead to Conflict 
and War. We are particxil arly interested in 
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(29) 
the emancipation of Colonial and dcpen-
d«it Countries and Peoples* and in the 
recognition in theory and practice of 
equal opportunitiea for al l races. ^ 
Since th i s concqpt was put forward In a cohe-
s ive form by N4hru» the non-aligned moYsment had develop* 
ed into a powerful and respected International Fonsn« 
which had been able to make a s ignif icant contribution in 
the direction of Mbrld Peace and Security the eliodnatiCMi 
of e v i l s of colonialism, racial discrimination and for 
the establishment of a just and equitable international 
economic and social order. 
In the early years, the impetus for non-aligned 
movement came from the Conferwnces both of % i^ch were held 
on the Continent of Asia, ii^ich were the Asian relat ions 
Conferences held in Mew Delhi in 1947 and thereafter in 
1949, and the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Countries 
held in Indonesia in 1955. These Conferences showed the 
tremendous support given to the policy of non-alignMint by 
the newly independent Countries of Asia and Africa. They 
demonstrated wide sphered recognition of the importance 
of avoiding domination or subjugation to either of the 
powers blocs and the need instead to work for d«nocratise-
tion of international po l i t i ca l system. 
1. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign PolicyiSelected 
Speeches, September 1946 - April 1961. The Publica-
t ions Division, Ministry of Information & Broad-
casting, Government of India, New Delhi. 
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(a) Po«t-War P o l i t i c a l S i tuat ion 
with a viaw to analyse the evolut ion of the p o l i c y 
of non-alignment and i t a increas ing populari ty among the 
countr ie s of Asia« Africa and Latin America, i t deems 
e s s e n t i a l to b r i e f l y survey the in ternat iona l scene and 
the internal condi t ions , obtaining in these countr ie s 
a f ter the end of the Second World War. The immediate 
period succeeding the conclusion of the World War II was 
marked by two main fac tors - emergence of the Cold War 
betwe«n the two Super Powers and breaking up of the c o l o -
n i a l system. 
I t was in the wake of a rsqpidly dec l in ing interna* 
t i ona l s i tuat ion* endangered by co ld MBT r i v a l r i e s ^ %i^ ich 
s t i l l held the world on the threshold of a th ird world 
war, that a number of Asian arid l a t e r African countries* 
obtained national ind^endence . The \;q;>surge of nat ion*-
l ism f a c i l i t a t e d the process of independence. The c o l o -
n i a l and under-developed countr ies of Asia l i k e India* 
Indonesia* Sri Lanka* Burma* e tc .* vdtnessed the smergence 
of strong a n t i - c o l o n i a l movsments s t r i v i n g for national 
independence. Soon after* West Asia* too* vas undergoing 
a revolutionary vqpheaval* the discontent , f inding manifes-
t a t i o n against the P a l e s t i n e p o l i c i e s and pelIt lco-economic 
domination of the countr ies of the region by western powers, 
e s p e c i a l l y Britain and France. 
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line Paris Con£er<»ce of 1946, vd.tne8sed a wldaning 
r i f t betwttftn the A l l i ed Powers* e s p e c i a l l y the United 
Sta tes and the Soviet Union about the sharing of the s p o i l s 
of the v i c tory . The true s p i r i t of Yalta and Potsdam 
conferences seemed to disappears, g iving r i s e to Cold War 
r i v a l r i e s . The d i s s o l u t i o n of o l d co lonia l empires and 
the emergence of new independent ooxantries was a new charac-
t e r i s t i c s of the contemporary in ternat iona l p o l i t i c s . 
Ihe emergence of Asia, Africa, and gradually Latin 
America, the r e v o l t against Europeans r u l e and the acce l e -
rated c o l l ^ s e of imperialism, a l l served to change the 
2 
world p o l i t i c a l scene beyond recogn i t ion . Another renarX-
able development of t h i s period was the founding of the 
United Nations on the b e l i e f that i t could help reduce the 
tens ion in the %«>rld and bring peace and prosper i ty through-
out the world. 
The dec l ine of the Kxiomlntang Government and r i s e 
of the Communist Party to power, in the mainland of China, 
was a lso , in a way a part of t h i s n a t i o n a l i s t upsurge on 
the one hand the n a t i o n a l i s t upsurge was gaining ground 
mainly in Asia in the second half of 1940s, whereas on the 
2 . V.p. Dutt, '*Non-alignment in a Changed World t An 
Outline", in M.K, Saini , ( e d , , ) Aspects of Non-
Alignment (New Delhi, 1981), p . 13. 
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other hand, the nat ions of the %K>rld were divided in to two 
power b locs under the aegis of USA and USSR. The t r a d i -
t i o n s and experiences of the newly independent countries^ 
where n a t i o n a l i s t upsurge was prominent found i t d i f f i c u l t 
to i d e n t i f y themselves with e i ther of the power b l o c s . Leo 
Mates observes* that the US and the Soviet Union had 
emerged as the main contenders for the arms race which 
conmenced after the war. These two Super Powers were p r l * 
marily the former a l l i e s and i t was t l ieir d i f f erences froei 
the time of the second world war rather than the ir coopera-
t ion which af fected the course of in ternat ional a f f a i r s in 
3 
succeeding years . 
India, Indonesia and Bxirroa adopted the par 11 amen* 
tary system of government, "The leadership of the ir r e s -
p e c t i v e n a t i o n a l i s t movement was usua l ly vested in the edu-
cated middle c l a s s e s ^ o were trained to think and speak in 
4 
terms of western p o l i t i c a l theory and i d e a l s . " However, 
the preva i l ing d i f f erences in l o c a l condi t ions had been 
instrvimental in g iv ing indigenous o r i e n t a t i o n s to the p o l i -
t i c a l theory and i d e a l s . 
3 . Leo Mates, Won-Aliotnm«it » Theory and C\irrent Pol iev 
(Belgrade, 1972), p . 22. 
4 . N.p, Nalr, "Non-Alignment i History, Ideology and 
Prospects", in K.P. Karunakaran, ( e d . ) . Outside the 
Context (New Delhi, 1963), P . 27. 
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The newly Independoir covmtrles of Asia had develop* 
ed a bas ic d i s t r u s t towards western powers >^ich l arge ly 
arose from the io tper ia l i s t character of the l a t t e r . The 
western power's argument that they were try ing to presorve 
democracy against t o t a l i t a r i a n conanunism, f a i l e d to «voke 
response frwt the newly independent coi intr ies of Asia. 
Though the United States was ITx^ re or l e s s f ree from charges 
o f d i r e c t co lonia l i sm unl ike other western powers l i k e 
Bri ta in vnA France, but the US po l i cy in Ph i l ipp ines and 
Latin /^«r ica had given r i s e to misgiv ings and doubts. 
At the sanae time, the newly independent countr ies 
were also averse to a t o t a l alignment with the Soviet b l o c . 
The n a t i o n a l i s t movements in these countr ies were l a r g e l y 
pioneered by middle c l a s s i n t e l l e c t u a l s Wio were in no 
sense communists or s o c i a l i s t s . The s o c i a l i s t or communist 
s tance in these n a t i o n a l i s t movenncnts was too mild to i n -
f luence the general p o l i t i c a l or jDcial character of these 
moverrients. However, tJ»e irf^pressive econoraic achievements 
of the 5?ovlet Union an<^  I t e conoisten'*: a n t l - i m p e r i a l i s t 
a t t i t u d e had developed a favourable a t t i tude about the 
Sovie t Union among these c o u n t r i e s . But the newly indepen* 
For d e t a i l s see Malvin Gxirtov, The Uyi;L|ted S^ft^^ 
I n f r v e n t i o n (Mew York, 1974). on. 4Q~60. s— also 
M.L. Sharma Terrorism t /roerican S t v l e (New Delhi, 
1983), pp. 13-17. 
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d«nt countries %r«r« opposed to align with the Soviet 
bloc. 
These countries tended to view the big-power 
p o l i t i c s %dth suspicion and kept thvaselves aloof from 
i t* Ihey disfavoured to recognise the leadership or 
guidance of any power bloc in their national or interna-
tional p o l i c i e s . Thus the policy of non-alignment with 
power blocs was an off-shoot of the sentiments of nationa* 
lism in these countries. The pursuit of an "independent" 
foreign policy by these countries was in consonance with 
their national pride and sense of independence. These 
countries also real ised that the pursuit of the policy of 
non-alignment was not only helpful in preserving their 
newly won independencet but i t also provided them a sense 
of dignity snd recognition in world af fa irs . 
The conclusion of the Second Vbrld War inaugurated 
the process of decolonisation* %<hich was sxibsequently a 
pre-requisite for the evolution of the pol icy of non-
alignment on a global scale . The oomnon factor % i^oh had 
prompted the Afro-Asian countries to be knitted together, 
in an endeavour to find a new and a separate identity for 
themselves, was a commonly shared experience of humilia-
tion and oppression under the imperial powers. Almost 
e • e S^ 
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two canturles of forcigm rule had "produced as InstinctiTs 
antagonlmi to any form of westarn domination and an intanaa 
h o s t i l i t y to racial discrimination**. 
Tha main raason for distrust of %rastam powars 
anong tha oovntrias of Asia and Africa can ba attributed to 
tha iiaparialist oharactar of most vastam powars. Utadar 
foraign rula almost a l l of tham wara draggad into innumara-
bla wars in pursuit of tha p o l i t i c s and intarasts of ttia 
in^arial powars. I t s rasultant affact was that tha nawly 
indapandant countrias "davaloped a strong urga to maintain 
thair indapandanoa in foraign affairs «id to Xa^ away from 
tha po l i c ias baing pxursuad by tha big powars for thair own 
7 purposas," Iha progress in tha struggle for fraadom prov^ 
ad instrtjnantal in daraloping an equally strong urga in 
these countries to play thair due role in vrorld affa irs . 
They were anxious to contribute to the ever continuing 
struggle for peace and freedom. Such urges coxild find 
manifestation through tha policy of non<-alignm«nt. 
6 . Malabika Banerjee* The Non^Alioned Movement (Calcutta, 
1982)« p. 4. 
7 . Bimal Prasad, "The Evolution of Non-alignment**, in 
Una Vasudeva« (ad.) . Issues Before tten-a^ionmant i 
Past and Future. (New Delhi, 1983), p. 35. 
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Ind^«ndenc« from th* colonial rule f i r s t d«Mned 
on South and Sout»aast Asia %^ch suba^quantly 9pTmad to 
other countries, llhe waves of independence swept across 
the African continent in the later half of 1950s and by 
the beginning of I960* barring a handful colonial out-
posts l i k e South Africa* Rhodesia and Namibia* the majo-
r i t y of the countries of Asia* Africa and Latin teeriea 
hed attalaed independence by shaking off the shackles of 
colonialism. 
Cc) Wewly Independent Coxantries and iheir Problems 
ihe newly independent countries of Asia and Africa 
were feeed %d.th the then probiams of preserving their new-
l y but hard won freedom and carry on the task of eoonoiaic 
development. As discussed in preceding pages* these 
countries pursued the policy of non-alignment in the wake 
of the cold war with a view to preserve their po l i t i ca l 
ind^endenoe. 
The long years of colonial zrtile had led to economic 
strangulation of these countries. This provided them an 
unequal position in their re lat ions with more developed 
co\intries. As Leo Mates has observedi "Under-development 
and slow economic gro%rth caused internal i n s t a b i l i t y and 
p o l i t i c a l problems Which offered opportunities for pre-
ssure from outside influence and even for open forms of in* 
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t«rv«ntlon and inttf£«:«nc« in those coiintrles in t smal 
a f fa ir s . '^ ihus th« urgs for modernisation and r^pid aoo* 
nomic and social davalopmant bacama tha imnadiata goals of 
thasa oountrias. Howavar* tha succass of socio-aconomio 
policy was dapandant on paaeaful conditions« dnaaatically 
and intamational ly . Tha faar of anothar war which could 
dastroy thair po l i t i ca l indapandanca always loomad largar 
bafora tha nawly indapandant oountri as. Thay consaquantly 
aspousad for total disamsmsnt and paaeaful sattlamant of 
disputes• Ihair support to tha United Nations was "largely 
based on the hope that the world body i s the only workable 
mechanism for peaceful settlement of international dls» 
. 9 putes ••.**• 
Another concomitant factor was the craving for 
seciurity aaong the newly independent countries which made 
them pxirsua a policy of non-alignment. The cold war posed 
greatest threat to the security of the amall and weak coun-
t r i e s . Ihe super power rivalry had accentuated th i s sense 
of insecurity. The newly independent countries which 
hiq;>paned to be adjacent to the communist powers were map^-
c i a l l y subjected to th i s kind of pressure from both the 
blocs due to their strategic importance. Under these c ir* 
8. Leo Mates^ n.4« p. 57. 
9 . Mair, n.5, p. 30. 
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oumst«nc«« non-allgnii)«Qt with both th« blocs was thus 
£ound to b« th« bttst possibl* guaranttt* by thtts« count-
r i e s to preserve their national integrity and indepen-
dence. 
BMDLUTIOH py THl HfH 
The emergence of the non-aligned movomflnt was the 
resul t of the i n i t i a t i v e s undertaksn by the Asian Count* 
r i e s . The leaders of Asia were quite aware of the 
revolutionary changJas that were going on to dominate the 
international p o l i t i c s after the Second World War. 
Cecil V. QpMtto opines that the doctrine of diplomatic non-
alignment arose due to in response to a particular act of 
12 
h is tor ica l circumstance and causations. 
India i s credited with making the f i r s t o f f i c i a l 
announcement of the policy of non-alignmflnt in September 
10. P. Worsely* ''Revolution in the Third VorId"« Hew 
Left Review. Mov«nber-Dec«nber 1961, p. 19. 
11. T,M, Das« "India, Past, Present and Future", 
P9XAU9rt Sgffi^gt Q^^^frly, June, 1947, p. 205. 
12. C.V. Crabb, The glwphants and the Grass i A study 
9f ^p-flliqaa^^ '^^ •w YQ^ ^^ ^ i^^s), p. i98. 
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1946. Th« essent ia ls Ilk* peace anti-coloniallsm« antl-
racial!an non-alignment %rlth power blocs support to Afro-
Asian sol idarity and faith in the United Nations which now 
const i tute the basic prsmises of the policy of non-align-
ment were also elaborated by Nehru a few days la ter . 
Like India« another Asian country Burma also 
pioneered the cause of non-alignment. Owing to serious 
internal troubles* Burma could not devote ful l attention 
to foreign affairs during the early years of i t s indapen-
dence# but there were firm assertions even during these 
turbiUant years that provided def inite Indications of an 
independent foreign policy* The Burmese premier said in 
1949 that "of the three great western powers, the Utaited 
Kingdom, the United States and the USSR . . . APPL^ ^ wish 
that Burma itfiould be in friendly relat ions with al l the 
three. "^  In 1950# the Prime Minister of Burma «nphati-
13. Jawaharlal Nehru, Indeoidsnce and After (Delhi, 
1949). p. 340. 
14. N.N, Mitra, (ed.) Indian Annual Register, September 
1946, \fol. 11 (Calcutta, 1946), pp. 251-56. 
15. The APPL (Anti-Faacist People's Freedom League) was 
the major nat ional ist organisation in Burma and was 
the ruling party at that time. 
16. Speech by the Burmese Prime Minister, Thakin Nu on 
13 June 1948* Itawards Peece ^ d Deaaocyaev (Rangoon, Qovemment Printing Press, 1948), p. 117. 
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c a l l y declared that Burma did not des i re "allgmment with 
a part lc i i lar power bloc anteigonlstlc to other opposing 
17 b l o c , " By 1950 other Aalan countr ies l i k e Indonesia 
and Sri Lanka had also declared the pursuance of the 
p o l i c y of non-alignment as the b a s i s of the ir foreign 
pol icy* 
A s i g n i f i c a n t addition to t h i s non-al igned group 
of Aalan cotintrled during t h i s period was Yugoslavia. 
The fac tors contribut ing for Yugoslavia's pursui t of the 
p o l i c y of non-allgnmait were to a large ext«sit d i f f e r e n t 
from tliose of the Asian c o u n t r i e s . Until i t s r i f t s with 
the Soviet Union in 1948, Belgrade formed part of the 
conanxinist b l o c . But after I t s r i f t with the comnunlst 
bloo« Instead of al igning with the western b loc , Yugosl»> 
v i a preferred to pursue an Independent foreign p o l i c y . I t 
was under these drcxanstances that countr ies l i k e Indla« 
Indonesia, Yxjgoelavla and l a t e r Eg '^pt not only made non-
alignmsnt as the bed rock of the ir reap«!!Ctive foreign 
p o l i c i e s but helped in ftirthering t h i s movement. The 
Asian Relat ions Conference in March 1947 and in January 
1949 and the Bandung Conference held in 1955 provided the 
backgrovmd as well as tha baaio for t h i K/H vvhich manlf 
tod I t s e l f at the f i r s t Non-aligned Summit held at Bel-
17. %>eeoh by Prime Minister ThaXln Nu on 19 July, 1950. 
rrow Peace to S t a b i l i t y (Rangoon, Government Pr int -
ing Press , 1950), p . 86 . 
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grade In 1961 and I t s dynamism i s d i s c e r n i b l e from the 
f a c t that i t s strength has grown from summit to summit. 
(d) Asian Relat ions Conference 
In March 1947« a conference of Asian countr ies was 
he ld in New Delhi at the i n i t i a t i v e of I n d i a ' s Interim 
Government through n o n - o f f i c i a l channels . Most of the 
Asian covoitries including India r ^ r e s e n t e d at the confer-
ence were y e t to a t ta in complete independence. In a l l 28 
countr ie s par t i c ipated In t h i s conference. They included 
some of the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union as 
well as Tibet . The Arab League sent an observer to the 
conference. India had convened the conference "with the 
dual purpose of bringing about c l imate of cooperation among 
the (snerging nat ions of renascent Asia and probing the 
18 grounds on which they might cooperate with each o t h e r . " 
Nehru in h i s i^eech praised the new s p i r i t of r e -
surgent Asia and said that in Mew Asia "there are no l ead-
ers and no fo l lowers , in t h i s atomic age Asia would have to 
19 play her part in securing peace in "one world. " Though 
s t i l l under Br i t i sh co lon ia l yoke, when the conference was 
18. Gandhi J ee Roy, The Non-alioned Diplomacy of 
Mrs Indira Gandhi (Patna, 1983). p. 68. 
19. G.H. Jans«r», Afro-Asia and Npn-Alignment (Ijondon), 
1966, p . 54. 
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held« India could focus a t tent ion on global problems. I t 
playttd a notable r o l e in r a l l y i n g the support of Indepen-
dent Asian countr ies in the f i e l d of in ternat iona l p o l i -
t i c s . Malaysia and Sri Lanka were c r i t i c a l of India and 
China, as well as the Indian and Chinese c o n s t i t u e n t s , of 
the i r l o c a l populat ion. Such sentiments were echoed at 
the conference but India played i t c o o l . 
Though the Asian Relat ions Conference of March 
1947 f a i l e d to achieve any subs tant ia l gain e i ther from 
the super powers or among themselves . Yet I t was recog-
n i s ed as a f i r s t step towards conso l idat ing the newly i n -
dependent countr ies of Asia. According to G.H. Jansen, 
Asian Relat ions Conference was not more than a large grin 
20 
without a Cheshire c a t attached. However, t h i s confer-
ence sowed the seed of the non-aligned diplomacy because 
i t was the f i r s t conference of the non-aligned Asian coun-
21 t r i e s . I t was for the f i r s t time that free and indepen-
dffi:it countr ies of Asia, had gathered together to d i scuss 
the i r mutual problems and share the ir concern over global 
i s sued with the i r neighbours and other fr iendly c o u n t r i e s . 
20. I b i d . , p . 74. 
21 . Gandhijee Roy, n. 18, p . 68. 
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The aucccesful holding of the Asian Relat ions 
Conference in March 1947 has alarmed the western media. 
News Chronicle of Ijondon wrote that "a cer ta in nervous-
ness has been apparent in European c a p i t a l s l e s t some 
conspiracy for an anti-western bloc was being hatched; 
nothing i s farther from the minds of those sponsoring 
the conference. "^ The Mew York Times warned that "the 
western world w i l l do well to watch care fu l l y what i s 
hiqppening in New Delhi s ince i t may envisage large poten-
23 t i a l i t i e s . * The Timea was even more minority : "the 
world has a new force to reckon with the awakened s p i r i t 
of Asia. "^* 
Within a year succeeding the Asian Relat ions 
Confturence in March 1947« most of the countr ie s in Asia 
became indcq^endent. In August 1947, India and Pakistan 
at ta ined indiqpendenee. In January 1948 Burma and in Feb-
ruary 1948, Sri Lanka became independent. 
Indonesia was s t i l l s truggl ing for Independence 
from the Dutch co lon ia l yoke, India convened a second 
conference of the Asian Powers In January 1949 to c o n s i -
22. New Chronicle (London), 25 March, 1947, 
23. New York Times (New York), 27 March, 1947. 
24. Ihe Tiroes (London), 26 March, 1947. 
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der the question of Indonesian Independence. The Iramedlate 
problem warranting xirgent a t tent ion was to come to the r e s -
cue* of Indonesia In I t s s truggle to preserve i t s freedom 
against the Dutch attempt to re-impose the ir co lon ia l hold. 
The second Asian Conference was d i f f e r e n t from the 
conference of 1947. I t was attended by only 20 countr i e s . 
Neither the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union nor 
Vietnam was i n v i t e d . The p l e a taken by the various p a r t i c i -
pat ing countr ies was that only such countr ies %^ich were 
recognised i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y as being sovereign should be i n -
v i t e d . About one th ird members of the United Nations were 
represented in t h i s conference. These countr ies Mt l^ced 
the i r common concern about Indones ia 's Independence. 
Ind ia ' s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal M^ru said in 
h i s inaugural address: 
We meet today because the freedom of a s i s t e r 
of ours has b««i imper i l l ed and the dying 
co lon ia l i sm of the pas t has ra i sed i t s head 
again and challenged a l l the forces that are 
s truggl ing to bui ld up a new structure of the 
world . . . I t was a chal lenge to a newly awak-
ened Asia which ao long suffered under var i -
ous forms of colonial iam . . . If t h i s chal lenge 
i s not met e f f o c t i v e l y then, indeed* the con-
sequences w i l l a f f e c t not merely Indonesia but 
Asia and the e n t i r e world.25 
25. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches. Vol. l , September, 1945-
May 1949, second ed i t ion (New Delhi, 1958), p . 326. 
(Hereafter Nehru's Speeches. Vol. I ) . 
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The conference was held In such an atmosphere charged vdth 
heavy emotions that many feared that i t might r e s u l t in 
the emergence of an a n t i - c o l o n i a l Asian b loc . Washington 
and London feared such a consummation and expressed the ir 
26 
a n x i e t i e s to India through the i r embassies. However,the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s , e s p e c i a l l y Indie were convinced that Asian 
bloc simply based on a n t i - c o l o n i a l sentiments was bound to 
y i e l d no p o s i t i v e ga ins . 
Ihe conference adopted three r e s o l u t i o n s . The 
f i r s t reso lu t ion was c r i t i c a l of the Dutch action and c a l l -
ed for the action by the United Nations. The second urged 
the representat ive of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g countr ies in the UN 
to consul t among themselves on the i ssue* The p a r t i c i p a t -
ing countr ies were c a l l e d upon by the th ird resolut ion* to 
'consult each other for f inding ways <tfid means e s tab l i sh ing 
an appropriate machinery for promoting coopcurax^ion within 
27 the frame-work of the United hiations. Though the th ird 
reaolut ion envisaged a pt iaa ib i l i ty for Uie future Integra-
28 t i o n of Asia, ye t i t could not y i e l d to persuasion. 
26. For d e t a i l s see , L.K, Rosinger, India and the Unlt»d 
Sta tes (New York, 1950), pp. 86-100. 
27. Si s i r Gupta, Indian and Regional Integrat ion in Asia 
(Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1964), p . 40. 
28. See Werner Levi, Free India in Asia dMinnesota, 1954), 
p . 42 . 
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Thus there was no plan to forge an Asian b loc . I t was evl^ 
dent that the free and sovereign coxintrles of Asia were 
eager to consul t each other In reso lv ing the mutual problems 
and uni tedly opposed co lon ia l i sm. The successful convening 
of the Asian Relat ions Conference in March 1947 and then iti 
January 1949 had proved i t . 
Bandung Conference 
As we have seen in t^e preceding pages, the Asian 
Relat ions Conference proved the d e s i r e and determination of 
Asian countr ies to pursue the p o l i c y of non-alignment. But 
the mid-1950s, many countr ies in Africa hac^  also at ta ined 
independence. Ihe independent and sovereign countr ies of 
Asia and Africa were i n v i t e d to an Afro-Asian Conference 
he ld at Bandung in Indonesia in April 1955. 
The Bandung Conference, where 29 countr ies were 
represented, captxired the contemporary imagination f i r s t 
and foremost by i t s s i z e . The primary i n i t i a t i v e for Ban-
dung Conference came from Indones ia ' s Prime Minister, Ali 
Sastroamidjojo, who "p^rsviaded h i s counterparts in the 
l o o s e assoc iat ion known as the 'Colombo Powers' an informal 
grouping of Burma, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia 
j o i n t l y to sponsor a meeting of Asian and African Govem-
.. H29 ment. 
29. Robert A. Mortimer, Ihe Third Vtorld Coal i t ion in 
I n t T n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s (New York. lOflnK pT 7, 
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The purpose of the conference was envisaged In 
general termst 
to promote goodwill and cooperation onong 
the nations of Asia and Africa . . . to con-
sider social* economic and cultural prob~ 
Isns . . . to consider probl«BS of special 
interest . . . raoialism and colonialism . . . 
to view the posit ion of Asia and Africa 
and their peoples in the world today and 
the contributioii they can make to the pro-
motion of world peace and cooperat ion.^ 
Though i t was hast i ly defined* but the vague hope that 
such a meeting might enhance the place of the new states 
in the global system was aufficient to get things started; 
In February 1951# Nehru had visualised the proposed 
Afro-Asian Confer«ice "as a c\jriou8 assortment of the 
countries of Asia and Africa. ** The ^onsoring powers 
declared that the basic purpose of the conference was to 
have the participants getting acquainted with one another's 
point of view and that a participating power would not be 
s\qp{)Osed to be connitted to any view held at the conference 
32 against i t s own wishes. 
30. George Mc Turnan Kahin« The Asian-African Conference 
(Ithaca, New York i Cornell University Press, 1956)7 
p. 3. 
31. Nehru's Speech in Lok Sabha, see Lok Sabha P l a t e s . 
Vol. I , Part I I , 1955, c o l s . 520-1^ 
3 2. See for deta i l s M.S. Raj an, India in World Affairs 
1954-56, Asia Publishing House, Bombay (1964), ppl 
201-213. 
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I n d i a ' s roltt In the confer«nc« was deteirmined by 
t\K> major f a c t o r s . I t was I n d i a ' s des i re to envisage a 
c l imate of peace, cooperation and unity In Asia and 
Africa, and thereby, to e s tab l i sh the Impact of Asia and 
Africa on Internat ional p o l i t i c s . By doing so, India 
was reso lved to discourage contlncntal lam, p o l i t i c a l or 
r a c i a l . Ihough i t was a lso aware of the fact that the 
oomnnon urge guiding Asian-African cooperation lay In the 
resentment to the supremacy in world held by the West. 
India also aimed at enlarging the area of peace by prac-
t i s i n g and popularis ing the p r i n c i p l e s of Panchsheel. 
The Conference envisaged the p r i n c i p l e s for econo-
mic and cu l tura l cooperation of the dependent peoples , by 
preserving the ir r i g h t s for se l f -determinat ion and peace. 
I t suggested to e s tab l i sh a spec ia l U.N. Fund for Asian-
African c o u n t r i e s . I t c a l l e d for e l iminat ion of co lon!a -
liam with a view to envisage p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a t i o n of the 
dependent people . I t also affirmed respect for fundamen-
t a l human r i g h t s , sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of 
33 . N«^ru's i^eech, n .25 . 
34, Tiber Mende, Conversations with Mr M«hru (London, 
1956), pp. 62-631 
35. Nehru's Speech, n. 25. 
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a l l nations* non-lnterf«r«nce In the Internal a f f a i r s of 
other countr ies e t c . These p r i n c i p l e s now c o n s t i t u t e s 
the bases of non-alignment. 
India played a notable r o l e in furthering the 
message and s p i r i t of the Bandung Conference. I t d i sp lay -
ed a remarkable determination to see the conferonce r e s u l t 
i n conmon agreements. Colonialism was of the two major 
36 
controvers ia l i s sues* causing d i v i s i o n in the confer-
ence. All par t i c ipa t ing countr ie s were opposed to the 
c l a s s i c co lon ia l i sm. As most of the countr ies opposed 
western co lonia l i sm, countr ies l i k e Sri Lanka wanted oppo-
s i t i o n to be voiced against Soviet Imperialism. India 
did not share t h i s view for i t regarded the East European 
countr ies as being sovereign in law and p r a c t i c e and could 
37 
not be held to be under c o l o n i a l domination. Ihough 
India found i t hard to ge t other p a r t i c i p a t i n g coiintriea 
to agree to i t s view point but at the s m e time i t played 
s i g n i f i c a n t role# in g e t t i n g the conference agree on dec-
lar ing co lonia l i sm, in a l l i t s manifestation* as an e v i l . 
Another b i t t e r f i g h t at the Confer«ice was provok-
ed by the speech made by Pakis tan ' s Prime Minister on 
36. A Appadorai* "The Bandupg Conference"* India 
Quarterly (Mew De ' 
1955* pp. 223-31. 
D.N. Malik, Devel, _ 
Foreign Policv (Allahabad, 1967)* p. 175. 
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April 22# v^ereln he claimed during d i scuss ion on the ques-
t i o n of promotion of world peace and cooperation that the 
p r i n c i p l e s of peaceful c o - e x i s t e n c e and evwi the United 
Nations Organisation did not s u f f i c i e n t l y guarantee the 
sovereignty* independence and secur i ty of the smaller coun-
t r i e s and they were therefore forced to r e s o r t to great 
powers' aid and union for the sake of the i r o^ m s e c u r i t y . 
In h i s raply* Nehru s ta ted that "the s o - c a l l e d r e a l i s t i c 
appreciation of the world s i t u a t i o n " had ac tua l ly l e d the 
world to the brink of a th ird world war. He pointed out 
tha t i f the Asian and African countr ies remained non-
al igned with e i ther bloc* they might be in a p o s i t i o n to 
t i l t the balance of strength in favour of peace. "If a l l 
the xorld were to be divided up between these two big 
b l o c s , v^at would be the r e s u l t ? The i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t 
38 
would be war." Referring to the r i g h t to indiv idual or 
c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - d e f e n c e which the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan had been try ing to g e t the conference to approve, 
Nehru said that he did not deny t h i s r i g h t , any more than 
the r i g h t to jo in mi l i t ary pacts* l i k e Pakistan, but he 
strongly objected to the conference being asked to approve 
i t . Referring to the Turkish d e l e g a t e ' s defence of NATO, 
N^ru said that bloc had become "one of the most powerful 
39 pro tec tors of Colonial i sm." 
38, M.S. Rajan, n .32, p . 207. 
39. Ijsli^, 
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I n d i a ' s Panchsh««l p r i n c i p l e s w«re h ighly acclalm«d 
by the Bandhing powers. 
Besides f i v e p r i n c i p l e s of Panchsheel or peaceful 
co-exis tence# some new i tems were added to the f i r s t f i v e 
p r i n c i p l e s of Nehru's Panchsheel making a t o t a l of t« t 
40 p o i n t s . Nehru ha i l ed the Bandung declarat ion as c o n f i r -
ming the Panchsheel and contr ibut ing to the "area of 
peace. ** India f e l t s a t i s f i e d on the fac t that the success 
of the conference l e f t i t s impact on world p o l i t i c s and 
enhanced the prospects of s i g n i f i c a n t r i s e in the import-
ance of Asia and Africa in the United Nations . I t was 
a t t h i s conference that the concept of non-alignment was 
f u l l y esqpounded and a new dimension given to i t . 
Ihe ten p r i n c i p l e s of non-alignment adopted by the 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g countr ies of the Bandung Conferoice enabled 
each country to base i t s r e l a t i o n s with other countr ie s 
on the p r i n c i p l e s of peaceful co-exist<mcc i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
d i f f e r « i c e s in the ir social# economic and p o l i t i c a l systems 
and l e v e l of developments. 
40 . Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 4, Part 2, 1955^ Col.6970. 
4 1 . Jawaharlal Nehru's aoeeches. March 1953.August 1957 
(New Delhi« 1958), p . 291. See also Richard I . 
Mi l ler , Dao Haawiarsklold and C r i s i s Qiplomacv. 
Washington, 1961/ pp. 24-51. 
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Th« p o l i c y of Panchsheel gathared strmigth in th« 
world and many co imtr ies conm«nd«d i t as worthy of uni -
versal respect* After the conference more and more adhe-
rent s were found for the p o l i c y of non-alignment* various 
countr ies r e a l i s e d the soundness of the concept and begin 
to take i n t e r e s t in spreading and strengthening i t . 
Jawaharlal N^xru* Nasser and Tito becaoe the beacon l i g h t s 
for non^allgnmw^t in Asia-Africa and Europe r e s p e c t i v e l y 
and formed the triumvirate of non-alignment. Thus the 
p o l i c y of non-alignment became a movement spearheaded by 
the three l e a d e r s . They conducted the crusade for the 
achievement of world peace not by div iding the vorld in to 
power blocs* but by enlarging the area of peace "Freedom", 
mutual cooperation and by the e l iminat ion of colonial ism* 
r^rial ism from the surface of the world. The growing club 
of non-aligned countr ies Xh&n f e l t the need for a common 
forum for promoting mutual consu l ta t ion at regular i n t e r -
v a l s . The summit conference that began in 1961 provided 
such a forum. 
I n d i a ' s Kole in the NAM 
Non-alignment c o n s t i t u t e s one of the bas ic tenants 
o f I n d i a ' s foreign p o l i c y . The evolution of I n d i a ' s p o l i c y 
o f non-alignment i s i d e n t i f i e d with Jawaharlal Nehru. A,K. 
Oamodaran opines that "the idea of non-alignment from power 
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blocs* aa d i s t i n c t from the e a r l i e r o o n c ^ t s of n e u t r a l i t y 
or the l a t e r pe jora t ive phrase neutral ism' i s assoc ia ted 
both in i t s o r i g i n and in i t s e>>olution %d.th Jawaharlal 
42 Mshru along with three or four l e a d e r s . " However, N«hru 
denied being the or ig inator of the p o l i c y of non-alignment 
i^en he sa id on 9 Decsmber 19581 *I have not or ig inated 
i t . I t i s a p o l i c y inherent in the circumstances of 
India* inherent in the pas t thinking of India, inherent in 
the whole mental outlook of India* inherent in the condi-
t ion ing of the Indian mind during our s truggle for freedom 
and inherent in the circumstances of the viorld today. "'^  
Though Nehru might not have fathered the concept of non-
al igned movement but he played the most s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e 
in i t s evolut ion and p r o l i f e r a t i o n . 
I n d i a ' s Foreign Po l i cy spd Mon-Alignaent 
I t has been described in the preceding pages that 
non-alignment emerged as the bas ic l e v e l of foreign p o l i c y 
i n p o s t - i n d ^ e n d e n t India . I n d i a ' s r o l e in the Asian 
Re la t ions Conference of March 1947 «id January 1949 and at 
the Bandung Oonfer«fice which l a i d foundations for the NM4 
has been analysed in the preceding pages. I n d i a ' s pursui t 
4 2. A.K. Domodaran* "Jawaharlal Nehru and Non-alignment" 
(New Delhi* 1983)* p . 48. 
eharlal Nehru* I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy* Sele< 
eches. September 1946-ADril 1961 (New Delhi. 
IT* p . 80 . , 
4 3. Jawaharl e lected 
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of th« p o l i c y of non-alignment i s b r i e f l y analysed In the 
context of leading events up to the holding of the F i r s t 
NAM Summit at Belgrade in September 1961. 
I n d i a ' s dest iny in foreign r e l a t i o n s had already 
been c a s t by Jawaharlal N ^ r u ' s statement of 7 September 
1946 v^en he sa id that India would keep away from the 
p o l i t i c s of power blocs* This statement was made by Hehru 
when India had y e t to a t ta in i t s independence. Oonsequent* 
l y vqpon India a t ta in ing independence on 15 August 1947, 
the non-alignment became the main bulwark of Ind ia ' s 
foreign p o l i c y . 
Non-alignment promoted in terna l s t a b i l i t y and 
ex terna l ly i t enhanc«KS I n d i a ' s p r e s t i g e in the in ternat ion -
al community. I t a lso did not e s c a l a t e the " p o l i t i c a l 
schisophrenia"* in the minds of the people . I t rather 
envisaged condi t ions condusive for the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . 
I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with almost a l l the countr ies have r e -
mained c o r d i a l . Even with Pakistan and China where cer ta in 
d i f f erences do e x i s t because of various rc^asons, India has 
always sought fr iendship and set t lement of d ispute by 
peaceful means. 
India played a p ivo ta l r o l e in espousing the cause 
of unity and cooperation in Asia. I t also helped in streng-
44 . Frank Moraes, Nehru i A Biography (New York, 1959), 
p . 402. 
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thttilng the NAM« I t never espired to be the leader of 
Asia. Yet i t s geographical s i tua t ion in the cont inent 
was dest ined to o f f er leadership to India* Sikkim was 
converted in to protec torate and Bhutan acquired a 
spec ia l s ta tus and Nepal wanted simply patronisat ion* 
India forged c l o s e and f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with Burma« 
Ceylon and Indonesia %^ich also needed mutual c o n f i -
dence. 
Despite the c r i t i c i « n « of i t s p o l i c y in India 
and abroad* India continued i t s coamitMent to the p o l i c y 
of non-alignment. As we have seen in the preceding pages 
the newly ind^endent countr ies of Asia affirmed the i r 
f a i t h in the p o l i c y of non-alignment and were mainly i n s -
p ired by the example of India . The successful convening 
o f the two Asian Relat ions Conferences and the Bandung 
Conference were proof of t h i s . 
45 . I b i d . / pp. 3-4 . 
46 . Sikkim was merged in to the Indian Union in 1974. 
47 . See« the Indiai-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 8 August 
(2nd edn.J^7<New Delhi, 1 9 5 ^ 7 pp. 15-19. 
4 8 . Hindu (Madras)« 29 S^terober, 1946. 
4 9 . Ibid.* 9 January, 1947. 
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Kor«an Cri«i«> 
But India remained s i l e n t for about a year in 
order to gain Chinese support £or envisaging peace and 
cooperation in Asia. At the same time India was r e l u c -
tant to acciqpt the reconmendations of the F i r s t Committee 
of the UN General Assvnbly where i t was reso lved that 
China's non-aoc^tance of the Arai>>Asian r e s o l u t i o n on 
c e a s e - f i r e ended the prospects of negot ia t ion on Korea. 
Nehru nursed the hope of re s tor ing the atmosphere with 
a l t e r n a t i v e proposa ls . However» subsequently India sup-
ported the UN reso lu t ion on Korea. I t s r ^ r e s e n t a t i v e at 
the UN Security Council had voted in favour of the f i r s t 
51 
re so lu t ion of 25 June. While supporting the second r e -
solution* India said that mediation over the Korean c r i s i s 
was p o s s i b l e . U.K. and China were informed by New Delhi 
of i t s own suggestion towards c lear ing the atmosphere for 
52 
mediation. At the same time* India wa& opposed to 
North Korean representat ive being i n v i t e d to the Security 
53 Council because the l a t t e r was the aggressor. "All t h i s 
50. United Nations (UN), O f f i c i a l Records of Qeneral 
Asseablv (hereafter O^gR) * F i r s t Commltte*, 1951, 
419th MeeUng* Cbl. 4597 
51 . Qggg^ftXfifpgrdf qf ^ i | Sf9xy4ty Cgx^yH (hereafter 
SCOR) 1950* 473rd M«eting, p . 16. Also see , B. Shiva 
Rao, "Nehru and the UN-I", The Statesman (Calcutta) 
7 December, 1965. 
5 2. K.M. Panlkkar, In Two Chinas (London, 1955),pp. 105-6, 
5 3. SCOR, 1950, 483rd Meeting, p . 11. 
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th«rtt£or«« may lead to infar that what motivated India to 
be prompt In holding North Korea an aggressor was I t s 
d e s i r e to demonstrate that the p a c i f i c Import of I t s non-
alignment did not mean appeasing the aggressor and that 
here non-alignment c l e a r l y contrasted vdth n e u t r a l i t y . " 
In the period prior to the Korean war, nei ther 
the East nor West regarded the p o l i c y of non-alignment 
ser iously* I t was viewed as nothing more than "a verbal 
55 
e x e r c i s e . " Under the Truman Doctrine* the United States 
had declared I t s p o l i c y of g lobal containment of the ooai-
munlam. China and Asian port ion of Russia became the main 
anchor aheets of US's Asian p o l i c y . By mld-19508« the 
United States had succeeded In creat ing a large network of 
a l l i a n c e s Involving as many as 42 c o u n t r i e s . This had 
l e d the Soviet Union and other East European countr ies to 
expand the i r network of a l l i a n c e s thus r e s u l t i n g In the 
e sca la t ion of co ld war. 
Unlike Pakistan, India could not be entrapped by 
Washington Into i t s m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e system, I n d i a ' s 
54. Malik, n.38, p . 84. 
55 . Charles H. Heimsath, "Hon-Allgnment Re-assessedi 
The Esqperience of India* in R. Hilsman and R.c . 
Sood ( e d s . , ) , ypreian P o l i c i e s in the S i x t i e s , 
(Bal t i0»re , 1965), p . 4 9 . 
56. For d e t a i l s see David Klmche , Xhe Afro-Asian Move-
meot » IdealoQV and fore ion Pol icy of the Third 
World (NewYbrk, 1973), p . 59, 
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57 p o l i c y of non-alignment* by thus* had c r y s t a l l i z e d . 
I n d i a ' s r«luctance to Join the Anerican ^x>nsored m i l i -
tary a l l i a n c e s annoyed the US and i t o f fered Pakistan on 
opportunity to befriend of the United States and accept 
B Q 
her a l l i a n c e p o l i c y so that she could contain India . 
The s t r a t e g i c planners in Washington were of the 
view that In ordM: to contain commxuiism in South and 
South-East Asia* t-he Asian coxintries had to be brought 
under an a l l i a n c e systsm modelled on North At lant ic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO). Bventually on 8 September 
1954 the countr ies of South and South-East Asia «nd USA 
59 
signed the flouth-Eaat Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 
In 1955, United States sponsored another treaty organi-
zat ion known as Baghdad Pact Which was renamed as Cent-
ra l Treaty Organization (CBNTO). Pakistan Joined both 
SEATO and CENTO because i t s straitegic l oca t ion provided 
a l ink betw««n SEATO and CENTO, 
57. A ^padorai* Essays in Indian P o l i U c a and Foreign 
Pol icy . (Delhi; 19^iL p . 14<d. 
58. John Kuttam>US-Pakistan and India t A study of US 
Role in the I i i ^ a Paikistan Arms Reee (New Delhi. 
1974)* p . 35. 
59. For f u l l t e x t of the Treaty see* Docuraents on 
/merican Ftoreign Relat ions 1954 (Washington, 1955), 
pp. 319-23. 
60 . For the t e x t of CENTO treaty , see . I b i d . , (1956), 
pp. 342-44. 
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Pakis tan ' s s trategy o£ Joining these mi l i t ary 
a l l i a n c e s was not governed by the fear of "communist agg-
r e s s i o n "# but because of i t s fear from a non-al igned India. 
Pres ident Ayub Khan %«ho played a leading r o l e in Pakis tan's 
alignment vilth SSATO and CEHTO* vtrote that "the cause of 
the problon from the very beginning was the Indian a t t i t u d e 
of h o s t i l i t y towards usi we had to look for a l l i e s to 
secure our p o s i t i o n . " He further asserted that h i s i n -
t e r e s t was e x c l u s i v e l y in terms of the defence of Pakistan 
and he wanted to take the advantage of such defence pacts 
62 
t o bui ld \xp the defence forces of Pakistan. Thus the 
main znotive of Pakis tan's jo in ing these a l l i a n c e s was the 
r e s u l t of i t s extreme patholog ica l o i t i - I n d i a s tance . Pak-
i s t a n also adgned the Mutual Defence Agreement Pact (MOAP) 
on 19 May 1954 with the United S t a t e s . Ihese arrange-
ments paved the way for inf low of ^ e r i c a n arms in to 
Pakistan on a very modest s c a l e from 1954. «^ich increased 
r ^ i d l y in sxibsequent years . 
India r e j e c t e d the bipolar d iv i s i on of the world. 
I t pursued an independent p o l i c y of keeping away from the 
6 1 . htohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Master (Lahore, 
1967), p . 154, 
6 2 . IbjLd., p . 116. 
6 3 . For f u l l t e x t see , Pocuments on Anerican Foreign 
Re la t ions , pp. 379-83. 
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m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s end Judga «very i c s u s on the bas i s of 
i t s mer i t s . This formed the p i t ch and substance of 
I n d i a ' s p o l i c y of non*alignment. Paki s tan ' s in ten t ion 
of jo ining the U.S. Defence Al l iance was viewed by India 
as a ser ious developnent which coxU.d «ndang«r the secur i ty 
o f the sub-continent thus marring the chances of any s e t -
tlement by peaceful means, l i ^ r u warned that the MOAP 
%#ould change the s i tua t ion in the Indian sub-continent* 
He forewarned in a statonant on 22 F^ruary 1954 that 'die 
'*step adds to the f e e l i n g of i n s e c u r i t y in Asia. I t i s , 
therefore* a vrong step from point of view of peace and 
65 
removal of t e n s i o n s . " He had even v i s u a l i z e d that US 
arms supplied to Pakistan were not going to be used against 
the comnunist countr ies but against India , vt i i le address-
ing the 59th Session of the Congress on 23 February 1954 
Mrtu:^ saidt "If Pakistan accepts t h i s aid, she becomes a 
part of the group of nat ions l i n e d up against another 
grovqp. She becomes p o t e n t i a l l y a war area and her p o l i c i e s 
w i l l be progress ive ly contro l l ed by o thers . . . The other 
f a c t that - t h i s mi l i tary aid might p o s s i b l y be used 
6 4 . K.R. Harayana, "I'lew Perspect ives on Indian Foreign 
Pol icy", The Round Table (London), No.248, Octob«: 
1972, p . 453l 
65 . Parliamentary Debates^ Vbl. I , No. 6 (1954), Cbl. 
432. 
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against India > cannot b«i Ignored. ** Unfortxinately 
N^uru did not l i v e to see h i s prophecy came true In 1965 
and 1971, 
I t i s worth mentioning here that at <i t i n e -when 
I n d i a ' s own secur i ty was endangered, owing to Pakis tan's 
Joining of the US sponsored railitary a l l i a n c e s , i t did 
not de^riate from i t s chosen path of non-alignment and 
rather pursued t h i s p o l i c y more v igorous ly . I t was a 
t e s t i n g for Ind ia ' s coiwnltinent to the p o l i c y of non» 
alignment ^ i c h i t s teered s u c c e s s f u l l y . 
I t seeiTis s u f f i c e here to say tliat India played a 
notable r o l e in furthering the cause of non-alignment. 
Even at the time of c r i s i s in which i t was d i r e c t l y i n -
volved. The po l i cy of non-alignment became the main bui-
werX of Ind ia ' s foreign p o l i c y . Indie 'r exartplary ro l e 
and i t s comniitment to the KAM p r i n c i p l e s insp ired other 
cot intr ies . Ind ia ' s r o l e in the non-aligned summit con-
ferences i s analysed in subsequent chapters . 
66 . Keesina's Contantporarv Archives (London), .fol. 9 
(1953-54), pp. 134-61. 
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Chapter I I I 
INDIA'S ROL£ AT THE FIRST SUMMIT CONFERENCE 
OF NON.ALIGNED COUNTRIES (BELGRADE, SEPTEMBER 1961) 
Th« f i r s t Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned 
countr ie s was held at Belgrade (Yugoslavia) from 1~6 Sep-
tember 1961. This Conference was attended by Heads of 
State or Government of the 25 countr ies and three cotmt-
r i e s were represented as observers . The non-aligned 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g countr ies weret Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, 
Cambodia/ Ceylon^ Congo« Cuba, Cyprus, Ethopia, Ghana, 
Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, 
Nepal, Seudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab 
Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia. 
Ihe fol lowing countr ies were r«pres«nted by 
observers! Bo l iv ia , Braz i l , Ecuador. 
The agenda of the Summit Conferaice comprised: 
(I) Exchange of views on the Internat ional s i t u a t i o n . 
(II) Establishment and strengthening of Internat ional 
peace and secur i ty : 
(a) Respect of the r i g h t of peoples and nat ions to 
se l f -determinat ion , s truggle against imptf-lilismt 
(b) Respect of the sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l In-
t e g r i t y of s t a t e s ; non- interference and non-
intervent ion in in terna l a f f a i r s of s t a t e s ; 
1. Qjcumwits of the Qatherinqs of Non-Alioned Countriep. 
1961-1978 (hereafter NAM doc\ments) (Belgrade, 1978), 
p . 5. 
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(c) Racial discrimination and oparthled; 
(d) g«n«ral and coBq;>let« dls«mam«nt; banning 
of nuclaar t « « t s ; problam of foralgn m i l i t a r y 
bas«a. 
(•; Paaoaful co -«x l s tance anong s t a t e s with differ-
ent p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l systams; 
(f) Role and structture of the United Nations and 
the linplflmantatlon of I t s r e s o l u t i o n s . 
( I l l ) Problems of unequal economic development; promo-
t ion of Internat ional economic and technical c o -
operation; 
(Iv) Other matters . 
(v) Commxinlque of the confero ice . 
(a) Background to the Summit 
The f i r s t summit of the non-aligned countr ies was 
he ld at Belgrade from 1-6 September 1961. Prior to thl8» 
a preparatory meeting of the representa t ives of the non-
al igned countr ies was held at Cairo (Egypt) from 5-12 Juni 
1961 \inder the Chairmanship of Egyptian Foreign Minister, 
Dr Mahmoud Fawzl# not to e s t a b l i s h an organizat ion or for* 
mulate a c o n s t i t u t i o n or a charter for th« non-aling«5d 
movement but to adopt cer ta in p r i n c i p l e s . 
Peter W l l l e t t s opines that there were three main 
reasons for holding the f i r s t summit at Belgrade: ' the 
c l o s e r e l a t i o n s betwe«n Yugoslavia, Egypt and India; the 
dramatic Impact of the African s t a t e s on world a f f a i r s In 
1960; and a sudden Increase in tension after hopes had 
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b«en ra i sed for an easing In the cold war. 
This conference* the ' f i r s t concerted action of the 
non-al igned countr i e s ' was i n i t i a t e d tinder the convic -
t i o n that non-alignment has become a growing force in the 
world and that time has now come to gather t h i s force t o -
gether to turn i t i n t o a coordinated accijumulated moral 
force* Th9 f i r s t suggest ion for arranging such a sunmit 
conference was reportedly mooted by Marshal Tito of Yugo-
s l a v i a in the year 1959. 
During the l a t e 1950s and t i l l 1960/ the wave of 
independence had swept across the African cont inent . In 
1960* s ix teen nat ions of Africa had become independent 
and Joined the United Nations. At the same time« the prob-
l e n of apartheid i n South Africa had s tar ted g e t t i n g the 
world at tent ion focussed on i t . The c r i s i s In Congo and 
g u e r r i l l a war in Algeria had brought the 'cold war' into 
the heart of Africa. The experiences in the Congo and 
Algeria l ed Kwamc Nicrumah of Ghana to sound the idea of a 
2 . Peter Wi l ia t t e s , The Non-Alioned Movementi The Origins 
of a Third World Al l iance . (Bombay, 1978), p . 10. 
3 . Belgrade Conferencf of Heads of s t a t e or Gcvernmwit of 
Non-AlJgned Oountries (Belgrade, 1961), p . 17. 
4 . Indonesian President Seokeurno's Speech at Belgrade 
Conferimce/ ib id .# p . 25. 
5 . K.P. Karunakaran, "Background to the Neutral Nations' 
Sxjnrniit", USI Journal (New Delhi ) , Vol. LXXXX, p. 175. 
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conference of a l l non-allgnnedl coxuitrles p a r t i c u l a r l y of 
Asia and Africa on 4 July 1960. 
However, the independent countr ies of Africa i^ich 
were 26 in 1960« w«re divided in to two groups - Brazzavi-
7 8 
l i e Group and the Cesab^lanca Group. ihe Brazzav i l l e 
group was appr^ens ive of Nkrumah's campaign for Pan-
Africanism. Egypt, because of i t s geographical s i t u a t i o n , 
i s both an African as well as Arab country. Nasser had 
already been in c l o s e touch with Nehru and Tito , and was 
regular ly 'consult ing them on a l l the major problons of 
9 
those t i m e s . ' The Casablanca group tinder the leadership 
of Nkr\iroah and Nasser supported the move for a meet of the 
non-aligned c o u n t r i e s . The f i f t e e n t h aeaaion of the l i l t e d 
Nations General Asssmbly was also due in Septontber i960. 
The meeting of the Casablanca group members in January 1961 
s t re s sed the need for a ge t - toge ther of th>e non-aligned 
c o u n t r i e s . 
6 . D.N. Malik, "Belgradet New Phase", in K.p. Karuna-
karan, ed . . Outside the Contest (New Delhi, 1963), 
p . 189. 
7. Brazzav i l l e Group comprised ex-Prench Colonies of 
Africa. 
8 . Casablanca Group cons i s t ed of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, 
Morocco, and Egypt. The Provis ional Government of 
Algeria was also i t s f u l l mannber. 
9 . M. Heikal, Nassert The Cairo Dpcuments (London, Mentor 
P^erbacks , 1973), Chapters VIII and IX are of spe-
c i a l i n t e r e s t , pp. 60-110. 
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In March 1961, Indonesian President , Soekamo sent 
l e t t e r s to Heads of other governments suggest ing a Bandung 
type ge t - together vdhich could inc lude newly independait 
countr ies vAno 'support the l iqu ida t ion of colonialiatn and 
imperialism in the shortes t p o s s i b l e time« • 
Itie third factor instrumental in c a l l i n g the B e l . 
grade summit was the increase in the cold war t e n s i o n s . In 
1959 fol lowing the visit of Soviet Premier Khrushchev to 
the United States , hopes were ra i sed for convening a sum-
mit conference of big powers, inc luding Bri ta in and France, 
in May 1960 at Par i s , But the shooting down of U-2 spy 
plane by the Soviet Union in early 1960 and the fxirore over 
t h i s a f fa ir brought the c o l l a p s e of such a sunmit. The 
c r i s e s over Berlin and Congo further .-Tiarred the p r o j e c t s 
of detente between the big powers. However, there was no 
support from the big powers for convening an in ternat iona l 
meet out s ide the United Nations to f ind out ways and means 
for easing the co ld war t ens ions . But the leaders of the 
non-al igned coxmtries l i k e ^ i t o , Nasser, l^^ru and Soekamo 
*had not l o s t the hope. As mentioned above, Soekarno had 
already c a l l e d for second Bandung type meeting in Ppril 
1961. However N<d^ ru was l e s s en thus ias t i c for, according 
to him, such a confer«rice at the moment was ' l i k e l y to r e -
10. Scekarno quoted in Malik, n.6 , p. 190. 
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s u i t In th« show of d i suni ty than un i ty . 
As th« leaders of the non-alignctd countr i e s were 
attending the f i f t e e n t h ses s ion of the UN General Asssmbly, 
in September 1960* Yugoslavia i s reported to have c a l l e d a 
meeting of Tito* Nasser, Ntfiru# NXrumah and Seokarno at 
the Yugoslavia's permanent miss ion at the UN, New York. 
Both the Egyptians and the Yugoslavs have referred to t h i s 
12 
meeting as the f i r s t non-al igned meeting. 
These f i v e leaders had agreed to j o i n t l y sponsor a 
pimple reso lut ion c e l l i n g upon both Soviet Union and the 
United States to review the i r contac t s interrupted recent -
13 l y . ' There was no en thus ias t i c response e i ther from the 
West or the East. F ina l ly N^ru withdrew the r e s o l u t i o n , 
14 
as i t no longer had much meaning or u s e f u l n e s s . 
In the wake of impending impasse, >Marshal Tito 
xindertook a long tour of Africa from 13 February to 23 
11. Nehru quoted in QuardiftP/ (Manchester), 10 May 1961, 
12. See, Ihe UAR and the Po l i cy of Hon-Alionment (Cairo, 
UAR State Information S«rvloe, n . d . ; , p . 22. See 
also Da9V»Hgflti* ^ t f v i t v of Mon^Alioned Co< 
(Belgrade, n . d . ) , p« l . Leo Mates claims that the 
meeting was held a t the Yugoslavia's permanent 
mission at the UN, New York. See Leo Mates, Npn-
Aliqnmentt Theory and Current Po l i cy . (Belgrade, 
1972), p . 228. 
13. UN O f f i c i a l Records of the General Asecmblv (here. 
af ter GAOR), 15th Sess ion, Plenary Meetings, p. 289. 
See also UN Doc. V 4 5 2 2 . 
14. Peter W l l l e t t s , n .2 , p . 12. 
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April 1961 to promote the idea of holding a conference of 
the non-aligned countr i e s . When Tito met Nasser In April 
1961 the l a t t e r showed keen i n t e r e s t in T i t o ' s proposal . 
Both Tito and Nasser were 'so anxious and so determined 
to hold t h i s conference that they at l«ngth decided to 
ignore Nehru', who was s t i l l re luc tant to that idea . 
During the l a s t week of April a j o i n t communique 
i s sued by Tito and Nasser appealed to the leaders of non-
al igned countr ies proposing the confer« ice and suggesting 
therein that i t had to be so organised as to have 'a 
salutary e f f e c t ' on the UN G«ieral Assembly meeting in 
i t s s ixteenth sess ion in September 1961. 
An i n v i t a t i o n to a preparatory conference to be 
held at Cairo to arrange the main conference was i ssued 
on 26 April 1961. Following t h i s f a i t accompli India had 
to support the idea and asked that i t s n^ne should be 
17 joined to those of the o r i g i n a l sponsors. 
15. G.H, Jans«i , Afro-Asj.a and Non-Aliqnroait» (London, 
1966), p . 280. 
16. For f u l l t e x t of the commiinique, see Arab Observer, 
(Cairo), >tol. I I , No. 20, 14 May 1961, pp. 14-15. 
17. Ihere are a few referofices to the f i r s t o f f i c i a l 
diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e for having is8U|ed i n v i t a t i o n s 
for a Non-Aligned Cbnference having been mooted by 
Tito and Nasser. The date 26 April 1961 i s given 
in the Svif^oDsis of the Second Conference of Non-
Alioned Countries. (Cairo« Information Department, 
n .d*) , p . v i i i . G.H. Jan8«m r e f e r s to a period 
about a week l a t e r than 22 April 1961. See Jansen, 
n. 15, p . 281. 
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On 16 May 1961, an announcement and an I n v i t a t i o n 
from P r e s i d « i t Ti to , Nassar and Seokarno, « iv isaged that a 
preparatory meeting for a non-aligned conference would 
meet in Cairo on 5 June 1961 to be followed by a main con-
ference held sometime before the s ix teenth sess ion of the 
18 General Assembly of the United Nations. India wanted 
the proposed conference to be primarily concerned with 
problems of in ternat ional r e l a t i o n s r e l a t i n g to war and 
peace. 
(b) Preparatory Meeting for the Belgrade Conference 
A preparatory meeting for the conference of the 
Non-Aligned Nations took p lace at Cairo from 5 to 12 Jtxne 
1961 in response to an i n v i t a t i o n of President Tito of 
Yugoslavia, President Nasser of Egypt and President Seo-
karno of Indonesia, who were joined by the Prime Minister, 
20 Pandit Ndiru of India. 
Orig inal ly 22 countr ies were to attend i t , but 
only 20 of them actual ly attended i t . There prevai led a 
18. Jansttn, n . l S , pp. 281-82. 
19. D.N. Malik, n.6, p . 191. 
20. NAM Documents, n. l , p . 3. 
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di£f«renc« of opinion on a numbar of i s s u e s discussed by 
the meeting. Of the e ight i t « n s on the agenda for the 
meeting* the composition of the conferwic '/ seat ing of 
the Algerian Provis ional Government and S t a n l e y v i l l e 
Government of Congo at the preparatory meeting and draft-» 
ing of the conference agenda were the most important. 
Ghana's proposal to i n v i t e the Algerian Provis ional 
Government and the S t a n l e y v i l l e Governmait of Congo r e a l -
l y sparked of f the controversy. Some of the p a r t i c i p a t -
ing countr ies v*iich had not recognized the Algerian Provi-
s ional Governmont opposed l a t t e r ' s membership. However, 
after long d i scuss ions the Provis ional Governm«it of Al-
ger ia was admitted to the meeting on the th ird day. 
The preparatory meeting f a i l e d to f i n a l i s e the 
composition of the conference* however, i t evolved broad 
p r i n c i p l e s . A f i v e point "def in i t ion" of non-alignment 
was drawn up on the b a s i s of which the l i s t of p a r t i c i -
pants was to be worked o u t . The task of choosing the i n -
v i t e e s was, however, l e f t to the Committee of Ambassadors 
of the 20 countr i e s . 
The c r i t e r i o n worked out on the bas i s of the f i v e 
po in t s as the "def ini t ion" of a non-aligned country was 
as followsx 
( i ) The coxintry should be p\irsuing an indepen-
dent p o l i c y based on non-alignment and 
peaceful oo -ex i s t ence ; 
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( l i ) I t should support a n t l - c o l o n i a l l i b e r a t i o n 
movement; 
( l i l ) I t should n o t be member o f t h e m i l i t a r y 
p a c t s i n t h e c o n t e x t of E a s t - w e s t s t r u g g l e ; 
( i v ) I t should n o t be a member o f a b i l a t e r a l 
m i l i t a r y p a c t wi th a b i g power; 
(v) I t should grant no m i l i t a r y banes to f o r e i g n 
powers . 21 
The f i v e - p o i n t d e f i n i t i o n o f non-a l ignment was 'a compro-
22 
m i s e between t h e moderates and t h e m i l i t a n t s * . 
The p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e meet ing a l s o d i s c u s s e d 
s u g g e s t i o n s for t h e agenda of t h e Conference . Although t h e 
Conference i t s e l f was t o workout i t s own agenda, the p a r t i -
c i p a n t s i n the preparatory meet ing recommended e d r a f t 
agenda so as to h e l d the p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o u n t r i e s . The r e -
commended agenda was as f o l i o w s t 
( i ) R e s p e c t of t h e r i g h t to p e o p l e s and n a t i o n s 
to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t 
i m p e r i a l i s m ; l i q u i d a t i o n o f c o l o n i a l i s m and 
n e o - c o l o n i a l i a m ; 
( i i ) R e s p e c t o f t h e t e r r i t o r i a l s o v e r e i g n t y and 
i n t e g r i t y o f s t a t e s ; n o n - i n t e r t e ' e n c e and 
n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s 
o f s t a t e s ; 
( i i i ) Rac ia l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and ^ a r t h e i d ; 
2 1 . Statesman/ (New D e l h i ) , 12 June 1961. 
2 2 , D.N. Malik, n . 6, p . 193. 
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(Iv) General and complete disarmament* prohib i -
t ion of nuclear experiments/ problem of 
foreign m i l i t a r y basesf 
(v) Peacefxil c o - e x i s t e n c e betwe«:i s t a t e s with 
d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l system; 
(vi) Role and composition of the United Nations 
and the ijiqplementation of i t s r e s o l u t i o n s ; 
problems of xinequal economic development; 
improvsment of in ternat iona l economic and 
technical cooperat ion. 23 
As regards the f i v e - p o i n t d e f i n i t i o n of a non-
al igned country, India espoused for a f l e x i b l e d e f i n i t i o n 
capable of maximum accommodation. India argued against 
the Non-Aligned being a r e l a t i v e l y small coherent exc lus ive 
group and proposed that many more countr ies should be i n -
24 
v i t e d to the f u l l summit conferwice. 
India further pleaded that i t was more p r o f i t a b l e 
to keep the d e f i n i t i o n very broad-based at t h i s s tage of 
the growth of non-alignment. I t argued that cer ta in count-
r i e s v^ich had involvuitari ly become party to m i l i t a r y pacts 
with the ir previous co lon ia l masters were p o l i t i c a l l y non-
25 
a l igned . India further opined that the newly independent 
covin t r i e s had to continue with the o ld economic t i e s they 
23. "Official Communique on the Preparation for the 
Belgrade Ck^nference", NAM DDCuments# n. 1, p . 3, 
24. r^ter w i l l e t t s , n.2, p. 13. 
25. Adopted from D.N. Malik, n, 6, pp. 193-94. 
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had with the former co lon ia l powers and these countr ies 
had, therefore, to cooperate with them out of n e c e s s i t y . 
Besides the newly Independent coxintries were having m i l i -
tary bases as a condit ion to the attainment of the ir inde-
pendence. I t also expressed the view that qu i te a c o n s i -
derable number of Latin American snd European n e u t r a l i s t 
countr ies could contribute to the expansion of the area of 
26 
non-alingment. 
The f ina l communique of the meeting observed that 
the *zone of non^allgnmont could be further extended both 
from the view-point of a c t i v i t y and of Inf luence, with the 
aim of transforming i t in to a base factor for the preserva-
27 t ion of internat ional peace and seciu'ity'. I t also ex-
pressed the convict ion that 'with the holding of such a 
conference, p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s could be achieved in the i n -
t e r e s t s of world peace, e f f e c t i v e Internat ional cooperation, 
and the r e a l i z a t i o n of the asp irat ions of m i l l i o n s of people 
28 for independence and a be t t er and hsppier future, ' 
The par t i c ipa t ing countr ies at the preparatory 
meeting affirmed ' the ir l o y a l t y to the po l i cy of non-a l ign-
ment as a method of approaching p o s i t i v e l y the problems 
26, Ib id . 
27, Ham Documents, n . l , p. 3. 
28, Ibid . 
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29 
which confront the world'. All the p a r t i c i p a t i n g count-
r i e s agreed that the Conference of State or Government of 
Non-Allgned countr ies should be held In Yugoslavia in 
early September 1961, 
The F i r s t NAM Surotnit Conference (Belgrade^ 1-6 September 
1961) 
The preparatory meet ing's task was qui te h i s t o r i c 
in deciding tiie veniie and time of the confero ice . Several 
cho ices for the prospect ive v«iue came up. Ihe suggest ive 
p laces included Havana, New Delhi* Belgrade* New York and 
even Stockholm. Cuba's suggestion that ' the conference be 
he ld at Havana as i t was the centre of s truggle against 
the US imperialism was p r a c t i c a l l y ignored' , because 
the other non-aligned co\ intries refused to take extreme 
p o s i t i o n s . India I t s e l f did not favour New Delhi as the 
venue. Final ly the cons^isus emerged in favour of Bel-
grade. Ilie choice of the date - 1 September 1961 - mani-
f e s t ed the common des i re of a l l non-aligned nat ions to 
'make the weight of the ir de l ibera t ions f e l t by the s i x -
teenth sess ion of the UN General Assembly' which was 
scheduled to meet on 16 September 1961. 
29. Ib id . 
30. D.N. Malik, n. 6, p. 196. 
31 . Ib id . 
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The 20-nation /<nbaasadors Committee which was 
cons t i t u t ed by the Preparatory Meeting to f i n a l i s e the 
l i s t of i n v i t e e s for the Belgrade Conference, s tarted 
work on 21 June 1961 at Cairo. This Committee was faced 
with the problem of how to i n t e r p r e t and apply the f i v e -
po int d e f i n i t i o n of a non-aligned country. There was a 
general agreement among the Committee Members with r e -
gard to the further es^anslon of the non-al igned area. 
But there energed a divergence of opinions as to how to 
do i t , India and Burma had advocated the degree of f l e x -
i b i l i t y and accommodation. But Cuba, Sri Lanka and fc^gypt 
were re luctant to envisage any d i l u t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s on 
which non-alignment was based. As the consu l ta t ions 
among the /tnbassadors of the 20-natlon committee were 
s t i l l going on, the committee r e a l i s e d that the term, 
•neutralism* included p o s i t i v e neutralism, progress ive 
neutra l ian , non-alignment, the uncommitted and the d i s -
32 
engaged. In order to avoid confusion and f a c i l i t a t e 
the smooth functioning of the committee, Jawaharlal Nrfiru 
in a personal l e t t e r addressed to Tito and Nasser s t r e s s -
ed that i t was not enough for the s o - c a l l e d n e u t r a l i s t 
3 2. Statpeaman, (New Delhi ) , 24 June 1961, The terms 
neutral ism, non-alignment uncommitted as used in 
t i l l s paragraph denote the preva i l ing connotation 
of the term and not what i t means today. 
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nat ions to be non-al igned to power-blocs but that they 
33 should b« non-aligned among thonse lves . 
Tito in h i s reply to N^ru agreed that the Confer-
34 
ence should be broad-based. Consequently bes ides the 
20 countr ies which par t i c ipa ted in the preparatory meet-
ing, 8 more countr ies were s e l e c t e d . These weret Lebanon* 
Bo l iv ia , Ecuador, Togoland, Upper ^folta, Nigeria, Mexico 
and Braz i l . However, Togoland, Nigeria and Mexico did not 
35 
accept the i n v i t a t i o n . Later Tvmisia and Cyprus were 
i n v i t e d to the Conference. Thus these 28 non-aligned 
countr ies a l l which had agreed to p a r t i c i p a t e in the Bel-
grade Conference. Of 28, 25 were ful f ledged p a r t i c i p a n t s 
and three opted to remain as observers . 
Thus a l l the decks were c leared to organize the 
f i r s t sunsnit conference of the non-aligned countr ies at 
Belgrade. I t was organized from 1 to 6 September 1961 .I t 
was attended by 25 non-aligned countr ies and three count-
r i e s sent observers . 
33 . Hindustan Ti^es (New De lh i ) , 28 July 1961. 
34. The Hindu, (Madras), 8 August 1961. 
35. Hindustan Tiroes, (New Delhi), 8 July 1961. 
36. "Declaration of the Heads of State or Governnia^t of 
Non-Aligned Countries at Belgrade, 1-6 September 
1961", NAM Eocuraents, n . l , p . 5. 
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The countr ies p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the Belgrade 
Conference represented above one-third of mankind and 
thus c l e a r l y demonstrated the thrust of non-alignm«it as 
a force to reckon within in ternat ional a f f a i r s . I t was 
very s i g n i f i c a n t that the conference had the character of 
a suiranit - the f a c t that the majority of the countr ies 
i 
were represented by the ir ch i e f execut ive s , Ntiiru, Tito# 
Nasser, Seokarno and Nkrtamah were the dominating f igures 
of the Conference. 
(c) Internat ional Problems, Summit's Decis ions and 
I n d i a ' s Role 
The Belgrade Summit Confer«nce was held in the 
background of an alarming i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of in ternat iona l 
t ens ion . N^ru f e l t impatient with those who continued to 
g ive top p r i o r i t y to co lon ia l problems. He f e l t that t h i s 
par t i cu lar b a t t l e had been won already in essence and that 
only the d e t a i l s remained to be worked o u t ; h i s own c o n t r i -
bution to t h i s working out of the d e t a i l s was the l i b e r a -
t ion of Goa. But an ana lys i s of the speeches de l ivered at 
the conference revea l s that there prevai led a d i f f erence 
of opinion in the views of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o u n t r i e s . 
Jawaharlal N^ru attached top p r i o r i t y to the 
question of the threat to world peace and secur i ty emanat-
ing from the c o n f l i c t between the two super powers on the 
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question of Ber l in . India'a view waa shared by Yugoslavia^ 
Egypt* Afghanistan, B\irma« Ghana« Ethiopia, Iraq. Nepal, 
Ceylon, Cyprus, Somalia and Congo. Nehru while s t r e s s -
ing on the Inherent dangers from the Impending war saldt 
. . . Imperialism, co lonia l i sm, rac ia l i sm and 
the r e s t * th ings which are v i t a l l y lmpor*> 
tant . . . are aoinewhat overshadowed by t h i s 
c r i s i s ( B e r l i n ) . Tor i f war comes a l l e l s e 
for the moment goes . Therefore, i t becomes 
Inev i tab l e for us . . . to make sure that the 
dominant r o l e of our thinking and act ion 
and %<hat we say and put down i s t h i s c r i s i s 
that confronts the humanity. 3" 
However, Indonesia l a i d s t r e s s on the e l imination of Impe-
r ia l i sm and coloniedism. The Indonesian view-point was 
supported by Sudan, Cuba, Tunisia, Cambodia, Morocco,Mall, 
Guinea and Algeria, Indonesian President , Seokarno, while 
e laborating t h i s aspect, saldt 
Many problems demand immediate so lu t ion , 
and as long as we f a i l to get the source 
of the tension and s t r i f e we sha l l be 
working l i k e amateur plumbers, plugging 
up a leak here only to f ind a bigger one 
^ u r t l n g up bi^ind our very backs, and 
another ye t another, preva i l ing world 
opinion would have us b e l i e v e that the 
rea l source of in ternat iona l tension and 
s t r i f e i s i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t betwecm 
the great powers. I think that i s not 
t r u e . Ihere i s the c o n f l i c t betvreen the 
new emergent forces for freedcmi and j u s -
t i c e and the o l d forces of domination. 3^ 
37. Belgrade Conference, n. 3 , pp. 107-8. See also 
Government ox Indie JjkWPieLQn A f f a i r e Record, \ b l . 
VII, No. 9, Ssptsmber 1961, p . 255. 
38. I b i d . , p. 27. 
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There I s no exaggeration In saying that the 
Conference was grea t ly Influenced by I n d i a ' s stand. All 
the par t i c ipa t ing countr ies a lso paid a t tent ion to the 
quest ion of economic development of the under-developed 
coxintries* Yugoslavia* Bolivia* Cuba* Ethiopia and 
Gxxinea attached more s i g n i f i c a n c e to t h i s problem. There 
was almost a consensus among the p a r t i c i p a t i n g coiontriea 
on the question of e levat ing and strengthening the non-
al igned movement by l ink ing i t to the question of i n t e r -
nat ional peace and security* 
But for the exceptions of Cuban c r i t i c i s m of the 
United States* Afro-Arab attacks on France* Yugoslav 
and Indonesian mild attack on the Soviet Union* the Con-
ference on the whole* maintain(»d remarkable balance by 
avoiding condemnation of e i ther super power. I t was e v i -
dent from t h i s that the non-alignment was capable of main-
ta in ing i t s i n t a c t n e s s and judic ious balance in assess ing 
the d e l i c a t e i s s u e s of a c r i t i c a l in ternat iona l s i t u a t i o n . 
Even the Soviet Union's dec i s ion to resume 
neuclear t e s t s which coincided with the holding of the 
Belgrade Summit* could not envisage any substant ia l change 
i n the s i t u a t i o n . Die western countr ies regarded the 
Soviet dec i s ion as "diplomacy of terror" and "atomic black-
mail" designed both against the non-aligned countr ies and 
the western co \ intr ies . The West regarded the a t t i t u d e of 
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the non-aligned countr ies on Soviet announcement as ' a c t 
39 of t imidi ty*. This does not mean tha t the non-aligned 
coxintries were non-sensi t ive to such developments but the 
MAM countr ies displayed an extra-ordinary sense of objec-
t i v i t y in viewing t h i s event in i t s co r rec t pe r spec t ive ; — 
as an ins tance in a sequoice of events . 
The Belgrade Conference envisaged more deep and 
c lea r i n t e rp re t a t i on to the meaning of non-alignment. Every 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g country expressed i t s views on i t and most 
of the ^eeches were spec i f i ca l ly detnated to explaining i t . 
Thus the respec t ive nat ional outlooks and poin ts of conver-
gence and divergence on the meaning of the non-alignment 
among the non-aligned countr ies were d i sce rn ib le at t h i s 
Conference. 
Indonesian stand on non-alignment was ra the r comp-
r ^ e n s i v e . As President Seokcurno observed! 'Non-Alignment 
i s act ive devotion to the lof ty cause of independence* 
abiding peace, social Jus t i ce , and the freedom to be f r ee ' 
He said t ha t non-alignment en ta i led a p o s i t i v e meaning and 
39. Robert B«ndiner in New Statesman (London), \A3l. LXII, 
15 September 1961, pp. 330-31. 
40. President Modibo Keita of Mal i ' s s ta tem«it on 15 
September 1961 a t New Delhi. See Hindustan Times, 
17 S^tember 1961. 
41» Bej.grade Conference, n . 3 , p . 27. 
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r e j e c t e d the Idea that being non«>alinged means becoming a 
4 2 
•buffer s t a t e between the tvo g iant b l o c s ' . While a l -
most a l l the par t i c ipa t ing coxintries denied the mere 
43 p a s s i v i t y of non-alignment, Carnbodia struck a marked 
note of divergence from Seokarno's stand v^en Prince 
Sihanouk saidt 
Certain non<^aligned fr iends perhaps consider 
tha t the f a c t of concert ing to b« a ''buffer" . . . 
between the two b l o c s I s i n d i c a t i v e of 
pass ive n e u t r a l i t y •^ *» to b« a buffer s t a t e 
i s to be in the b e s t p o s i t i o n to bring about 
a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between our fr iends in the 
two b l o c s by e l iminat ing the causes of f r i c -
t ion as much as pos s ib l e .^^ 
While the par t i c ipa t ing coxintries agreed on the contwi ts 
o f non-alignm«it as ''abiding peace", and "freedom to be 
free", vihich also means Independent judgement of interna** 
t i ona l I s sues , each on i t s own merit . Prime Minister Nehru 
attached more s i g n i f i c a n c e % e^n he sa id: 
. . . Itie word non-al igned may be d i f f e r e n t l y 
interpreted but b a s i c a l l y i t was used and 
coined almost, with the meaning non-aligned 
with the great power b l o c s of the w>rld. 
Non-aligned has a negat ive meaning, but i f 
you g ive i t a p o s i t i v e connotation i t means 
nat ions ii^ich o b j e c t to t h i s l i n i n g up for 
war purposes, m i l i t a r y b locs , m i l i t a r y 
a l l i a n c e s and the l i k e . Iherefore , we keep 
away from t h i s and we want to throw oiir 
* 2 . Ib id . 
4 3 . Cambodia i s now c a l l e d Kampuchea. 
44 . Belgrade Gonfer<mce. n .3 , p . 188. 
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weight, such as i t i s , in favoiir of 
p«ac«.45 
The countries l ike Burma, Saudi Arabia, Cambodia and 
Ethiopia laid stress on the balance of impartiality in 
non-alignment. The Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia 
said that the 'non-alignmoit means that our souls must be 
46 
innocent of any bias towards any bloc in dispute*. 
Nehru v^iXe «ocplaining the growth of non-alignment ampha-
sisedt 
Some few years ago - s ix , sevei or eight, 
i f ycu l ike • th is business of non-align-
ment was a rare ph«nom«non ••• the \Aiole 
course of history of the l a s t few years 
has shovm the growing an opinion, ^read 
of th i s concc|>tlon of non-alignment, vhy 
i s that so? Beoause i t was in tune l i n e 
with the eotirse of events; i t was in l i n e 
tune with the thinking of the vast numbers 
of people whether the country conc€»med 
was non-ali(^ed or not.*'' 
The Indonesian President, Seokarno, eiqplained h i s percep-
tion of non-alignment* 
We each arrived at th i s policy inspired by 
common ideas, prompted by similar circims-
tances, q;>urred on by like-escperiences. 
There was no attempt at compromise among 
us, no attempt to round off disagreements 
to make our {)olicies idwit ica l . But not 
one of us, I think, wi l l deny that we did 
inspire each other. The experionces o€ one 
45. Government of India, Foreign Affairs Record, ^fol. 
VII, No, 9, September 1961, p. 255. 
46. Bg],gfydf Cffpfyepffft, n.3, p. 134. 
47. Belgrade C6nfereiice. n.3. pp. 25-26. 
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country In discovering that a p o l i c y of non-
alignment i s the b«9t guarantee for sa fe -
guarding our nat ional and i n t e m a t i p n a l 
p o s i t i o n have xindoubtedly helped others to 
come to a similar conclus ion .48 
While referr ing to the Belgrade Conference, Seokarno 
saidt 
And now we have t h i s present conference . . . 
to draw the non-al igned countr ies in to a 
coordinated and accumulated moral force 
in order to help preserve world peace end 
bring about a new s tab le equilibrium bas-
ed on a world order and soc ia l J u s t i c e 
and prosper i ty . 49 
There seemed a degree of cohesion ariong the 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g countr i e s . All agreed that the underlying 
emphasis of non-alignment was on "depolarization" and 
the N/SM was not designated to form a "third bloc" or a 
"third force". The speeches de l ivered by the p a r t i c i -
pants commonly l a i d s t r e s s on the p\ irsuit of the po l i cy 
of non«>alignment through peaceful c o - e x i s t a n c e . The 
f ina l declarat ion noted that the urge of the non-al igned 
countr ies was to 'draw the a t tent ion of the world commu-
n i t y to the e x i s t i n g s i tua t ion and to the n e c e s s i t y that 
a l l people should exert e f f o r t s to find a sure road t o -
50 
wards the s t a b i l i z a t i o n of p e a c e ' . 
48 . Government of India, Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 
VII, No. 9, September 1961, pp. 256-57. 
49 . I b i d j , p . 38. 
5 0 . NAM Dccx3ments# n. l , p . 6 . 
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The paacftful c o * e x l 8 t « i c e enta i l ed cooperation 
between powers I rre spec t ive of dif£erwice* i d e o l o g i c a l or 
otherwise* betweim the ir s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l and economic 
systems. The rernarkable feature d i s c e r n i b l e in the Con-
ference was the g« iera l awareness anong the non-aligned 
countr ies that they had to work for %#orld peace j o i n t l y . 
I t was also pleaded that the non-aligned countr ies should 
work together in the United Nations in a concerted way. 
At the Bene time# the leading p a r t i c i p a t i n g coxintries l i k e 
India, cetutibned that such a move should in no way be i n -
terpreted $s an att«Tipt at forging a third b loc . The ur-
gcmcy for peace ais a p r e - r e q u i s i t e of any progress was 
d i s c e r n i b l e i'" the thinking of a l l members. The Burmese 
Prime Minister U Nu said* 
The f i r s t pJT^-requisite of a sane and sober 
conduct of n e g o t i a t i o n s i s the re s tora t ion 
of a calm atiao^phere* free from frenzy or 
h y s t e r i a . Her« the non-al igned countr i e s 
can play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e . . . part of our 
de l ibera t ions be d irec ted towards ways and 
means of bringing about t h i s coo l ing o f f 
process .^1 
Establishment and strengthening of in ternat ional peace 
and secur i ty was given p r i o r i t y at the Confer«nce and i t s 
r e s u l t a n t impact was the i s suance of the 'Statement on 
the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace* by the Confer-
ence. The Berlin question rece ived urgent a t t e n t i o n . 
5 1 . Belgrade Conference, n .3 , p . 69. 
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Indonesia and Yugoslavia pleaded for the sovereignty of 
the two German s t a t e s , f ree access to West Berlin and 
neutra l i za t ion of Oermany. Ghana and others supported 
t h i s move. India pleaded for the recogni t ion of the rea« 
S2 
11 t i e s as they e x i s t e d . 
The question of disarm«n«it was also de l iberated 
by the Conference. Ihe need for urgent nego t ia t i ons b e t -
we«i the two super powers was s t r e s s e d . Nehru while add-
r e s s i n g the Conference observedi 
• •• I consider disarmament an absolute 
n e c e s s i t y for the peace of the world in 
futxxre - I think that without disarm ament 
these d i f f i c u l t i e s * fears and c o n f l i c t s 
w i l l continue • nevertheless* one cannot 
expect suddenly because t h i s conference 
wants i t * disarroaaent to appear on the 
scene in f u l l panoply. We should lay 
s t r e s s on disarmament of cotirse* but for 
the present moment the only thing that we 
can do i s to l ay s t r e s s on the f a c t of 
n e g o t i a t i o n s viith a view to g e t t i n g over 
these present fears and dangers. 53 
I n d i a ' s viewpoint was strongly r e f l e c t e d in the f ina l com-
munique of the Conference which i n t e r - a l l a m«ntionedi 
. . . dsarroament i s an Imperative need and 
the most urgent task of mankind. A radica l 
so lut ion of t h i s problem* which has become 
an urgent n e c e s s i t y In the present s t a t e of 
armament* can be achieved on ly by means of 
a general cor^ le te and s t r i c t l y and in terna-
t i o n a l l y contro l l ed disarmament.^ 
52 . Foreign Affairs Record, n. , p . 258. 
5 3 . Ibid.* pp. 257-58. 
54. NAM Dpcum«it. n. 1, p . 7, 
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The problom of imperialism and co lonia l i sm was also d i s -
cussed in d e t a i l s at the Conference* The view that ''neo-
colonialism'* was a new manifestat ion of imperialiam got a 
wide sx^port. Majority of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g countr ies 
were not %d.llin9 to concede the view that co lon ia l i sm was 
dead. Ihe Conference while welcoming the "Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples" passed by the UN General Assembly in 1960 as a 
l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l b a s i s for the e l imination of c o l o n i a -
l i sm, demanded i t s s incere implementation. I t a lso c a l l e d 
for ending a l l p r a c t i c e s of r a c i a l d i scr iminat ion . 
prime Minister Jawaharlal N^ru made touching 
reference to the Continent of Africa with s p e c i f i c empha-
s i s on Congo* Angola, Southern Rhodesia ar^ d South west 
Africa* %^ich %rere s truggl ing for shaking of f the co lon ia l 
yoke, while e3q>ressing concerning over the e v « i t s in 
Angola, Nehru saidt 
That though Angola had been a c lo sed book 
but something i s happ«ning in Angola - not 
only in Angola, but round about which 
r e a l l y was a kind of horror, massacres, 
genocide and so on. Of course, our minds 
go out and %ra would not only to sympathise, 
we want to do what we can to put an end to 
t h i s . 5 5 
While expressing concern oveur the aparthied p o l i c y of the 
white r a c i s t regime of South Africa, N^ru said: 
55. Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi ) , Mol. v i i . No.9, 
September 1961, p . 250. 
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And further. In South Africa, you have the 
suprefne - symbol of r a c i a l arrogance, 
r a c i a l discrimination aparthied, and a l l 
that %^ich i s an i n t o l e r a b l e pos i t i on to 
be accepted by any of u s . 56 
The Import of Ind ia ' s emphasis was envisaged in the 
f ina l declarat ion adopted by the NAM Summit at Belgrade. 
India made brief reference to these i s s u e s %<hereas the 
Belgrade NAM Declaration gave a comprehensive coverage to 
focus the at tent ion of the non-aligned countr ies and the 
global commiinity toweurds the problem of aparthied in South 
Africa. The Belgrade Declaration i n t e r - a l i a noted: 
The par t i c ipant s in the conference r e s o l u t e l y 
condemn the p o l i c y of eqparthied p r a c t i s e d by 
the Union of South Africa and demanded the 
iinmediate abemdonment of t h i s p o l i c y , they 
further spate that the p o l i c y of r a c i a l di8> 
crimination anyv^ere in the world c o n s t i t u t e s 
a grave v i o l a t i o n of the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights . 57 
The Conference r e i t e r a t e d the fa i th of non-aligned 
countr ies in the United Nations . I t showed the optlmxan 
universal concern for the strengthening and extension of 
58 the UN's inf luence in the world. Expressing I n d i a ' s 
p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s UN, Pt . N^ru to ld the Conferencet 
56. Ib id . 
57. Documents of the Gatherings of Non-Aiioned Countries 
1961-1978 (Belgrade, 1978), p . 7. 
58 Foreign Affairs Record, n.S5, p . 258. 
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The v^ole frame work of the United Nations 
ever s ince i t waa formed f i f t e e n years ago 
was the recognit ion of the balance of power 
in the world* That i s %fhy they have perma-
nent had cer ta in members in the Secxirity 
Council vetoing e tc • • • Now# of course* th«> 
world has changed s i n c e then* cons iderably* . . 
and t h i s requires a change in the s tructure , 
e t c . , of the United Nations.59 
The f ina l communique of the Confer«nce urged for the app«> 
r o p r i a t e changes in the s tructure of the UN Secre tar ia t . 
I t inter«>alia envisagedi The tjnity of the Ibrld Organisa-
t ion and the assuring of the e f f i c i e n c y of i t s work makes 
i t absolute ly necessary to evolve a more appropriate s truc-
ture for the Secretar iat of the United Nations bearing in 
mind equitable regional d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
llie par t i c ipa t ing countr ies l a i d spec ia l emphasis 
on according recogni t ion to the People ' s Republic of China 
and demanded the rev i s ion of the structtire of the Security 
Coxincll and the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations in favoxir of greater rapreso i ta t ion of African and 
Asian countr i e s . 
The Conference ended with the adoption of t*)o 
documentst (i> 'Statement on Danger of war and an /^peal 
for Peace' and ( i i ) 'Declaration of the Heads of s t a t e or 
Government of Non-Aligned Countr ies ' . The'Statement on the 
59 . NAM Docum<gits, n . l , p , 6, 
60 . Belgrade Conference, n .3 , p. 117. 
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Danger of War and an ^ p e a l for Peace* was adbpted mainly 
due to Ind ia ' s endea^roiirs, Nehru had iinderllned the empha-
s i s on t h i s aspect \jh«i he t o l d the Confer«ice! 
Mien t h i s matter comes xxp and some kind of 
re so lu t ion or dec larat ion or statement I s 
being Issued at tent ion %d.ll be paid to 
t h i s question of world peace being put not 
only foremost but so that I t catches every 
person's a t tent ion and so that I t does not 
g e t l o s t In a morass of d e t a i l and thus 
l o s e a l l s i g n i f i c a n c e and ln^portance.6l 
Krishna Menon said on 3 September 1961« that there was a 
sharp d i f ference of opinion in the Coimnlttee entrusted with 
draft ing the communique over the question of s ^ a r a t l n g the 
war threat from colonial i sm/ and in g iv ing primacy to the 
62 former. Eventually the Indian view-point p r e v a i l e d . 
ihe 'Statement on the Danger of War and Appeal for 
Peace' expressed the de<^ concern of one- th ird of humanity 
represented at the Conference about ' the imminent and onni -
ous prospect of c o n f l i c t . . . would Inev i tab ly lead to de-
vas ta t ion on a s c a l e h i ther to unknown* i f not to world 
annih i la t ion* . The conference demanded as urgent and 
imperative that the p a r t i e s concc^rned* e s p e c i a l l y the 
United States and the Soviet Union, should imnedlately s u s -
6 1 . 'Ihe Hindustan Tlmes# 5 s^tember 1961, 
6 2. Belgrade Conferwice* n . 3 , p . 69. 
6 3. Ib id . 
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pend the ir war preparations and take no steps which would 
further aggravate the s i tua t ion and should resume nogo-
64 t l a t l o n s . The s imi lar emphasis was incorporated In the 
opening statem«it of the f ina l 'Declarat ion' of the Con-
ference Wiich envisaged i t s purpose as 'contributing more 
e f f e c t i v e l y to world peace and secur i ty and peaceful c o -
operation among p e o p l e s ' . 
The general mood of the ConfereJice manifested a 
s p i r i t of accommodation and cooperat ion. Though d i f f e r -
ence were d i s cern ib l e among the par t i c ipa t ing countr ies 
but they in no way hindered the smooth functioning of the 
Conference, Such d i f f « r « i c e s were natural In the wake of 
the varying emotional complexes of the various non-aligned 
countries* represented at the Conference* which belonged 
to d i f f eren t regions of the world and condi t ions by vary-
ing stages of development. The King of Morocco in h i s 
concluding speech observed: 'The Conference may be proud 
of the fac t that i t has not f u l f i l l e d the expectation of 
the bad prophets ' . 
64 . I b i d . , p . 253. 
65 . Ib ld i , p. 263. 
66 . Ib id . 
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While referr ing to aocio-economic problems faced 
by the newly Independent countries* Javaharlal Nehru* Prime 
Minister of India* saidt 
many of the coxuitries r ^ r e s e n t e d here have 
only recent ly become free as independent. 
They have the tronendous problems and above 
a l l the problems of making good and to ad-
vance the ir o%m people economically* s o c i a l -
l y e t c .* we must recognise that most' of 
these countr ies are s o c i a l l y and economical-
l y backward and i t i s not an easy matter to 
get r i d of t h i s inher i tance of backwardness 
and under-development. 67 
He further added that* 
I t enjoined to help the economiceilly back-
ward countries* v h i l e conceding that the 
r ich countr ies had rondered economic a s s i s -
tance to the economically backward count-
r i e s to some extent* 
He further cmphasisedt 
I think they should do more of i t but what-
ever they may do* the u l t imate burden wi l l 
l i e on the people of our own 03\ intr ies .68 
Thus Nehnj was cer ta in that though foreign economic 
a s s i s t a n c e was necessary but in h i s view* i t was - s s e n t i a l 
for the developing countr ies to mobi l ize the ir own resour-
c e s . Because i f by some miracle or somebody's e l s e ' s 
help* we stood viqp* well* we should f a l l down agedn. U l t i -
6''» foreign Affairs Re«>rd (New Delhi)* Vol. VII, No.9* 
September 1961* p . 259. 
68 . Ib id . 
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mately the biurden I s on u s . So I t i s no good expecting 
69 
other^'to do a l l of our work. 
The almllar emphasis was d i s c e r n i b l e from the f ina l 
declarat ion adopted by the NAM Sijonmit held at Belgrade. I t 
urged the need for making e f f o r t s to remove economic imba-
lance inher i ted from colonia l i sm and imperial ism. 
The par t i c ipa t ing non-al inged countr ies regarded 
i t necessary to narrow down, through acce lerated economic, 
indus tr ia l and agricul tural development, the ever-widening 
g^^ in the standard of l i v i n g between the r ich countr ies 
i 
and economically les8'><3eveloped countr i e s . The Belgrade 
NAM Conference mooted the idea of the irrenediate e s t a b l i s h -
ment and operation of a United Nations C o i t a l Development 
71 Fund (UNCDF). ^ Ihe Gonference also urged for jus t terms 
of trade for the economically l e s s -deve loped countr ies and 
i n part i cu lar , to launch cons truc t ive e f f o r t s to e l iminate 
the excess ive f luc tuat ions in primary commodities trade and 
the r e s t r i c t i v e measures and p r a c t i c e s "vAiich adversely 
a f f e c t the trade and revenues of the newly developing coun-
72 t r i e s . "'^ 
The Conference also c a l l e d upon "all countr ies con-
cerned to consider to convene, as soon as p o s s i b l e , an i n -
69. Ib id . 
70 . Documents of the Gatherings of Npn-Allgned Countries 
1961-1978 (Belgrade. 1978), p . 8. 
7 1. Ib id . 
7 2. Ib id . 
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ternat ional conference to d i scuss the ir common problems 
and to reach an agreement on the ways and means of r e p e l -
l i n g a l l damage v^ich may hinder the ir development and to 
d i scuss and to agree x^ pon roost e f f e c t i v e measures to en-
sure the r e a l i z a t i o n of the ir economic and soc ia l deve-
73 lopmcoit* 
Thus i t i s evident from the above analys i s that 
the suggest ions mooted and d e c i s i o n s adopted by the Bel-
grade NAM Cdnference with regard to measures designed to 
envisage economic development of the developing countries* 
were more comprehensive than suggested by India . 
^^^e HAM presa i ted 'a spark of fresh hope which may 
74 
r e s t o r e confidence . . . in t h i s trouble-some period' The 
Times published from London in i t s e d i t o r i a l opined that 
the countr ies represented at Belgrade had remained l a r g e l y 
unaligned, even among themselves/ and that they were un-
75 
able to form a b loc . WJIS was the main o b j e c t i v e of the 
Belgrade Conference. The non-alignment was envisaged as a 
movement and not as a new power b loc . To t h i s e x t « i t , the 
Belgrade Conference was a big success and a great landnark. 
NAM had become more se l f - conf idence and more conf ident . 
7 3. Ib id . 
74 . l imes (London), 7 September 1961. 
7 5. Ib id . 
7 6. Malik, n. 6^  , p . 193. 
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I n d i a ' s Role in the F i r s t Non-Aligned Sunntiit 
Ind ia ' s r o l e in the Belgrade Conference and the 
views expressed by India at t h i s Conference have already 
been analysed in the preceding pages . 
India being one of the leading non-al igned 
countr ies played a pi^fotal r o l e at the Belgrade Conference. 
In the beginning* as discussed in the preceding pages* 
India was not very en thus ias t i c about the idea of the Con-
ference . Such an Indian a t t i t u d e was perhaps cpvemed by 
the fac t that* apart from the general outlook as non-
alignment* common to the non-al igned countries* the ir 
motives* percept ions and p o l i c i e s were heterogeneous to a 
great extent . 
The prospect ive p a r t i c i p a t i n g covintries at the 
Belgrade Conference seemed to be pre-occupied with the i r 
l o c a l problems and had m i l i t a n t a n t i - c o l o n i a l s tance . In 
the wake of these circumstances* India wanted to be stire 
whether the proposed Confer«ice would r e s u l t in attaching 
the sane s i g n i f i c a n c e to world peace %^ich i t demanded at 
that t ime. 
As Tito* Nasser and Scekarno went ahead with the 
idea of convening the Conference* India also endorsed i t 
and a c t i v e l y cooperated %d.th these c o u n t r i e s . I n d i a ' s 
stand on major global i s s u e s l i k e maintaining world peace 
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and averting the wwr, dla-armaroent* Berlin c r i s i s e t c , r e -
ce ived wider support. The Incorporation of these i s s u e s 
in the f ina l declarat ion vindicated Ind ia ' s stand. 
India played a p ivota l r o l e in s t r e s s i n g the need 
for maintaining cohesion and uni ty among the non-aligned 
c o u n t r i e s . Ind ia ' s stand that the NAM was not a "third 
force" or "third power bloc" but an on-going movement ga in-
ed fu l l support of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o u n t r i e s . 
At the Confer Mice i t s e l f India acted as a great 
check on the tendencies to condemn others and to become 
polemical , to have part isan approach in favour of one Gold 
War antagonist against the other and to indulge in pressure 
77 p o l i t i c s . 
I n d i a ' s Premier, Jawaharlal N^ru, who represarjted 
India at the Conference, urged the par t i c ipa t ing non-a l ign-
ed countr ies to accord top p r i o r i t y to world peace and a 
spec ia l urgency to i t . I n d i a ' s suggest ion, though opposed 
by some coxintries which wanted to accord p r i o r i t y to a n t i -
c o l o n i a l stance, was f i n a l l y taken up by the Conference. 
This re su l t ed in i s su ing a spec ia l statement on 'Danger of 
War and /appeal for Peace' to Super Powers. I t was a v ind i -
cat ion of Ind ia ' s stand. Ihere i s no exaggeration In saying 
that India gave a lead to the NAM at Belgrade Conference 
without trying to dominate i t . 
77 . I b i d . , p . 194. 
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Chapter IV 
INDIA'S ROLE AT IHE SECOND SUMMIT OF IHE 
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES (CAIRO,OCTOBER 1964) 
The second Summit Conference of t h e Non-Al lgned 
C o u n t r i e s was h e l d a t Cairo , t h e Egyptian c a p i t a l , from 
5 t o 10 October 1964. I t was a t t e n d e d by 47 c o u n t r i e s o f 
As ia , 17 c o u n t r i e s from A f r i c a a t t e n d e d and 4 Arab count* 
r i e s a l s o p a r t i c i p a t e d . Among t h e o b s e r v e r s , 9 were from 
L a t i n America and t h e t « i t h was F i n l a n d . The f o l l o w i n g 
c o u n t r i e s p a r t i c i p a t e d as f u l f l e d g e d members: Afghani s -
t a n , A l g e r i a , Angola, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Centra l A f r i c a Republ i c , Ceylon, Chad, Congo ( B r a z a v i l l e ) , 
Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, E t h i o p i a , Ghana, Guinea, I n d i a , 
I n d o n e s i a , I raq , I s l a m i c R ^ u b l i c o f Maxiritania, Jordan, 
Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Li^anon, L i b e r i a , Libya, Malawi, Mal i , 
Morocco, Nepal , N i g e r i a , Saudi Arabia, Senega l , S i e r r a 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syr ia , Togo, T u n i s i a , Uganda, Uhited 
Arab Reptiblic o f Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Yemen, Y u g o s l a v i a 
and Zambia. The f o l l o w i n g c o u n t r i e s were r e p r e s e n t e d by 
2 
o b s e r v e r s : Argent ina , B o l i v i a , B r a z i l , C h i l e , F in land , 
1. Documents o f t h e Gather ings o f Non-Al ioned C o u n t r i f s 
1961«'1978 ( h e r e a f t e r NAM Documents) (Be lgrade , 1978) , 
p . 19. 
2 . I b i d . 
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Jamaica, Maxlco, Trinidad and Ibbago, Uruguay and Vene-
zue la . The Secretary-General of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) and the Secretary-General of the 
League of Arab States were also present as observers . 
(a) Background to the Second Sunlit» 
The success of the f i r s t NAM Suiranlt Conference 
he ld In Belgrade In September 1961 had proved that the 
newly Independent s t a t e s of Asia and Africa were deter-
mined to pursue the po l i cy of non-alignment. In July 
1962, a Confer«ice on the Problems of Economic Develop-
ment was held in Cairo from 9-18 July 1962 as a follow-up 
of the Belgrade Conference. This meeting was attended by 
31 countries and 5 countr ies were r ^ r e s e n t e d as observers. 
Agoida of t h i s meeting included - Internal 
problems of economic development including the mobi l i za-
t ion of resources and e l iminat ion of o b s t a c l e s and soc ia l 
growth, promotion of economic, technical and trade c o -
operation and development of transportat ion among develop-
ing countr ies , prospects of economic development and trade 
betweoi the developed and developing countr ie s , and econo-
mic and technical a s s i s tance to the developing c o u n t r i e s . 
The f ina l declarat ion of the conference on the 
problems of Economic Development viewed with concern the 
3 . I b i d . , p. 12. 
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growing d i s p a r i t i e s in the standards of l i v i n g preva i l ing 
in d i f f erent parts of the world. I t further noted that 
apart from the universal acknowledgem«it of the \irgency 
to acce lera te the pace of development in l e s s developed 
coxintries, 'adequate means of concrete and p o s i t i v e nature 
have not been adopted to enable the developing co\ intries 
4 
to at ta in a reasonable r a t e of growth*. I t a lso focussed 
at tent ion on the internal problems of economic development 
faced by the developing countr ies e s p e c i a l l y in the f i e l d 
of mobi l izat ion of human, material and f inancia l resources . 
While regarding the expansion of tr^de between 
developing countr ies , p a r t i c u l a r l y on regional b a s i s , as a 
contributory factor for economic development, the confer-
ence recorranended appropriate measures to be taken to pro-
mote such an o b j e c t i v e . I t also c a l l e d upon the develop-
ing countr ies to undertake i n i t i a t i v e for the promotion of 
mutual, b i l a t e r a l and broader r e l a t i o n s in the f i e l d s of 
trade, payro«its, f inancing, technical and s c i e n t i f i c c o -
operat ion, indus tr ia l cooperation, transport and communica-
t i o n s . 
Export earnings of the developing countr ies being 
v i t a l to the economic development of the l a t t e r , the con-
4 . Dacuments of tjhe Gatherings of Non-Aliqned Countries 
1961-1979), Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries. 
5 . I b i d . , p. 14. 
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ference suggested the developing countr ies to continue 
consu l ta t ions in order tox 
•> Exchange information and views between 
them on question regarding economic re« 
l a t i o n s with i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s . 
- Concert mutually the a t t i t u d e s to be 
adopted by them with regard to economic 
question examined by internat ional o r -
ganizat ions; 
•> exchange views and prepare the ground 
for concerted act ion in connection with 
any negat ive e f f e c t s of in tegrat ion 
p o l i c i e s of indus tr ia l co \mtr i e s .^ 
The conference f i n a l l y c a l l e d upon the p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
countr ie s to cooperate c l o s e l y in the United Nations and 
i 
the other in ternat ional bodies with a view to ensuring 
economic progress and strengthwiing peace among a l l 
n a t i o n s . 
I h i s conferttice was convwied mainly at the lnltia-> 
t i v e of Yugoslav President^ Marshal Tito to 'd i scuss 
i s s u e s of economic development and thereby to mobi l ize 
p o l i t i c a l support b ^ i n d the development organizat ion 
7 
proposal*. The Cairo meeting was attended by almost the 
same countr ies which par t i c ipated at the Belgrade Summit. 
A notable feature of the conference was the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
6 . Ib id . 
7 . Kobert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coal i t ion in 
Internat ional P o l i t i c s (New York« 1980), p . 16. 
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o f Raul Prebisch as head of the Acg&xtisn de legat ion a« 
observer . He was then the Executive Secretary of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin /roerlca 
(ECLA)« and was l a t e r to become the f i r s t Secretary-
General of the UNCTAD. Raul Prebisch*s par t i c ipa t ion 
proved instrumental in strengthening the i n t e r e s t of 
Latin Anerica. 
The intervening period betwe«i the Belgrade Summit 
and the holding of the second NAM Summit at Cairo in Octo-
ber 1964 was marked by major developments ^ i c h wielded 
considerable Inf luence on the succeeding events . Primary 
among these was the establishment of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 at Addis Ababa.® Ihe for -
mation of the OAU had for the time being avoided the 
s p l i t among the African countr ies in to d i f f e r e n t b l o c s . By 
the early 1960s, there had developed among the newly In -
dependent African s t a t e s some ser ious d i v i s i o n s over ques-
t i o n s regarding the nature and extent of Pan-African Co-
operation and the character of the i r foreign and domestic 
p o l i c i e s . 
8 . For d e t a i l s on OAU see, Mark w. Zacher, I n t e r n ^ 
t i o n a l Conf l i c t s and C o l l e c t i v e Security > The UN, 
OAS. OAU and Ihe Arab League. 1946-1977 (New York, 
1979), pp. 121-55. 
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The formation of the OAU as a s i n g l e cont inenta l 
organizat ion Improved Afr ica 's capacity to present a 
common front on broad Issues l i k e economic development. 
32 Independent African countr ies wdre represented In t h i s 
organizat ion ,^ The member cotintrles of the OAU, ECLA and 
the Asian countr ies were able to i s s u e a Jo int Declara-
t ion on the ir conception of the purposes of the for th -
coming Geneva Conference on Trade and DevelO|Mnent, ^ 
By the beginning of 19608, v*ien the f i r s t NAM 
Summit was held in Belgrade, but for few co lon ia l v e s t i g -
es , the wave of Independence had swept across the c o n t i -
n&nts of Asia and Africa. The emphasis at the Belgrade 
Summit was on p o l i t i c a l emancipation \^lch h i therto 
acquired added emphasis on economic development. The 
Geneva Conference on Trade and Developmait held from March 
to Jxine 1964 r e s u l t e d in the establishment of united 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) . I t 
came to be known as UNCTAD-I. I t discussed the question 
l i k e t a r i f f reduction, expansion of the ir market opportu-
n i t i e s , s t a b i l i z a t i o n of raw mater ia l s p r i c e s , prov is ions 
of greater f inancia l resoxurces for developinent, and 
improvement of the ir share in the " i n v i s i b l e s " of trade 
9 . fiobert A, Mortimer, n.7, p. 16. 
10, For f u l l t e x t of the Jo in t Declaration see, Alfred 
George Moss and Harry N.M. winton, ( e d s . ) , A Nfw 
Internat ional Economic Ordert Selected Docxanents 
1945-75 (New York. UNITAR, 1978). po. 18-19. 
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such as shipping and insurance. There arose a sort of 
"confrontation" between the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d and the develop, 
ing countr ies on the question of future s e t up of the 
UNCTAD, Ihe industrial iaiKi countr ies of the West had 
agreed to the UNCTAD Conference with great re luctance and 
were rather opposed to the establishment of a new d i s t i n c t 
organizat ion of trade and development. The developed 
coxintries were of the view that the General Agreement on 
Tar i f f s and Trade (GATT) could be r e l i e d upon for harmoni-
s ing trade r e l a t i o n s . However, the developing countr ies 
wanted a new ag«icy desp i te the fac t that there prevai led 
d i f f erence of opinions aroong them about the p r e c i s e form 
of such an i n s t i t u t i o n . Ihe 75 developing countr ies at 
the G«ieva Conference i n s i s t e d on envisaging a new agency. 
These countr ies cane to be known as the Group of 77. 
The developed countr ies of the West demanded that 
the new internat ional machinery should be subordinate to 
the United Nations Economic and Social Cotincil (EXX>SOC), 
These countr ies further proposed equal representat ion to 
developed and developing countr ies on the Standing Coimiit-
tee# or, as l a t e r anoided, a vote procedure by which a 
11. Ihe i n i t i a l strength of developing countr ies demand-
ing the establishment of the UNCTAD was 75 . Follow-
ing the %d.thdrawal of New Zealand, but addition of 
Kenya, South Korea and South Vietnam ra ised the ir 
numerical strength to 77 and i t came po be c a l l e d as 
the Group of 77. 
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majority vote of the 12 major trading countr ies vould b« 
12 
required on substant ive d e c i s i o n s . In other words, the 
developed co\ intries endeavoured to l i m i t the autonomy of 
the UNCTAD and to re ta in a veto by any combination of s i z e 
of the indus tr ia l power. On the other hand, the develop-
ing countr ies pioneered the cause of an indep«fident agency 
on which their nximerical majority could be exercised,There 
were heated debates g iv ing r i s e to the speculation that 
the nascent Group of 77 might s p l i t up under s tra in in 
the ir quest for achieving a cotranon bargain p o s i t i o n , but 
the process f i n a l l y strengthened the merging developmental 
c o a l i t i o n . I t proved the bargaining and numerical 
strength of the developing c o u n t r i e s . 
Along with t h i s i n t e n s e des i re of gaining economic 
leverage , the non-aligned countr ies were also viewing for 
leadership of the NAM, Such a trend was pre-eminently 
d i s c e r n i b l e in Asian c o u n t r i e s . 
President Soekarno of Indonesia was trying to 
convene a second Ban(2ung type conference of e x c l u s i v e l y 
Asian-African meeting with China, Pakistan, Txirkey and 
12. Robert A, Mortimore, n ,7 , p, 17. 
13. Branislav Gasovic, UNCTADt Conf l ic t and Compromise 
(Leiden, A.W. S i j thof f , 1972), p . 51. 
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some other non-aligned countr ies being included, but ex-
cluding Yugoslavia* the £uropean neutra ls and the non-
14 
al inged countr ies of Latin America. The Indonesian 
move could not go through, 'had i t taken p lace , i t might 
15 have been the end of non-alignment*. 
Yugoslavia suggested in 1963 to convene a second 
conference of the non-aligned countr i e s . In October 
1963, £:^ gypt and Sri Lanka agreeing to Yugoslavia suggest -
ion also c a l l e d for convening a second non-al igned confe-
rence . Such a move upset the Indonesian plan for a 
second Bandung. Soekarno's plan sui ted China. Evidently, 
an Asian-African plateform comprising aligned and non-
aligned countr ies was conducive for China's entry into 
world p o l i t i c s . 
This idea could not f ind favour with India, Egypt 
and Yugoslavia, the pioneer founders of the NAM. The ex-
change of Sino-Indian h o s t i l i t i e s in October 1962 had 
undermined Ind ia ' s p r e s t i g e as the leader of Asia and the 
s i t u a t i o n helped in boost ing China's impage. Besides, in 
the wake of growing Sino-Soviet schism during t h i s period. 
14. Rikhi Ja ipa l , Non-Alionment, Origins . Growth and 
Potent ia l for Wbrld Peace (New Delhi, 1983), p . 80, 
15. Ib id . 
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most of- the non-aligned countr ies d i s l iked the emergence 
of China as the le&der of the NAM at the displeasxire of 
Soviet Union. *Ttie non-aligned countr ies p a r t i c u l a r l y 
Egypt, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, would not, however, per -
mit a regional diversion l i k e Bandung to jeopardise the 
success of the second non-aligned summit*, India too 
supported Yugoslav-Egyptian move. 
(b) Foreign Miniatgrs ' Heating and Decisions 
(COLOMBO Prqparatory M—ting) i 
The f i r s t NAM Sumtrtlt held a t Belgrade in 1961 had 
not l a id down any hard and f a s t ru le s with regard to hold-
ing of the subse»quent summit confer«ice». i t was l e f t to 
the non-aligned countr ies to decide themselves as wh#«n and 
where to l»old the forthcoming summit conference. At the 
i n i t i a t i v e of Yugoslavia, Egypt and other non-aligned 
countr ies a Preparatory Meeting was convened at Colombo in 
March 1964. Yugoslavia, Egypt and Sri Lan>:a had on 18 
February 1964 issued an appeal-cum-invltation to the Heads 
of State or Government of tile 25 non-aligned countr ies 
which had attended the Belgrade summit conference, to par-
t i c i p a t e in the Preparatory Meeting a t Colombo to be held 
in March 1964. I t was to discuss two major i ssues - ex-
16. Ib id . , p . 81 . 
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panslon of membership of the non-aligned coxuitries and the 
organizat ional preparation for the forthcoming sxanmlt 
conference. Decis ions at the NAM conference are generally-
arrived at on the b a s i s of consensus. If any occasion 
a r i s e s v^en the majority of non-al igned members attending 
a conference have favoured the i s s u e which i s being opposed 
t e by a few par t i c ipa t ing countr ie s , e f f o r t s are usueilly 
17 
made to have a unanimous support. At the Colombo Prepa-
ratory Meeting, when majority of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g count-
r i e s ^ r e e d to i n v i t e Venezuela, the Cuban de legate , who 
had in the beginning opposed the move, decided to withdraw 
i t s d i scuss ion and followed the majority in favovir of In-
18 
v i t i n g Venezuela to the non-al igned conference. 
There was a general d e s i r e among the p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
countr ies to in terpre t l i b e r a l l y the e s tab l i shed c r i t e r i a 
of membership as envisaged at the Belgrade Summit Confer-
ence without prejudice to i t s essence , llie consensus also 
merged to extend i n v i t a t i o n to as many "observers" as were 
w i l l i n g to attend from Latin America and Europe, National 
Liberation Movements were free of course to p a r t i c i p a t e 
and express the ir views in accordance to the p r a c t i c e e s -
tabl i shed in 1961. 
17. xMalabika Banerjee, The Non-Aliqned Movement (Calcutta, 
1982), p. 56. 
18. "Report of the Colombo Preparatory Conference", Docu-
ments of the Conferences of Non-Alioned Sta tes (New 
Delhi , MEA, 1973) (Ministry of External A f f a i r s ) . 
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Besides d iscuss ing the c r i t e r i o n for membership/ 
the Preparatory Meeting also discussed the draft agenda 
submitted by various p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o u n t r i e s . The Soma-
l i a n de legate introduced an item to the e f f e c t that mem-
ber s t a t e s should f ind o a t means to s e t t l e d i f f erences 
peacefu l ly through the good o f f i c e s of other non-aligned 
c o u n t r i e s . The f ina l >«ord covering t h i s item read as 
fol lowst "Settlement of d i sputes %d.thout the threat or 
use of force in accordance with the p r i n c i p l e s of the 
United Nations Charter and p a r t i c u l a r l y the r i g h t to se l f* 
19 determination". 
A meeting of Foreign Minis ters of the Non-aligned 
countr ies was held on 2 October 1964 on the eve of the 
Cairo Summit Conference where a rev i sed agenda for the 
summit was approved. Great importance was attached to the 
l i q u i d a t i o n of co lonia l i sm by adding a sxib-itemt "concert-
ed action for nat ional l i b e r a t i o n of dependtent countr ies" . 
The "self-determination" was incorporated as a separate 
i tem. 
(c) Organizational laauea and Their Solutiont 
As mentioned supra, the second NAM Summit Confe-
rence was held at Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964. The 
19. Ib id . 
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f i n a l declarat ion of the conference was c a l l e d "The Prog-
ramme for Peace and Internat ional Cooperation". Ihere 
were no major organizat ional i s s u e s involved at the Cairo 
Summit Conference. Ihe Preparatory Meeting held at 
Colombo had already sorted out the i s s u e s l i k e c r i t e r i o n 
for s e l e c t i o n of new members and the f i n a l i z a t i o n of the 
agenda. This was done in order to f a c i l i t a t e the smooth 
and successful functioning of the conference, ihe f ina l 
Declaration noted with s a t i s f a c t i o n the great enthusiasm 
evoked by the Cairo Summit Gonfer«ice. "This emphasizes 
the rightness^ eff icacy* and vigour of the p o l i c y of non-
alignment and i t s cons truc t ive r o l e in the maintenance 
20 
and conso l idat ion of in ternat iona l peace and 8ec \ i r i ty ' . 
I t further acknowledged that ' the p r i n c i p l e s of non-
allgnment# thanks to the confidence they i n s p i r e in the 
world« are becoming an increas ing ly dynamic and powerful 
21 force for promotion of peace and the welfare of mankind'• 
(d) Internat ional Problems* Summit's Decis ions and 
Ind ia ' s Role in the Second Kon-Aligned Summit! 
Before we analyse the dec i s ions or recommendations 
of the Second Cairo Summit on contemporary in ternat iona l 
20. "The Programme for Peace and Internat ional Coopera-
t ion", NAM Documents* n . l , p , 19. 
21 . Ib id . 
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problems and I n d i a ' s r o l e in t h i s summit* i t deems apprO" 
p r i a t e to b r i e f l y survey the domestic and external deve-
lopments s ince the conclusion of the Belgrade Summit t i l l 
the convoiing of the second summit at Cairo. 
Exactly, a year after the Belgrade summit confer-
ence/ the r e l a t i o n s between India and China had de ter iora-
ted considerably leading to the hot exchange of h o s t i l i -
t i e s between the two countr ies in October 1962. The 
Chinese ag^session on India proved to be the g r e a t e s t t e s t 
of l a t t e r ' s non-aligned p o l i c y . China launched a massive 
attack on Indian t e r r i t o r y and occupied a substant ia l por-
t ion of Indian t e r r i t o r y in Ladakh region of Jarrvnu and 
Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. 
India faced the Chinese attack with a l l might. 
Prime Minister Nehru be l i eved that Bei j ing might d e s i s t 
from launching a major attack in ant i c ipat ion of i t s r«pur-
22 
cuss ions on world opinion. Nursing t h i s not ion, Nehru 
23 
wished to avoid any "advwiturist act ion". He regarded i t 
unwise to undertake extra-ordinary meastires which might 
24 discard the character of non-al igned diplomacy. 
22, Government of India, Prime M i n i s t T on Sino-Indian 
ReleUons , Vol. I (New Delhi , 1962), p . 124. 
2 3 . I b i d . , pp. 46-57. 
24. I b i d . , p . 119. 
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But when China launched fu l f ledged attack, N^iru 
t o l d the Lok Sabhai 'For f i v e years* we have been v i c -
tims of Chinese aggression o c c a s i o n a l l y , there 
were some inc ident s and c o n f l i c t s . These c o n f l i c t s might 
well be termed front ier i n c i d e n t s . Today we have seen a 
regular and massive invasion of our t e r r i t o r y by very 
25 large f o r c e s ' . Under these circumstances India s o l i c i -
ted help from the Western countr ies and the Soviet Union, 
U.K., the United States and Canada provided arms and eco-
nomic a s s i s t a n c e . This n e c e s s i t a t e d Ind ia ' s increased 
co l laborat ion with the Western countr ies vtiich was charac-
t e r i z e d as a pro-Western a t t i t u d e in Ind ia ' s foreign 
p o l i c y . On 5 November 1962, the then U.S. Ambassador to 
India, J,K, Galbraith, c l a r i f y i n g the p o s i t i o n of India 
sa id that U.S. mi l i t ary aid to India was simply an a s s i s -
tance. While oidorsing I n d i a ' s p o l i c y of non-alignment, 
he said that American Government did not want to envisage 
26 
any change in Ind ia ' s foreign p o l i c y . 
In view of the Western arms and other kinds of 
m i l i t a r y help to India, i t was speculated by some count-
r i e s that Ind ia ' s non-alignment might get d i l u t e d . 'In 
25. Jawaharlal N ^ r u ' s Speeches, September 1961 - Mav 
1964, \fol. IV (New Delhi, 1964), p . 230. 
26. The Statesm<m (New Delhi ) , 7 November, 1962, 
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coxirse of time i t became c l ear that only some pro-Chinese 
non-al inged powers l i k e Indonesia, Gxiinea, Mali, Ghana etc 
27 
were being prejudiced against I n d i a ' , and had given 
r i s e to such speculat ions* 
I t i s to be observed here, that India in the event 
of Chinese aggression was able to procure, r e q u i s i t e arms 
and economic aid both from the East and West because of 
i t s po l i cy of non-alignment. The m i l i t a r y aid acquired by 
India from outs ide was designed to make i t s e l f capable of 
safeguarding country's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . I t devised 
long term planning for a t ta in ing se l f su f f i c i ency in de-
fence production. This was k e y i n g in t\me with Ind ia ' s 
p o l i c y of non-alignment. 
After Nehru's death in May 1964, Lai Bahadxor 
Shastri became the Prime Minister of India . 'But he cotild 
not take any i n i t i a t i v e to bring a change in I n d i a ' s non-
28 
al igned p o l i c y , and followed N ^ r u ' s p o l i c y . While add-
res s ing the second NAM Summit at Cairo, Lai Bahadur Shas-
t r i saidx "Though Jawaharlalji i s no longer with us, the 
government and people of India stand dedicated to freedom 
27, D.N. Malik, Developro«it of Non-Aliqnment in I n d i a ' s 
Foreign Pol icy , (Allahabad, 1967), p . 267, 
28. Gandhijee Roy, Ihe Non-Aljqned t^plomacv of Mrs 
Indira Gandhi (Patna, 1983), p , 96, 
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and p«ace» to the p r i n c i p l e of non-allgrment and peaceful 
c o - e x i s t o i c e and to the eradicat ion of rac ia l i sm and 
29 
co lonia l i sm*. Lai Bahadur Shastri represented India at 
the Cairo NAM Summit. Jawaharlal Ntfiru, one of the found-
e r s of the NAM could not l i v e long to see the movement 
ripening in to f r u i t i o n . India was represented by i t s new 
Prime Minister^ Lai Bahadur Shas tr i . 
The second NAM Summit Conference a t Cairo addressed 
i t s e l f to the urgent task of maintaining peace throughout 
the world and envisage in ternat iona l ooop«ration ins tead 
of confrontat ion. The p a r t i c i p a t i n g countij-ies 'while dec-
lar ing the ir contribution towards the establishment of 
Just and l a s t i n g peace in the world# affirm that the pre -
servat ion of peace and the promotion of the wel l -be ing of 
peoples are a c o l l e b t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y dtf'ivlng from the 
natural asp irat ions of mankind to l i v e in a be t t er world*. 
The Prime Minister of India* Lai Bahadur Shastr i , 
in h i s address a t the second NMl Summit he ld at Cairo em-
phas i s ing the importance of peace made no d i r e c t reference 
29. Lai Bahadur Shastr i*s speech at the Second NAM 
Sinmit at Cairo# Cbnfereoce of Heads of S ta te or 
Qovernment of Non-Alicrned Coxintries (Cairo, 1964), 
p . 103. 
30. NAM Documents* n .4 , p . 19. 
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to the establishmaat o£ foreign m i l i t a r y bases , e s p e c i -
a l l y by the United States and the need for dismantling 
th«m« I t can be surmised that h i s asser t ion was based 
on the f ^ t that India svqpported f t i l ly the United S ta te s 
programmes for peace and development* could imply t h i s 
aspect as well# but t h i s was not so because the f ina l 
dec larat ion a<topted by the second NAM Summit held at 
Cairo made an elaborated reference to the i s s u e . The 
f i n a l dec larat ion noted with concern the f a c t that "for* 
eign m i l i t a r y bases are in p r a c t i c e a means of bringing 
pressure on nat ions and retarding the i r emancipation and 
development* based on the ir own i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i t i c a l , 
32 
economic and cu l tura l i d e a s . ** 
Dius the Cbnference declared i t s f u l l si:^port to 
the evacuation of foreign bases and c a l l e d upon a l l coun* 
1 
t r i e s maintaining troops and bases in other countr i e s to 
remove there. I t a l so accursed the Uhited S ta te s for main-
ta in ing i t s m i l i t a r y base at Guantanamo in Cuba in d e f i -
ance of the w i l l of the Cuban people . Noting that the 
Cuban Government had esqpreased i t s readiness to s e t t l e 
i t s dispute over the Ouantanamo (Cuba) base with the US 
31 . Foreign Affairs Record (New Delh i ) , \tol. X, No. 10, 
October 1964, p . 247. 
32. Pocuments of the Qatherings of Mon-Alicmed Count-
r i e s * 1961-78, Belgrade 1978, p . 25. 
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on an equal foot ing , the Conference c a l l e d upon the US 
Government to "negotiate the evacuation of t h i s base i d . ^ 
-33 the Cuban Government." 
Hucl^ar Olaarmamentt 
India attached top p r i o r i t y to the question of 
nuclear disarmament at the Cairo Summit. The negot ia t ions 
between the US and Soviet Union were in progress with r e -
gard to resume negot ia t ions on nuclear disarmament. India 
noted with s a t i s f a c t i o n that there had been a measiire of 
agreement* however* l imi ted , at the Geneva Dlsarmamoit Cof-> 
34 
ference . India further expressed the view that the non* 
al igned countr ies should continue to play a helpfxil r o l e 
in promoting an agreement towards t o t a l disarmament. The 
f i n a l Declaration of the Cairo Summit Confer n ice also 
attached the paramovunt importance to disarmament 'as one 
of the bas ic problems of the conten^porary world and 
s t r e s s e d the n e c e s s i t y of reaching immediate and prac t i ca l 
so lu t ion %^ich would free mankind from the dango: of war 
35 
and sense of insecxxrity*. I t further urged the super 
33. I b i d . . p . 26. 
34. Cairo Documents^ n. 29, p . 104. 
35. NAM Documents, n. 1, p . 29. 
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powers and other countr ies to render full cooperation to 
the Eighteen Nations Qisamnament Committee (ENDC) with a 
view to the r ^ i d conclusion of an agreement on general 
and complete disarmament. 
India also esqpressed ser ious concern a t the f a c t 
that a l l countr ies had not subscribed to the Part ia l Test 
3fi 
Ban Treaty (PTBT) "** signed at Moscow in 1963. I t c a l l e d 
upon a l l the non->aligned nat ions to take a c lear and 
for thr ight a t t i t u d e in persuading a l l the countr ies to 
a c c ^ t the ban on nuclear t e s t s and 'our moral support 
must be brought to bear on those coi intr ies which s t i l l r e -
fuse to subscribe to the p a r t i a l nuclear t e s t ban t r e a t y . 
The Cairo Conference also c a l l e d upon ' a l l s t a t e s to ac-
cede to the Moscow trea ty p a r t i a l l y banning the t e s t i n g of 
nuclear vreapons and to abide i t s prov is ions in the i n t e r -
e s t s of peace and the welfare of humanity.' 
The Indian de legate esqpreased s p e c i f i c concern a 
about the newly emerging nuclear powers. I t i s worth men-
t ion ing here that at the time of convening of the Cairo 
Summit* mainland China was about to detonate the nuclear 
explos ion . He urged the conference to 'consider the r e -
36. Cairo Documents* n. 29, p . 105. 
37. Ib^d. 
38. NAM Documenta, n. 1, p . 25. 
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cent disturbing indicat ion vihich auggost that China i s 
about to e}q)loda a nuclear dev ice . I \ou ld propose that 
we might consider sending a spec ia l mission to persuade 
39 China to d e s i s t from developing nuclear %reapon8'. 
Ind ia ' s concern about China's going nuclear was not 
governed by the £act that i t had d i f f erences with the 
l a t t er* 'but the threat to humanity from one more country 
having nuclear weapons at i t s disposal i s a far more ser -
i o u s matter ' . Affirming i t s oonmitment to the peaceful 
uses of atomic entrgy. Prime Minister Shastri t o l d the 
Cairo Summit that even though t e c h n i c a l l y India had the 
ceqpacity of developing nuclear weapons but 'our s c i e n t i s t s 
and technic ians are under firm orders not to make a s i n g l e 
e}q>eriment* not to per fec t a s i n g l e device which i s rK>t 
41 
needed for the peaceful uses of atomic energy' . Though 
the Cairo Declaration made no s p e c i f i c r e f e r « i c e to China 
but requested ' the Great Powers to abstain from a l l p o l i -
c i e s conducive to the discr iminat ion of nuclear weapons 
and the ir by-products among those s t a t e s >Aiich do not at 
42 p r e s « i t pos se s s them'. 
39. Cairo Dacuments* n.29/ p . 105. 
40 . Ib id . 
4 1. Ib id . 
4 2 . NAM D;)cximente. n. 1, p . 25. 
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Another notabls fttature of the Cairo Declaration 
was the emphasis on the cooperat ive development of the 
peaceful use of atomic energy for the b e n e f i t of mankind. 
Thus i t i s evident from the above that most of the s a l i e n t 
p o i n t s mooted by India on the question of nuclear d i s -
armament were incorporated in the f ina l dec larat ion of the 
second NAM Summit Conference. 
Peaceful Settlement of Border PLsputesi 
India smphasised on the need for set t lement of 
border disputes through peaceful means. I t noted that f r e -
quent f i gh t ings broke out in d i f f eren t parts of the world 
because neighbovurs had boundary d i sputes . Indian de legate 
i n h i s address to the Cairo Conference %felcomed the ann-
ouncement of Soviet Union and other countr ies not to use 
force for so lv ing t e r r i t o r i a l d i sputes or question of 
f r o n t i e r s and h a i l e d i t 'as a p o s i t i v e lead which must be 
followed and the p r i n c i p l e shoxild be made un iversa l* . 
Ihe f ina l Cairo Declaration while observing that 
the use of force might take a number of forms/ m i l i t a r y 
and economic* urged that the ' p a r t i c i p a t i n g countr ies deem 
i t e s s e n t i a l to affirm the p r i n c i p l e s that a l l the s t a t e s 
sha l l re fra in in the i r in ternat iona l r e l a t i o n s from the 
4 3. Cairo Ppouments. n. 29, p . 106. 
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threat or use of force against the terr i tor ia l integrity 
or po l i t i ca l independence of any state . . . In order to 
make this principle successfxil* India mooted the sugges-
tion of evolving other methods of se t t l ing such disputes. 
While suggesting the direct negotiations between the 
part ies concerned as an ideal solution* India opined that 
the basis of negotiations should be the customary or tra-
ditional boundaries %ihich might be in existence and not 
any new boundaries created by force of any kind.*^ 
The final Cairo docxment esqpressed the conviction 
of the participating countries of 'the necessity of exert-
ing al l international efforts to find solutions to al l 
s i tuations >^ich threaten international peace or impair 
46 friendly relat ions among nat ions' . Thus on th is score 
also the Indian viewpoint gpt ful l endorsement from the 
other participating countries. 
Elimination of Colonialism, Imperialiam and Racial 
Pi scrimin ation t 
India also voiced i t s concern for the elimination 
of colonialism, aggression, subversion and racial d l s -
44. NAM Documents, n. l , p . 24. 
45 . Cairo Documents, n. 29, p . 106. 
46 . NAM Documents, n. i , p . 24. 
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c r i n l n a t i o n . The f ina l dbctiment of the Cairo Summit adop* 
ted t h i s declarat ion In t%o p a r t s . The f i r s t part dea l t 
with 'concerted Action for the Liberation of the countr ies 
s t i l l Dqpandent/ S l ln lnat lon of Colonialism, Neo-Colonle-
l l sm and Imperlallara'; and the second part d e a l t with 
'Racial Discrimination and the Po l i cy of Apartheid*. 
Ind ia ' s suqpport for the l i b e r a t i o n of the countr ies 
s t i l l dependent was insp ired by i t s own esqperioice of 
freedom s trugg le . Ihe Indian de legate t o l d the conference 
that 'both because of our p a s t h i s t o r y and our own freedwB 
s trugg le , we stand unequl'^rocally for the emancipation of 
47 
c o l o n i e s and dependent c o u n t r i e s . 
Ihe Cairo Declaration observed that Imperlal ian, 
c o l o n l a l l a a and neo«<x>lonlallsm c o n s t i t u t e d a bas ic source 
of in ternat ional tension and c o n f l i c t becaupe they endan-
gered world peace and s e c u r i t y . India e3q>ressed conctfn 
over some of the African s t a t e s l i k e Angola, Mozambique, 
Guinea and South Rhodesia ( i t adopted the name Zimbabwe 
af ter at ta in ing independence) %^ich were s t i l l r e e l i n g un-
do: co lon ia l yoke. I t a l so decried the continued ru l e of 
South Africa over Namibia as i l l e g a l , vftiile greet ing the 
Angolan freedom-fighters India of fered then ' f u l l support 
for the success of the ir heroic s truggle for independence*. 
47 . Cairo Documents, n.29, p . 106, 
4 8 . Ib id . 
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Th« Cairo Declaration adopted a d e t a i l e d r e s o l u -
t i o n In t h i s regard making a s p e c i f i c reference to each de-
pendent colony of Africa. Ihe Conference while noting 
that the process of l i b e r a t i o n was i r r e s i s t i b l e and irre» 
vers ible* fvtrther warned t h a t the ' co lonised people may 
l e g i t i m a t e l y r e s o r t to arms to secure the f u l l exerc i s e of 
t h e i r r i g h t to se l f -determinat ion and Independence i f the 
c o l o n i a l powers p e r s i s t in opposing the ir natural asp ira-
49 t i o n s . The Cairo Summit made a s p e c i f i c re ference to 
the res torat ion of a l l r i g h t s of the Arab people of P a l e s -
So t i n e in the ir s truggle for l ibera t ion* 
The conference also reaffirmed the r i g h t of peo-
p l e s to se l f -determinat ion and make the ir own des t iny , 
India t i^ile pledging i t s support to the r i g h t of s e l f -
determination for dependmt t e r r i t o r i e s under co lon ia l 
rule* to ld the p a r t i c i p a t i n g countr i e s ; that s e l f - d e t e r -
mination i s the r i g h t of any country that i s dominated by 
another. But there can be no se l f -determinat ion for d i f -
ferent areas and reg ions within a sovereign and Indepen-
dent country, for t h i s would lead to fragm«itatlon and 
disruption and no country's i n t e g r i t y would be sa fe . 
49 . NAM Documents, n, 1, p . 20. 
50 . I b i d . . p . 47. 
5 1 . I^idi., p . 22. 
52 . Cairo Docum«its« n. 29, p, 107. 
. . . 1 2 1 
(121) 
However* the f ina l Cairo Declaration did not contain t h i s 
re ference . 
India denotjunced the hatefu l p o l i c i e s of ^ a r t h e i d 
and r a c i a l discrimination of the r a c i s t regime of South 
Africa as an affront to mankind* Ihe Prime Minister fur-
ther to ld that India had severed trade r e l a t i o n s with 
South Africa as early as in 1946« and she has adhered to 
firmly to t h i s p o l i c y through a l l these y e a r s . I t c a l l -
ed for s t r i c t economic sanct ions against South Africa fay 
the world conmiinity. The Cairo Declaration also unequiiro-
c a l l y voiced i t s concern over the p o l i c i e s of apartheid 
and r a c i a l discrimination of South African government 
which in i t s opinion cons t i tu t ed a v i o l a t i o n of the Univer-
54 
sa l Declaration o f Hvonan Rights . I t c a l l e d upon a l l the 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g countr ies and big powers to implement United 
Nations re so lu t ion concerning sanct ions against South 
Africa . I t made spec ia l ^ p e a l to a l l countr ies to rend«r 
' t h e i r support to the spec ia l bureau s e t up by the Organi-
zat ion of Mrican Unity (OAU) for the exp l i ca t ion of sanc-
55 t i o n s against South Africa*. 
53 . Ib id . 
54 . NAM Dpcumai^s. n . l , p . 22, 
55. Ib id . 
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Progronnmc for Soonomle I>ttV«lopffi<ntt 
The Cairo Summit was hald j u s t aftor the UNCTAO.I 
in which the non*align«d developing countr i e s , also known 
as "Grovq? of 77" had played a p ivo ta l r o l e . The p a r t i c i -
pat ing countr ies pledged t h e i r support to the Jo int Dec-
lara t ion of the "Group of 77", The Cairo r e s o l u t i o n on 
Economic Development end Cooperation in a b i t to tack le 
the problems of trade and economic development, vtrged a l l 
s t a t e s to implem«nt an urgent b a s i s the recommendation 
contained in the f ina l act of the UMCTAD r e l a t i n g to the 
establishment of new in ternat iona l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
India emphasised that i t s concept of progranme for 
economic development through in ternat iona l cooperation did 
not mean seeking mere economic a s s i s t a n c e from the deve-
loped world but * i t i s b a s i c a l l y a programme of greater 
57 
e f f o r t on the part of each on our own f e e t * . India did 
not deny the n e c e s s i t y of o u t s i d e economic a s s i s t a n c e for 
economic development of the developing countr i e s , but such 
aid, in i t s view should come without any s t r i n g s . India 
emphasised on the f a c t that the developing countr ie s 
should help themselves. Cit ing I n d i a ' s own example,Prime 
56. I b i d . , p . 27. 
57. Cairo Documents, n. 29, p . 107. 
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Minister Shastrl to ld the Cairo Summitt 'we in India are 
trying our b e s t to muster technica l and material resoxrr* 
c e s to p a r t i c i p a t e in a progranune of economic cooperation 
with other developing countr ies to whom we can o f f er 
CD 
a s s i s t a n c e ' • 
India v ^ i l e welcoming the UNCTAD-I's recommenda-
t i o n s as important s teps in the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , further 
observed that i t was not s a t i s f i e d with vhat had been 
done or promised ao far . Indian de legate to ld the Confe-
rences 'Unless the developing countr ies can expand and 
d i v e r s i f y the ir e3q>ort trade, un le s s the transfer of 
c a p i t a l from the developed to the developing countr ie s on 
s a t i s f a c t o r y terms can be acce lerated, economic progress 
w i l l not at ta in a pace compatible with peace and f r e e -
dom*. 
I t a^jpears from the above ana lys i s that there was 
almost a convergence of opinion between India and that of 
the f ina l Cairo Declaration of the second NAM Sutnmit on 
the question of economic development and cooperation bet* 
ween the non-aligned countr i e s . 
58 . Ib id . 
59. Ib id . 
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S trength i i lng the United National 
India appreciated the r o l e of the United Nations 
(UN) which 'as a whole has given stuport to the p o l i c i e s 
and programnes of the peace* freednn and progress . 
India urged the non-aligned nat ions to support the UN not 
i n words but in ac t ion . I t envisaged a greater responsi* 
b i l i t y on the non-aligned countr ie s in strengthening tttm 
peace )ce«ping operat ions of the UN. Cit ing I n d i a ' s case 
o f placing i t s armed forces at the d i s p o s e of the UN, 
prime Minister Shastri t o l d the p a r t i c i p a t i n g coxintriest 
' I t i s on the non-aligned nat ions that the brunt of sup-
p ly ing forces for the peace-)cecping operat ions f a l l s ' . 
The Cairo Declaration a lso l a i d s t r e s s on 
strengthening the %dorld organizat ion . While recognis ing 
the paramount importance of the UN and the n e c e s s i t y of 
enabling i t to discharge the funct ions o i t rus ted to it« 
the Conference f e l t that the 'Non-Aligned countr ies 
should consul t one another at the Foreign Ministers or 
Head of the Delegation l e v e l at each sess ion of the iMi-
ted NaUons' .^^ 
India f e l t that everything was not r i g h t with 
the UN because so many c o n f l i c t s and tense s i t u a t i o n s 
60 . I b i d . , p . 108. 
61 . Ibid^, p . 109. 
6 2. NAM Doctiments* n. 1, p . 26. 
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which threatened the world peace« s t i l l e x i s t e d . The 
P a l e s t i n e problem/ f l u i d s i t u a t i o n in the Cyprus and 
Indo-China were some of them which c a l l e d for greater UN 
involvemoit . India« desp i te i t s d i f f erences with China* 
pleaded for l a t t e r * s admission in to the UN. The Indian 
de legate saidt 'The UN has been moving s t e a d i l y in the 
d i r e c t i o n of Universa l i ty of membership. The major ex* 
cept ion i s China which i s s t i l l not a member. Although ? 
we have oxir d i f f erences with China* we have always suppor. 
ted and s t i l l svqpport her admission to the United 
Nations'.^"* 
Ttie Cairo Declaration a lso observed in the s imilar 
vein; 
Reca l l ing the recotmnendations of the Belgrade 
Conference* the Conference asks the General 
Assembly of the United Nations to r e s t o r e the 
r i g h t s of the p e o p l e ' s Republic of China and 
to recognise the representa t ive of i t s C3ovem-
ment as the only l e g i t i m a t e representa t ive of 
China in the United Nations.64 
In t h i s case also# Ind ia ' s stand was v indicated . 
There emerged a consensus among the p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
coxantries on almost a l l I s sues de l iberated at the second 
NAM Summit Conference held at Cairo, ifiowever, there 
emerged some d i f ference of opinion with regard to the prin< 
6 3 . Cairo EQcuments* n. 29, p. 108. 
64 . NAM Documents, n. 1, p . 26. 
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c i p l e of co-exl8t«nc«* I h i s d i f ference emerged t^ hen Indo-
n e s i a wanted to i n s e r t in to the d e f i n i t i o n of peaceful c o -
e x i s t e n c e a declarat ion on "Confrontation" between esnorg-
ing nat ions and the o ld forces of in^eria l i sni . A cc»npro-
mise was arrived at when some countr ies supporting Indo-
nesian proposal agreed to withdraw the i r suggest ion on the 
condit ion that nuclear bases abroad and economic blockade 
would be condemned. Ihe f i n a l dec larat ion on peaceful 
c o - e x i s t e n c e was l arge ly based on the Indian draf t . India 
had submitted a ten-point Charter, vihich included the fxind-
amental p r i n c i p l e s of peaceful c o - e x i s t e n c e between nat ions 
with d i f f eren t socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l system. 
The comparative content -ana lys i s of the speech by 
India at the Cairo Suiwnit and the f ina l Cairo Declaration 
r e v e a l s a c l o s e resemblance and i d e n t i t y of views between 
the two* Ihere was complete i d e n t i t y of views between 
India and the other non-al igned countr ies on major global 
i s s u e s and the suggested means to tack le these problems* 
Thus India played a cons truc t ive r o l e at the second NAM 
Sximmlt Conference at Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964, 
The success of the Cairo Svumit was another mile* 
stone in the annals of the non-<U.lgned movement. 
65 , '^^ l.ffrlto B a n ^ l ^ . n. 17, p . 80. 
66 . Tiroes of India (New Delhi ) , 6 October, 1964. 
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CONCLUSION 
Qmergence of Non«>alignttd Move»«it (NAM) has be«n 
the most remarkable event o£ the post-second World war 
period %i^ lch has changed the pattern of global b^avlot ir . 
No ideology or creed has ever formed the b a s i s of foreign 
p o l i c y pursued by so many countr ies as the NAM. With the 
passage of time* the NAM has gathered enough mom«itum be> 
cause of i t s i n - b u i l t dynamism, %<illingnes8 of i t s members 
to profess and p r a c t i s e i t s pr inc ip les* and i t s u t i l i t y as 
s h i e l d against ou t s ide overt or covert t h r e a t s . I t i s 
current ly the roost widely accepted form of foreign p o l i c y 
pract i sed by maximum number of coxintries. 
Pursuit of ind^endent foreign p o l i c y designed to 
envisage national i n t e g r i t y and t e r r i t o r i a l sovereignty has 
been the u l t imate o b j e c t i v e of every country s ince the 
advent of modern s t a t e . I h i s o b j e c t i v e remained to a few 
coi intries of Europe and elsewhere for c e n t u r i e s , ihe bulk 
of other countr ies being subjected to co lon ia l domination 
for centur ies could not r e a l i s e t h i s o b j e c t i v e . The con-
c lus ion of Second Wbrld War inaugurated the process of de-
c o l o n i z a t i o n . The co lon ia l powers l i k e United Kingdom 
(U.K.), Germany, I t a l y , France, Portugal, e t c . , were forced 
to re l lngu i sh the ir c o l o n i e s by the contemporary develop-
ments. The t i d a l wave of Independence swept across Asia in 
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l a t e 1940s and %«lthln a decade i t enveloped the cont l* 
nent of Africa too . The r e s u l t a n t impact was the 
emergence of newly Independent countr ies in Asia and 
Africa. 
The concomitant remarkable development of the 
post>Second World War period was the emergence of cold 
war between the United Sta tes and Soviet Union, both 
Super Powers. The post-war period had witnessed the 
dec l ine of ers twhi le co lon ia l powers in Aaia and Africa 
thus creat ing a s o - c a l l e d "^wer vaccum", Washington 
and Moscow t r i e d to bring the newly independent coxintries 
of Asia and Africa under the ir r e s p e c t i v e spheres of i n -
f luence . This competition between the Super Powers for 
winning over new spheres of in f luence assximed the form of 
Super Power r i v a l r y . Ihe United States vinder Truman 
Doctrine declared i t s p o l i c y of global containment of 
communism. The North At lant ic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
was es tabl i shed in 1949 with US as i t s l eader . 
Besides, Washington also patronised other regional 
and b i l a t e r a l m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s l i k e South-£ast Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO), Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO), Pac i f i c Treaty Organization (ANZUS) e t c . Over 
40 countr ies were involved in US-sponsored mi l i t ary a l l i -
ances. The Soviet Union and i t s East iiuropean a l l i e s 
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balng alarmed at the nniahroom growth of US~8ponsored 
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s , also founded Warsaw Treaty Organisa-
t ion (WTO) in 1955, The o s t e n s i b l e o b j e c t i v e underlying 
the formation of these m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s was the fear 
of one Super Power from the o ther . 
Such a rapid p r o l i f e r a t i o n of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s 
under the auspices of the Super Powers was deemed with 
suspicion by the newly indepwident countr ies of Asia and 
Africa as portents of threat to the ir s e c u r i t y . These 
countr ies having been subject to co lon ia l ru le for cen-
t u r i e s were determined to preserve the ir hard-%4on ind»> 
pendence by not ge t t ing entangled in to the m i l i t a r y pac t s . 
The newly independent ooxintries wanted to pursue an i n -
dependttit foreign p o l i c y and to harness the ir resources 
for economic development and nat ional reconstruct ion . 
Ihe national leadership of India during the period 
of freedom struggle had esp>oused for the l i b e r a t i o n of 
people under co lon ia l ru l e throughout the world. Pandit 
Jawaharlal Nehru# who l a t e r bec«ne free I n d i a ' s f i r s t 
Prime Minister and main a r c h i t e c t of Ind ia ' s foreign 
po l i cy / had declared in September 1946, at a time v4ien 
India had not yet attained independence, that the free 
India would pursue an independent foreign p o l i c y of keep-
ing India a way from the mi l i tary a l l i a n c e s being forget 
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by great powers. A few months prior to a t ta in ing Inde-
pendence, India played a key r o l e in bringing about two 
dozen independ&it countr ies of Asia together in March 
1947 by host ing f i r s t Asian Relat ions Conference at New 
Delhi , This s o l i d a r i t y of newly independ«it countr ies 
was being forged at a t i n e when the cold war between 
the Super Powers was reaching at i t s plateau* 
The idea of pursuing an independent foreign p o l i c y 
and of keeping away from the mi l i t ary a l l i a n c e s found 
favour with majority of the newly independ«it countr ies 
of Asia and Africa, These countr ie s perceived in co ld 
war mi l i tary a l l i a n c e s a new threat to the ir independence. 
Unti l the l a t e 19508 the term "non-alignment" had not 
gained currency. The p o l i c y of keeping away from the 
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s was being connoted as "neutral i ty" or 
"neutralism". 
In the wake of term "non-alignment" gaining ciurr-
ency in l a t e 1950s« the pxirsuit of an independent foreign 
p o l i c y and the p o l i c y of keeping away from m i l i t a r y a l l i -
ances of great powers was termed as the pol icy of non-
al ignmoit . A country p r a c t i s i n g t h i s p o l i c y came to be 
c a l l e d as a non-aligned country, the success of f i r s t 
Asian Relat ions conference of March 1947 had enco\iraged 
India and other countr ies of Asia to pursue the ir indepen-
dent national p o l i c i e s without g e t t i n g entangled into 
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m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s forget by Great Powers. In 1949, ano-
ther conference of Asian countr ie s was convened to d i scuss 
t h e question of Indonesia. The recommendation of t h i s 
conference had due impact on the contemporary developments 
leading to the independence of Indonesia from Dutch c o l o -
n ia l i sm. The newly independent coxmtries of Asia continued 
the ir e f f o r t s in forging c l o s e r cooperation onong them-> 
s e l v e s . India, Indonesia* Burma, Sri Lanka and other count-
r i e s made s incere e f f o r t s in furthering t h i s cooperat ion. 
The Bandung Conference held in Indonesia in 1955 marked ano-
ther milestone in t h i s d i r e c t i o n . I t was attended by 25 
countr ies including India and gave a c a l l for world peace 
and secuLtity of smaller n a t i o n s . 
The l a t e r half of 1950s witnessed the t i d a l wave of 
indflpendcnce sweeping across the African cont inent and by 
1960 more than two dozen African coi intr ies had shaken o f f 
the co lon ia l yoke and become Independait. Majority of 
these newly Independent countr ies of Asia and Africa had 
opted for the p o l i c y of non-alignment. A need was f e l t for 
organis ing a summit conference of the coxintries pursuing 
the p o l i c y of non-alignment. A group of countr ies headed 
by Indonesia was making e f f o r t s to convene a second Bandung 
type conference - a move ii^ich was opposed by other non-
aligned c o u n t r i e s . Imbued with the des i re of convening a 
sximmlt conference, India, Egypt and Yugoslavia s tarted 
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mobi l i s ing support among th« Afro-Asian c o u n t r i e s . Pro-
longed negot ia t ions and sustained e f f o r t s by N^ru« Nasser 
and Tito« soon y ie lded f r u i t f u l r e s u l t s when I t was d e c i -
ded to hold a preparatory meeting of the non-aligned 
coxintries at Cairo in June 1961. The Cairo Preparatory 
Meeting evolved through consensus a c r i t e r i o n on member-
ship , the p r a c t i c e of which could make a country e l i g i b l e 
t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the Non-aligned Sumnlt Conference. I t 
was incumbent \qpon a country to be e l i g i b l e to p a r t i c i -
pate in a Non-aligned Summit Conference to be an a c t i v e 
pract ioner of the po l i cy of non-allgranent» non-part ic ipa-
t ion in m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s forged by the St^er Powers, 
oppos i t ion to co lonia l i sm and neo-colonial iam and support 
for national l i b e r a t i o n movements. 
Thus having l a i d down the c r i t e r i a for membership 
o f the NAM at Cairo Preparatory Meeting, a Summit Confer-
ence of the Non-Aligned Coxintries (NACs) was held at Bel-
grade (Yugoslavia) in September 1961. I t was attended by 
25 countr ies of Asia and Africa with a f<»w observers from 
Latin /fterica. 
India one of the leading non-aligned countr ies 
played a valuable r o l e at the Belgrade Confer«ice. Although 
in the beginning, India was not very en thus ias t i c about the 
idea of the Conference. Such Indian a t t i t u d e was perhaps 
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governed by the f a c t that# apart from the general ou t -
look of non-alignment/ conmon to the non-al igned count-
rlea* the ir motives* percept ions and p o l i c i e s were 
heterogeneous to a great ex tent . 
As Tito* Nasser and Soekarno went ahead with 
the Idea of convening the Conference* India also endors-
ed I t and a c t i v e l y cooperated with these c o u n t r i e s . 
Ind ia ' s stand that the NAM was not a "third 
force" or "third power bloc" but an on-going movement 
gained f u l l support of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g coxintrles. 
Ind ia ' s Prime Minister at the Conference xirged 
the par t i c ipa t ing non-al igned countr ies to accord top 
p r i o r i t y to world peace and attached a spec ia l urgency to 
I t . Ind ia ' s suggestion* though opposed by some countr ies 
for the ir a n t l - c o l o n l a l stance* was f i n a l l y taken up by 
the Conference. This r e s u l t e d In Issuing a spec ia l s t a t e -
ment on 'Danger of War and Appeal for Peace' to Super 
Powers. I t was a v indicat ion of I n d i a ' s stand. India 
gave a lead to the NAM at Belgrade Conference without t r y -
ing to dominate I t . 
While esqpresslng concern over the aparthled 
p o l i c y of the white r a c i s t regime of South Africa, India 
emphasised that the po l i cy of South Africa was a symbol 
of rac ia l arrogance* and r a c i a l d i scr iminat ion , which was 
an i n t o l e r a b l e p o s i t i o n to be accepted by any nat ion . 
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The importance of I n d i a ' s emphasis for the 
e l iminat ion of rac ia l i sm was envisaged in the f ina l dec-
lara t ion adopted by the MAM Summit at Belgrade. The 
Belgrade declarat ion r e s o l u t e l y condemn the p o l i c y of 
aparthied pract i sed by the Union of South Africa and de-
manded the immediate abandonment of t h i s p o l i c y , as i t 
was a grave v i o l a t i o n of the Chart«r of the United 
Nations and Universal Declaration of Human Rights . 
Vhile re fer ing to socio-economic problems faced 
by the newly independent countr i e s , India emphasised 
that though foreign economic a s s i s tance was necessary, 
but i t was also e s s e n t i a l for the developing countr ies 
to mobi l ize the ir own resources* because i f by some 
miracle or somebody's help , the countr ies stood up,they 
would to ld to f a l l down again. The s imi lar emphasis 
was d i s cern ib l e from the f ina l dec larat ion adopted by 
the NAM Sunvnlt held at Belgrade. I t iirged the need for 
making e f f o r t s to remove economic imbalance inher i t ed 
from co lonia l i sm and imperialiani. 
Exactly a year after the Belgrade Summit Confer-
ence, the r e l a t i o n s between India and China had d e t e r i o -
rated considerably leading to the hot exchange of h o s t i -
l i t i e s between the two countr ies in October 1962. The 
Chinese aggression on India proved to be g r e a t e s t t e s t 
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o f l a t t « r ' 8 non-aligned p o l i c y . India faced the Chinese 
attack vdth a l l might and regarded I t unwise to under-
take «octra-ordlnary measure >iihlch might discard the 
character of non-aligned diplomacy. Under the shadow of 
the Chinese aggression India s o l i c i t e d help from the 
western countries^ and the Soviet Union. 
In view of the Western arras and other kinds of 
m i l i t a r y help to India* I t was speculated by some count-
r i e s that I n d i a ' s non-alignment might g e t d i l u t e d . But 
In the course of time I t became c l ear that only some 
pro-Chinese non-aligned countr ies l i k e Indonesia, Guinea, 
Mall, Ghana,etc. , were being prejudiced against India and 
had given r i s e to such i ^ e c u l a t l o n s . Thus India In the 
event of Chinese aggression was able to prociure, requi -
s i t e arms and economic old both from the East and West 
because of I t s p o l i c y of non-alignment. The m i l i t a r y aid 
acquired by India from out s ide was designed to make I t -
s e l f C€^able of safeguarding country's t e r r i t o r i a l In teg-
r i t y . I t devised long term defence planning, keeping In 
tune with Ind ia ' s p o l i c y of non-alignment. 
After Nehru's death In May 1964, Lai Bahadur 
Shastrl became the Prime Minister of India, and he too 
fol lowed N ^ r u ' s p o l i c y . Lai Bahadur Shastrl represented 
India at the Cairo NAM Summit as Jawaharlal N^rru, could 
not l i v e long to see the movament r i p o i i n g in to fxruition, 
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Ihe Second NAM Summit ConfttCMictt at Cairo address-
ed i t s e l f to the urgent task of maintaining peace through-
out the world and envisage in ternat iona l cooperation ins« 
tead of confrontat ion. Lai Bahadur Shastri as a leader 
of the Indian delegat ion in the second Non->Aligned Sunmit 
sa id that the government and people of India stood dedi -
cated to freedom and peace* and to the p r i n c i p l e of non-
alignment and peaceful c o - e x i s t e n c e and for the eradica-
t ion of rac ia l i sm and co lon ia l i sm. The Indian de legate 
made no d i r e c t reference to the establishment of foreign 
m i l i t a r y bases* e s p e c i a l l y by the United States and the 
need for dismantling them* but i t does not mean that 
India supported the establishment of US m i l i t a r y bases 
in other countries* because the f ina l dec larat ion adopt-
ed by the second NAM Swmit he ld at Cairo made an e labo-
rated reference to the i s s u e . The f ina l dec larat ion 
noted viith concern the fac t that foreign m i l i t a r y bases 
i n prac t i ce were a means of bringing pressure on nat ions 
and retarding the i r emancipation and developm«it. Ihus 
India as a member of NAM declared i t s f u l l support to 
the evacuation of foreign bases and c a l l e d upon a l l coun-
t r i e s maintaining troops and bases in other countr ies to 
remove them. I t also accused the United States for main-
ta in ing i t s m i l i t a r y base at Guantanamo In Cuba in d e f i -
ance of the vd l l of the Cxiban People. The Conference 
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c a l l e d upon the US Government to ''Negotiate the evacua-
t ion of t h i s base v l th the Cuban Government", 
India appreciated the r o l e of the United Nations 
(UN) v^ich as a v^ole has given support to the p o l i c i e s 
and programmes of peace* freedom and progress and urged 
the non->aligned nat ions to 8iq>port the UN not inwards 
but in ac t ion . I t envisaged a greatar r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
on the non-aligned cotmtries in strengthening the peace 
keeping operat ions of the U.N. 
Thus« India played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in the 
f i r s t and second N ^ Summit Conferences. I t made con-
c r e t e and substant ia l contr ibut ion in s tro igthening the 
non-aligned movement. I n d i a ' s ac t ive p a r t i c i p a t i o n in 
the f i r s t two NAf-i Summit proved instrumental in providing 
a new impetus to the N;tf4 which was manifested in the ra -
pid p r o l i f e r a t i o n of i t s strength in the years to come. 
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